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Abstract 
Official state ideology (Kemalism) whose core principles are Turkish nationalism and 
secularism excluded Kurds and Islamists from the newly formed social and political 
structure of modern Turkey. By insisting on a Kemalist modernization project in which 
assimilation of Kurdish ethnic identity within Turkish nationalism, and a top down 
imposition of secular policies on public and state affairs, Turkey has had to deal with 
two profound issues—the Kurdish question, and political Islam. As these social and 
political rivals of official state ideology present an alternative way of modernization 
projects, the Kemalist state apparatus has until recently considered their existence 
and development within Turkish society as a menace to their core existence.  
That is why the nearly century-long Kurdish question and Islamism (reactionism-
gericilik) have occupied the agenda. The striking point of this reality of Turkey is that 
while Kurdish nationalist and Islamist social and political groups, whether they are 
legal or illegal, have sought to supersede the official state ideology with their 
understandings, they have never united or operated joint activities against their, 
roughly speaking, enemy. The research, because of this focuses on the reasons why 
these two social and political groups in Turkey did not work together to eliminate their 
common rival.  
Regarding pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic groups, ideological distinctiveness and rigidity 
led them to consider each other as a part of or as an extension of official state 
ideology which tries to eliminate its rivals. Despite the fact that they both ideologically 
and practically confirmed the existence of repression towards Kurds and religious 
people, the leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish political stream considered religion as a 
component of denial and assimilationist policy of official state ideology, so that they 
did not differentiate between Islamist groups and the established state structure, 
whereas the pro-Islamic political stream refused to co-operate with any member of 
the leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish stream because of its secular characteristic.  
The reaction of these groups towards assimilation of Kurdish ethnic origin, and 
repression over religion, initially embodied itself in several uprisings and revolts in the 
Kurdish populated eastern areas of Turkey, and religiously sensitive cities, 
respectively.  Thanks to the multi-party system, these groups have found a way in 
which they can express themselves through political parties, labour unions, 
associations and foundations so that they have become social movements forcing the 
Kemalism dominated state to meet their demands. As long as these demands are not 
met, the interaction between these two social movements and the official state 
IV	  	  
ideology has been hostile. Within this process, the hostile approach to their common 
enemy reflected in each other’s activities and understandings as they see each other 
as a part of official state ideology. In the next phase in which their transformation from 
social movements to a legal political stream competed, the inherited ideological 
rigidity between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams preserved itself. 
Overall, the research will indicate that since the mid-20th century, ideological barriers 
between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic streams have become the fundamental 
determinant of how they perceive each other.   
Key Words: Pro-Kurdish political stream, Pro-Islamic political stream, Kurdish 
question, Islamism 
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Abbreviations 
Most of the abbreviations are as below, which are chosen in accordance with 
the most common use of them within the literature.  
AKP Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) 
ARMHC Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti (The Committee of 
Defence of Anatolia and Rumelia) 
BDP Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) 
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis 
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People Party, RPP) 
CUP Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki Partisi) 
DEHAP Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People Party) 
DEP Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party) 
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs-DRA) 
 DP Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party) 
DTP Demoratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) 
FP Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) 
HADEP Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party) 
HEP Halkın Emek Partisi- (People’s Labour Party) 
Hürriyet and İtilaf Fırkası (Freedom and Accord Party, FAP)  
JP Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) 
KDPT Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi- Türkiye (Kurdistan Democrat Party in 
Turkey) 
KSHS Kurdish Student-Hope Society (Kürt Talebe-Hevi Cemiyeti) 
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) 
MNP Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) 
MSP Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) 
ÖZDEP Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi (Freedom and Democracy Party) 
PKK Kurdistan İşçi Partisi (Kurdistan Labour Party- Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan 
in Kurdish) 
RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) 
SMT Social Movement Theory 
SP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) 
SRK the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti) 
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SRPK Society for Rise and Progress of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teali ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti) 
TWP Turkey Worker Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) 
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INTRODUCTION  
The Republic of Turkey was established from the ashes of the Ottoman 
Empire and has been seen as the main successor state of the former empire. 
From the early Republic to the present, Turkey has had two significant 
fundamental issues to struggle with—Islam as a religion, and the Kurds as an 
ethnically distinct population living within. Islam was perceived to be a major 
obstacle since the latter stage of the Empire because it was perceived as 
being a source of backwardness vis-a-vis European powers. This perception 
has continued through to the foundation of modern Turkey. Therefore, ruling 
elites of modern Turkey spent a significant amount of effort trying to prevent 
re-emergence of the religion into the official political arena by passing special 
laws eliminating Islamic symbols and reminders. The new regime was, in 
practice, mostly successful in the annihilation of the social and political power 
of religion especially in the time span from consolidation of the single party 
regime until the mid-20th century. Yet, it is arguably impossible to preclude 
religious sentiments of people forever, and infant religious movements 
emerged by the 1950s. This trend has gradually grown and an Islamic-rooted 
party, whether it is named as being political Islamist or conservative, has now 
been in charge of Turkey for the last decade.  
The presence of the Kurdish, of ethnic origin, constituted the other significant 
issue that compelled the founder of modern Turkey to put some precautions in 
operation to obstruct the emergence of a Kurdish nationalist movement, and 
also to implement a radical Turkish nationalism. Several Kurdish revolts 
occurred as a backlash towards secularization and nationalization processes 
in the single party era, but none of them succeeded. Atatürk and his close 
associates, the founders of modern Turkey, used religion to bind Kurdish 
people to the Turkish nation as their religious brothers in the course of the War 
of Independence, but excluded them while establishing the structure of the 
state just after. Interestingly, in spite of several Kurdish uprisings in the 
Republican era, there was no nationalist revolt embraced by all Kurdish, but 
eventually and inevitably, radical nationalist Kurdish organizations including 
political parties were founded in late 1970s. This remains significant in 
domestic, regional and international terms.  
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These two issues have been fundamental issues since the establishment of 
modern Turkey. The striking fact is that in Turkish political history, these two 
aspects meant to be erased in social, political, cultural and even economic 
arenas by Republican ruling elites, but in fact, recently they have become two 
major political groups with tremendous influence on Turkish politics. This 
condition attracted my attention while I was reading about political Islam in 
Turkey and I started to wonder as to how these factions perceive each other, 
and how this perception reflects itself onto, or affects, Turkish politics. This 
question and the issues around it are the main questions of this research. 
On the one hand, Islamic sentiments in Turkey never fully disappeared—they 
had remained overtly apolitical, but still maintained their presence. For 
instance, the religious movement of Said-i Nursi and several tariqahs (religious 
orders) such as Naqhsibedi, Ticani and Qadiri have stayed silent until the 
advent of a multi-party system in the 1950s, and within the ongoing years they 
sometimes co-operated with the mainstream conservative parties. In addition, 
the Milli Selamet Partisi 1  (MSP-National Salvation Party), which can be 
considered as an early iteration of the political Islamic movement in Turkey 
was founded by Necmettin Erbakan due to the fact that its final target was 
making Islamic rules the common law of Turkey, and turning back to the 
religious sources to re-establish an Islamic order.  
On the other hand, after the brutal suppression of Kurdish ethnic identity in the 
single party era, Kurdish nationalism gained a greater space in which they 
could breathe more oxygen than before in the multi-party era, but their ethnic 
identity was still denied by the official state ideology. As a result, Kurdish 
nationalism could not form its own political party; instead, it placed itself into 
the centre-right, or conservative, and leftist political parties. By the 1980s an 
illegal armed organization, the PKK2 (Kürdistan Işçi Partisi- Kurdistan Worker 
Party), surfaced via a struggle against the state and afterwards, by the 1990s, 
pro-Kurdish legal political parties have had a chance to organize without 
officially mentioning their Kurdishness.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Just before the Milli Selamet Partisi, established in 1972, Necmettin Erbakan formed another political 
party, named the Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP- National Order Party) in 1970, but it was closed because of 
1970 coup d’état in Turkey. 
2 The abbreviation of the PKK originally comes from its Kurdish name, which is ‘Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan.’  
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These groups suffered from the official state ideology, namely Kemalism, or 
Atatürkçülük. Roughly speaking, by relying on the concept that ‘my enemy’s 
enemy is my friend’, it would suggest that these two political groups should 
have come together against the official state ideology denying Islamic legacy 
as well as Kurdish ethnic origin. They might have come together in 
conservative or leftist political parties and there could have been a tangible 
improvement in the political history of Turkey. Based on the fact that none of 
these groups ever worked together, it is obvious that they do not perceive 
each other as friends. This lets me move on to my main research question, 
which is how pro-Kurdish3 and pro-Islamic political4 streams perceive each 
other specifically over the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
Contributions of the Research 
Nowadays, the political atmosphere in Turkey is concerned with solving or at 
least dealing with the Kurdish question. The main actors in that process are 
the Peace and Democracy Party representing the pro-Kurdish side, and the 
Justice and Development Party, representing the pro-Islamic side. This 
research will definitely contribute to the politics in Turkey by illustrating the 
history of the relations between Kurdish and Islamic streams, and the analysis 
obtained from the research will provide a kind of road map of the current and 
future political condition of Turkey.  
In general, the research might contribute to the relations between a minority 
group and an Islamic movement in any country. The research is believed to 
contribute an ideological examination of Middle Eastern, specifically, of 
Turkish, societies. By emphasizing their similarities, it is going to be seen that 
by targeting a global good as their eventual goal for humanity, it can also be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 What I mean by saying the pro-Kurdish political stream is legal pro-Kurdish political parties starting with 
the establishment of HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi- People’s Labour Party) and continues with ÖZDEP 
(Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi- Freedom and Democracy Party), DEP (Demokrasi Partisi –Democracy 
Party), HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi- People’s Democracy Party), DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi- 
Democratic People Party), DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi- Democratic Society Party) and BDP (Barış 
ve Demokrasi Partisi-Peace and Democracy Party). Except last one, the rest of them were banned by 
the Constitutional Court in Turkey. Since they are successor political parties with more or less the same 
mentality of being pro-Kurdish, I have named this continuation as ‘pro-Kurdish political stream.  With the 
same token, Ruşen Çakır, a prominent columnist and an expert on Kurdish politics in Turkey defines this 
ongoing political tradition from HEP in 1990s to current BDP as ‘Legal Kurdish Political Movement’ 
(Yasal Kürt Siyasi Hareketi) (2011, p.4).  
4 While I am articulating with the phrase of ‘pro-Islamic political stream’, I mean the same as in the case 
of pro-Kurdish political stream, which began with the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi- National Order Party), 
continued as the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party), the RP (Refah Partisi-Welfare 
Party), the FP (Fazilet Partisi-Virtue Party) and then divided into two as the SP (Saadet Partisi-Felicity 
Party) and the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and Development Party).   
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considered as a major point towards which they can both work, at least from a 
practical point of view. Furthermore, their common issues, e.g. asking for 
benefits on behalf of oppressed groups, could remove or at least refine 
ideological barriers preventing people who are from different, even opposing 
ideas, uniting to benefit, at least, social science, and specifically, the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. 
Furthermore, the main reason that I have delved into such a research question 
is my hope that it would also make a contribution to the field of the studies 
related to the Kurdish question and Islamism in Turkey. I am ethnically a Kurd 
and also have a religious background. These two significant identities directed 
me to search for any sort of co-operation between Kurdish ethnic politics and 
religious politics in terms of replacing the official state ideology. I realized that 
there is almost nothing in which they unite in order to have a more robust 
stand against repressive Kemalist implications. That is why I personally want 
to look towards researching the reasons why they never worked together. I 
have concluded that they perceive each other as rivals and not as another 
repressed group.  
The possible readers of the research might be academicians and students at 
every level, as well as decision makers in Turkey in order to find out how 
perception affects their practices in terms of delivering local and national 
policies.  
Limitations 
I will limit my research to the pro-Islamic political parties (the National 
Salvation Party, the National Order Party, the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, 
and finally the Justice and Development Party) and the pro-Kurdish legal 
political parties (People’s Labour Party, Democracy Party, People’s 
Democracy Party, Democratic People Party, Democratic Society Party, and 
finally Peace and Democracy Party). As these parties are the continuation of, 
or successor to those of the same ideological aims, I will refer to them as pro-
Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams, respectively.  
While I use the term ‘pro-Islamic or pro-Kurdish political stream in Turkey’ I 
only mean the political actors represented with the parties that I have 
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mentioned above. Other religious groups are not included in the research 
because almost all of them are unofficial Islamic groups which make tracing 
and researching them difficult. 
The time period the research covers starts with the date 1980 when both pro- 
Kurdish and Islamist parties had emerged in Turkey and ends with the year of 
2011, when the last national general election occurred. It is because of this 
fact that the research will focus on the perception pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic 
political streams have of each other. Of course, I have to investigate the 
conditions that led to the emergence of the Kurdish nationalist and political 
Islamist groups in Turkey; that time span will start from the late Ottoman 
Empire and early modern Turkey to investigate the roots of Kurdish 
nationalism and of the Islamism. By beginning early modern Turkey, it will be 
possible to highlight historical similarities of these oppositional social and 
political groups. In this case, it would be argued that despite their historical 
similarities, ideological rigidity would have core factors shaping relations of 
each other.   
Methodological Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis 
‘It (CDA) is not a method, nor a theory that simply can be applied to social 
problems. CDA can be conducted in, and combined with any approach and 
subdiscipline in the humanities and the social sciences.’ (Van Dijk 2001, p.96) 
‘Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research 
that primarily studies the way social power abuse, abuse, dominance, and 
inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social 
and political context.’ (Van Dijk, 2003, p.352) 
Perception is not easy to measure. Therefore, unless directly mentioning ideas 
about someone or something, to examine the perception between two 
distinctive groups requires an in-depth analysis of the language in use whether 
it is written, oral, visual, or behavioural. In specific terms, the perception 
between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams is also considerably 
hard to determine. Yet, I believe that, thanks to limiting the resources within 
legal political streams, official party programs and speeches of MPs of political 
parties within these two political streams, there are adequate, at least 
substantial, resources to study. The question that should be asked is whether 
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or not this methodology is reliable or justifies the idea of measuring the 
perception between the two political streams. From my point of view it is 
applicable and reliable, based on core principles of the critical discourse 
analysis.  
First of all, I am not a linguist and this research is not a linguistic study. It 
seems beneficial to state that I am not going to apply linguistic analysis to this 
research. What I am going to do is to expose the perception between these 
political groups through the interpretation of the language used in party 
programs. This provides a justification for presenting Critical Discourse 
Analysis as a methodological framework. In the following paragraphs I think 
that I answer this crucial question in depth.  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is derived from linguistic (semantic, 
grammar, and vocabulary) studies and originated in discourse analysis. 
Critical linguistics, developed by the East Anglia School, can be regarded as 
the inception point of CDA, with respected linguists such as Bakhtin (1981). Its 
fundamental aim is to critically interrogate the constructed or structured social 
inequalities, which are legitimized, expressed, constituted or signalled by the 
language in use. In this sense, it can be said that CDA to a degree, takes 
Habermas’ arguments that ‘language is also a medium of domination and 
social force and that language is ideological as given or approved contraction 
(1977, p.259).  That is why critical discourse analysts think that discourse not 
only covers written and spoken texts but also every action, productions and 
meanings socially, historically and cognitively constructed into discourse. 
Foucault’s social theory follows these developments. In linguistic terms, 
Chomsky’s (1957) transformational grammar, and later Halliday’s (1985) 
‘systemic functional grammars,5 have prevailed in the field of CDA (Wodak 
and Chilton 2005, p.20).  
Despite several different approaches including ‘the social psychological 
approach of Wetherell and Potter (1992), the social cognitive model of van Dijk 
(1993 and 2001), and the discourse historic model of Wodak (2001), 
Fairclough’s approach to CDA has seemed to prevail within the CDA literature. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For more examples of application of systemic functional grammar, please see Young, L. & Harrison, C. 
(2004). Systemic Functinal Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis: Studies in Social Science. 
London and New York: Continuum. 
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Leaving linguistic discussions on definitions of discourse and text aside 
(Widdowson, 2004; Locke, 2004), and relying on prominent figures of CDA, 
Norman Fairclough (1989, 1992 and 1995) transcends linguistic studies and 
combines it with social change pertaining to ideology and power. Influenced by 
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher who argued that the nature of power 
functioned within the social structure, Fairclough suggests relationships may 
be discerned between language and power through regarding ‘language as 
social practice’ (Wodak, 2001, p.1). In the same line with Ruth Wodak, Van 
Dijk summarizes core principles of CDA as such (2003, p.353):  
1. CDA addresses social problems. 
2. Power relations are discursive. 
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture. 
4. Discourse does ideological work. 
5. Discourse is historical. 
6. The link between text and society is mediated. 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.  
8. Discourse is a form of social action. 
As seen from the principles above, discourse is not something restricted within 
the written texts but might consist of all kinds of acts reflecting core ideas of a 
certain group. From this perspective, the concept of discourse is constituted 
through economic, social and cultural changes and interactions among these 
variations (Fairclough, 1992; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 4). In other 
words, context and therefore discourse, is ‘crucial for CDA, since this explicitly 
includes social-psychological, political, and ideological components and 
thereby postulates an interdisciplinary procedure’ (Meyer, 2001, p.15). 
Therefore, apart from texts as a part of discourse, the concept has been 
considered as something which can be produced, disseminated, consumed 
and if necessary, reproduced. Fairclough developed a ‘three dimensional 
framework’ for CDA consisting of ‘text, discourse practice and social practice.’ 
He also emphasizes the significance of the link or relations between text and 
practice by stating that ‘analysis of texts should not be artificially isolated from 
analysis of institutional and discourse practices within which texts are 
embedded’ (Fairclough, 1995, p.9). Instead of separating the CDA into three 
theoretical components of text, discourse and social practice, as Fairclough 
did, I would prefer to take it as a set of ideas reflecting and visualizing itself 
into actions including ideological influence on written texts (Blommaert and 
Bulcaen, 2000, p.456). In this case, language is an instrument bridging 
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between what is in the mind and written text or speech.  Language infiltrated 
by ideological implications is a sort of mediation between text and institution, 
between communication and structure, and between discourse and society 
(Weiss & Wodak, 2003, p. 9; Wooffitt, 2005, pp.137-45).  
In terms of CDA, ideology is seen as a significant aspect of eradicating and 
maintaining power relations between the dominated and the dominant. It also 
cohesively locates in structures of combination of past and current events. In 
specific terms, as Gramsci argued, ideology is regarded as ‘a conception of 
the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the 
manifestations of individual and collective life’ (Gramsci, 1971, p.328).  
Eventually, it can be argued that ‘...language is a material form of ideology, 
and language is invested by ideology’ (Fairclough, 1995, p.73). In this sense, 
ideological approaches to the party programs would be justified. The leftist-
oriented pro-Kurdish political stream and pro-Islamic political stream have an 
ideological distinctiveness compared to each other, so key vocabularies 
affiliated with certain ideologies can be traced in party programs. For instance, 
looking at what is written in the section on ‘religion’ in pro-Kurdish parties’ 
party programs would give a clue as to how they perceive pro-Islamic political 
parties. On the other hand, for instance, looking at what is written in the 
section ‘Eastern question’ in pro-Islamic parties’ party programs would also 
reflect how they perceive pro-Kurdish political parties. Definitions, 
contextualization and conceptualization of crucial values and principles in 
written or spoken texts, even in whole discourses including actions give clues 
as to the perception of the one over the other. It is because of this, that I 
presume that their different ideological backgrounds are one of the significant 
determinants of the perception between the two political streams. 
To crystalize, the way of reading the world system, regional politics, position of 
Turkey within these conditions and finally local dynamics will be used to point 
out ideological connotations differing from each other. In this term, I actually 
measure the perception between these two political party streams via how 
they define and describe political and social conditions of the world, regional 
politics and national and local factors which have direct impact on their way of 
thinking of each other. It might be because it is hard to find out directly related 
phrases and references over each other but this would not stop the research 
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as their distinctive way of reading and thinking can be dismantle into 
ideological components in which specific understanding of each other can be 
taken out. Apart from that, specific words referring the each other can be 
analysed by relaying on critical discourse analysis. For instance, in leftist-
oriented pro-Kurdish political stream, ‘gerici gücler veya odaklar’ (reactionist 
powers or foci) are referred to any sort of religious (Islamic) groups whether 
they are legal political parties or illegal socio-political movements. On the 
contrary, in pro-Islamic political streams, ‘materialists, separatists or banditries’ 
are used to refer leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish legal political stream or covertly 
the PKK. It is easy to come across such specific terms within speeches of 
representatives of each political stream or in their written texts. Therefore, 
CDA will definitely help to indicate what actually meant by using these specific 
terms in implicit way.   
Furthermore, since the inception of the modern Republic of Turkey, Kemalist 
ideas such as full independence of Turkey, Turkish nationalism, recognizing 
Islam as a part of being Turkishness albeit one that should be state-controlled 
and secularism, were determined by Atatürk and his close associates, as 
sacred founders of the state6, who formed the ideology of people in Turkey 
through controlling most of the instruments disseminating the dominant 
discourse. This included the socially respected elites through whom official 
state ideology gained absolute authority over public discourse and its 
structure. In the same way, it always has a control in the production and 
reproductions of ideas and values, which are socially accepted in people’s 
mind. In relation to that, van Dijk suggests ‘access to socially valued resources 
such as wealth, income, position, status, force, group membership, education 
or knowledge’ as a substantial requirement of social power providing control 
on actions and cognition of people7 (1993, p.254). That is to say that there is a 
direct correlation between social power and dominance in a positive way so 
that their combination might lead to inequalities between/amongst dominant 
powers (ideology) controlling social power, and dominated groups within the 
same society. His approach to social power seems to provide an explanation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This includes the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- Republican People Party), Atatürk’s party, and the 
military acting as guardians of what was gained from the First World War. 
7 He also takes the core ideas of the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’, while van Dijk is arguing a 
power and dominance relation through claiming that this relationship is ‘usually organized and 
institutionalized’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p.255). 
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and a context in terms of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams working 
against the Kemalist-dominated state structure.  
While general cultural, political and economic discourse of official state 
ideology has continued to preserve its hegemony over public discourse, 
opposition movements have sought an alternative way of cultural, social, and 
political discourse as much and long as conditions have allowed them to do. 
That is why, in forthcoming chapters I have explained how rivals of official 
state ideologies emerged, and finally institutionalized as political streams 
which now have created their own place within the political structure of Turkey. 
The discourses of these two rivals have always been a way of shaping their 
adherents’ minds and actions against a symbolic enemy.  
The Kemalist regime enforces the ideas of secularism and Turkish 
nationalism. On the other hand, one of its rivals, the pro-Kurdish political 
stream approves the initial but refuses the latter, while the other, pro-Islamic 
political stream, rejects the initial but partially approves the latter. Based on 
this picture, it seems that pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams have 
always preserved their ties with the official state ideology and so in some 
occasions or context their discourses have resembled each other on the 
subjects they have in common. From this perspective, I look at how they 
perceive ‘the embedded state’, as both groups have been excluded from 
mainstream politics.  
This situation illustrates the complications of political thoughts within Turkish 
society. Ethnic and ideological distinctiveness in discourse of these groups’ 
representatives always create fluctuations in people’s minds. Despite that, 
prevailing thoughts of these groups on each other’s positions accordingly to 
their discourse in context, text and talk can be used to measure how these 
political entities perceive each other. To respond to these questions, CDA, as 
a sort of political analysis focusing on the role of discourse and contending a 
set of ideas, values, historical cognition of events and socio-political elements, 
seems to be useful to apply in the research, especially by interpretation of 
certain sections, utterance, words,8 and eventually context of party programs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 To emphasize the vitality of words, it is meaningful to quote a phrase from Luke, which is that ‘To use 
the vocabulary of power in the context of social relationships is to speak of human agents, separately or 
together, in groups or organizations, through action or inaction, significantly affecting the thoughts or 
actions of others’ (1974, p.54). 
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In the sense that ‘interpretation arises from an act of reading or analysis which 
makes meaning of a text’ (Locke, 2004, p.8), it is to say that I will take what is 
written in the party programs of each political parties in these two political 
streams by offering ‘interpretations of the meanings of texts rather than just 
quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from this; situate what is 
written or said in the context in which it occurs, rather than just summarizing 
patterns or regularities in text; and argue that textual meaning is constructed 
through an interaction between producer, text, and consumer rather than 
simply being ‘read off’ the page by all readers in exactly the same way’ 
(Richardson, 2007, p.15). 
In addition, the methods of the research will use general qualitative research 
methods ranging from using archival resources to interviews. Due to the fact 
that members of these political streams have subsequently been closed down 
by the constitutional court, their party programs and declarations are hard to 
obtain unless archival resources of successor political parties have a 
hardcopy. Interviews will be with members of these two political parties, 
especially the deputies, and also with the members of previously banned 
political parties on both sides. The structure of the interviews would be semi-
structured as their massive memory directs the interviews to more interesting 
areas in which tiny details might be quite useful. In addition, I will use the 
archives of political parties as well as the national archive to determine a clear 
history from the beginning of modern Turkey to the 1970s. Based on the party 
programs and regulations, I will also use the discourse analysis method, which 
is explained in preceding paragraphs. It will assist me to analyse critical 
concepts and identify words illustrating the pro-Kurdish and Islamists’ 
perception of each other. 
Conceptual Framework: Nationalism and Islamism 
Nationalism 
The concept of ‘nationalism’ has become one of the legitimate way for forming 
a state since the late 18th and early 19th centuries and constituted a level of 
analysis within the social sciences despite the fact that transnationalism, 
12	  	  
internationalism and multiculturalism9 fields arguably reduced its core position 
(Brown, 2000). It basically claims that a unit of people has an exclusive right to 
have their own state and government, which is able to exercise the legitimate 
power within its borders and among other states. That group of people 
constructing the ‘nation’ have a certain amount of features. They have been 
granted as self-evident in terms of natural right to govern themselves within 
the national state structure in which nationality is a crucial determinant and 
affiliated with certain characteristics (Kedourie, 1993, pp.1-4). As a 
fundamental duty of a given state is to provide to its own people happiness, 
welfare and other basic needs, it is thought that the best way a state can fulfil 
these duties is through having a homogeneous society regarding to nationality 
requiring love for the fatherland and people putting their nationality at their 
most important notion.  
Under these circumstances, what the French revolution brought is that people 
of a nation have the right to choose their own government in case the 
incumbent government is not wanted; they should be able to change it with 
another as they wish (Fuller, 2012). In other words, the core principle of 
sovereignty within a national state is embedded into the nation and those, 
which are based on the national will, are legitimate. It is quite natural that 
nationalism wiped out or at least degenerated the previous legitimation 
instruments ranging from feudal structure, kingdoms, tribal structure, etc. As 
long as a nation is formed, that nation would decide the system with which 
they would be governed. Gellner’s definition of nationalism makes perfect 
sense here as he defines it as ‘a political principle, which holds that the 
political and national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 1983, p.35).  
Within this way of conceptualising of nationalism, the question of what the 
nation is and of what the nation consists of requires further explanations. The 
literal meaning of nation stems from the Latin word of ‘natio’, which has a 
strong affiliation with birth and being born. Through the historical evolution of 
the concept, nation can denote to a group of people constituting a community 
in which people have a common descent, language, culture, values, and 
history (Smith, 1983, and 1986). These commonalities can be extended with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In particular, multiculturalism has been promoting a pluralist concept of nationalism seeking for a 
national identity in which all ethnic, religions, racial individuals and groups can find themselves.  
13	  	  
common territory, common race, the sense of solidarity among the members 
of a given community, which also varies, for example, citizenship solidarity, 
ethnic solidarity, and territorial (political/administrative borders) solidarity. 
Relying on these various factors applied into defining what the nation is, 
different forms of nationalism have emerged in accordance with the 
importance of, and determinative role given to mentioned factors generating 
core of a nation.  
Ranging from ethnically homogeneous society in which people give priority to 
ethnicity with common history, language, culture/cultural symbols, religion and 
sense of ethnic solidarity, to citizenship based-nations in which different 
ethnicities, cultures, and languages are approved within a state structure, and 
even to nations without states (Guibernau, 1999) but possessing cultural 
recognition and political autonomy. The core ideas of each argument led to 
fierce debates on nationalism theories10 within the social sciences. The initial 
one can be descried as ethnic nationalism (ethno-nationalism), whereas the 
latter one is labelled as civic nationalism. The last one is hard to put within any 
nationalist theories, yet it is obvious that it directs researchers to more 
discussions and research in order to have a conclusive description and also 
shows that there has to be a limitation within the nationalism discussion before 
dragging people into atomization based one single common point among 
people together with newly emerged concepts such as particularism or 
cosmopolitanism (Gans, 2003).  
Apart from these types of nationalism theories, cultural nationalism11 is a 
recent phenomenon, which emphasises the recognition of cultural existence of 
a certain group of people and the right to sustain it for the following 
generations. What differentiates cultural nationalism from nationalism is 
argued that the first one focuses solely on cultural rights within the embedded 
administrative structure and geography, while the second combines these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For further details about various nationalism theories or classifications, please look at: Alter, P. (1989). 
Nationalism, trans. S. McKinnon-Evans (London, 1985).; Eley, G., & Suny, G. (Eds.). (1996). Becoming 
national: A reader. Oxford University Press; Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. SAGE publications Ltd.: 
Brown, D. (2004). Contemporary nationalism: civic, ethnocultural, and multicultural politics. London and 
New York: Routledge. Hastings, A. (1997). The construction of nationhood: Ethnicity, religion and 
nationalism. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
11 Chaim Gans also makes a distinction between liberal and none-liberal cultural nationalism just after 
the divides the concept of nationalism into two: cultural and statist nationalism seeking more cultural 
homogeneity among its citizens, based on single culture (2003, p.1). Within the first chapter, he has a 
distinguished discussion on various types of nationalism theories.   
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demands with national self-determination and national territory with political 
borders.  
Since the implementation of nation-state structure, the discussion of modernity 
goes further with the discussion of nationalism. If modernity requires 
freedoms, including cultural and language rights as common points of a 
nation, then modernity causes the emergence of every nationalist movement 
to have absolute freedom of applying their culture through a separate nation 
state. That is why Taylor argues, ‘the nationalist imperative is born’ (1997, 
p.34). Eventually, modernity brought nationalist discussion with itself, 
regarding both internal national rights among different ethnicities, and nation-
state-centric analysis at the international level.  
Though the subject of this thesis is not providing a full theoretical explanation 
for either Turkish or Kurdish nationalism, it is better to clarify the concepts 
used within it. While the concept of ‘ethnic awareness’ or cultural nationalism 
is stated among the lines of the thesis, it does not mean that a proper 
nationalist movement must demand for full ethnically based national rights 
within political sovereignty as a separate state. It might denote that the 
existence of an ethnic group with its own cultural daily practices and language, 
who just demand only that they not be deprived of their rights to remain as 
they were/are. Within this context, at the time of the late Ottoman Empire, 
Kurdish ethnic awareness increased as a reaction towards centralization as 
well as parallel with other ethnic nationalist uprisings in the Balkans, and 
cultural nationalism among Arab subjects of the Empire. I believe that, as the 
rest of the thesis will indicate; Kurdish ethnic nationalism has mainly remained 
as cultural nationalism, which has been willing to accept local self-
determination without asking for a full independent Kurdish state until the end 
of the 1970s in Turkey.  
On the other hand, studies pertaining to the Kurdish ethno-nationalism 
(Entessar, 1992) would argue otherwise. By employing primitive nationalism 
which ‘contains elements which have disappeared or are disappearing from 
the character of modern nationalism’ (Koht, 1947, p.265), most of the Kurdish 
ethno-nationalist studies date the Kurdish nationalism back centuries in order 
to historically prove the presence of an ethnically aware Kurdish community by 
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using the example of Medes and Zoroastrianism as a Kurdish state and 
Kurdish religion before Islam, respectively (Edmonds, 1971, p.88). The same 
case can be witnessed with the other post-Ottoman nationalisms as Turks 
trace their culture back to the Hittites and other Turkish tribes in Asia, as 
Egyptians emphasized their time of the Pharaohs, and Iraqi Arabs claimed 
Babylon. Furthermore, the uprising of Kurdish tribes since the early 19th 
century, to the demise of the Empire (Strohmeier, 2003), has been considered 
as indicative of Kurdish nationalism even though they were actually reactions 
towards centralization and reformation policies of the Empire. Yet, it can still 
be claimed that they have gradually raised ethnic awareness among leading 
Kurdish figures (intellectuals, tribal and religious leaders and notables). That 
awareness gradually developed legal and illegal pro-Kurdish social and 
political organizations after the mid-20th century in Turkey, especially those 
that fledged between the 1960s and 1980s. 
 
Emergence of the PKK with a Marxist-Leninist ideological background with the 
target being the rule of the proletarians and labour, in a classless and equal 
society, from the 1980s to 1990s, might be an exception since based on the 
PKK’s documents, a fundamental aim was to form a separate great Kurdistan 
covering certain territories from Iran, Iraq, Syrian and Turkey, just after 
liberating Kurds from the exploitation of Turks. When for the first time, 
Abdullah Öcalan, states the possibility of a federal structure in which Kurds 
could have their own local self-determination, especially choosing their own 
rulers, as a solution for the Kurdish question, the Kurdish nationalist 
movement in Turkey regained its cultural nationalist characteristic. This might 
be because no fraction of Kurdish nationalist movements including the PKK, 
have never obtained the privilege to represent all Kurds in Turkey, whether 
religions or a different language dialect prevented such a thing or not. So that 
none of the aforementioned Kurdish nationalist groups achieved a total ethnic 
solidarity among all Kurds, as even in mid-1990s when the armed struggle 
reached a peak level, some of the Kurds sided with various legal and illegal 
organizations rather than to gather around a single one.   
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Current peace negotiations between the PKK together with BDP12 and Qandil 
(headquarter of the armed PKK guerrillas) and incumbent AKP government 
evolves around cultural rights, especially language, of course apart from a 
peaceful return of the PKK militias if disarmed. Not asking for a separate 
national state does not reduce the qualification of Kurdish nationalist 
movement, as not to be ‘national’ or ‘nationalist’, it is because of that it is still 
possible to have nationalist politics within a nation-building process through 
mobilizing national myths, emphasizing national holidays, using the Kurdish 
language in literature, stressing Kurdish ethnic consciousness within 
discourses and sentiments (Tsang and Woods, 2014; Edensor, 1997; 
Greenfeld, 1992) given that Kurds’ priority of religion, tribal loyalty, different 
language accents, and geographical obstacles, prevents Kurds having a 
common ethnic sense of solidarity among all Kurds. Within the context of the 
thesis, any phrase pertaining to stages of development of Kurdish nationalism 
in Turkey, I believe would make more sense together with the conceptual 
framework of nationalism. 
Islamism 
Islam as a religion has regulations covering almost every single aspect of lives 
ranging from individual faith to political issues which stem from the Qur’anic 
verses, the Prophet Muhammed’s sayings, and interpretations of these two 
fundamental Islamic sources by Islamic scholars. This creates a tremendous 
amount of different applications of Islamic rules based on different 
interpretations, by applying and comparing any single context with another 
case. It is a natural process that each individual might come up with slightly, or 
totally different, interpretations of given cases, rules, and regulations. As a 
result, official or unofficial Islamic applications vary in terms of the way which 
they follow the law in order to fulfil religious duties. Taking plenty of Islamic 
groups with distinctive social, economic and cultural environments (in this 
case, nation states) into account, these groups in accordance to their core 
ideals revitalizing Islamic society and states as in the time of the Prophet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP- Peace and Democratic Party) is current pro-Kurdish political party in 
Turkey. The very initial one was Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP-People’s Labor Party), formed in 1991, and 
from this to current one, there have been many political party succeeding one after another as the 
constitutional court of Turkey banned those parties with the argument of that they were menace to the 
indivisible unitary of the state. That is why I have named the continuation of pro-Kurdish political parties 
as ‘pro-Kurdish political stream.’  
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Muhammad13, and the instruments used to achieve their ideas pave the way 
for different labelling of Islamic groups. The first sentence of Esposito in his 
book (1997), ‘Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?’ is quite 
meaningful to quote here; he states that ‘Across the Middle East in the late 
1990s, Islam takes many shapes and forms: Islamic republics; illegal 
opposition organizations and groups; and Islamic movements, from Egypt to 
Pakistan, engaging in social and political activism and participating within state 
and society’ (p.1). 
From this perspective, the concepts of Islamism, political Islam, and radical 
(jihadist) Islam or fundamentalism (Makris, 2007, pp.193-197), seem to be 
byproducts of new political formations following the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire. During the Ottoman Empire, Islam as a religion was employed as a 
way of legitimation for the established state structure (Margulies and 
Yildizoglu, 1997, p.145; Toprak, 1981, p.20-34), 14 which was more or less 
taking control of religious institutions. Yet, taking the religion out of 
components of legitimation and superseding it with the nation (ethnic or 
territorial based) pushed social religious organization to be constrained within 
the society rather than within an official circle. That is why unofficial Islam has 
reshaped itself as initially social (legal or illegal) organizations aiming at 
preaching the good, and forbidding evil as well through asking Muslims to be 
comparatively more pious. Examples of this include; the Deoban school in the 
Indian sub-continent (India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), Tabligh organization 
in Bangladesh, Ihvan-i Muslim in Egypt; Cemmat-i Islamiyye in Pakistan 
(Kepel, 2002, pp.23-42), and religious orders (Naqshibendi, Khalidiyye, Qadiri) 
in Turkey (Mardin, 1983, p.144).  
After the mid-20th century, these Islamic movements transcended their area of 
influence from individuals, to society, and then to politics as soon as they 
could. The presence of the communist threat, as disseminated by the US and 
the western block during the Cold War era, accelerated Islamic groups’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The core idea of Islamism and its all variations is the returning to the original sources which are the 
Our’an and Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and teachings). However, adherents of any Islamic 
groups are preaching their ideas or doing politics in modern world. Which is why, Emmanual Sivan titles 
his book as ‘Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics’.  
14 Historical perspectives might refute my division of pre-and post Ottoman state approaches to Islam 
and Islamic organizations as several figures such as Cemaleddin Afgani and Abdullah ibn-Wahhab 
(founder of Wahhabi sectarian) were already critical towards the way of Islamic implications. This critical 
approach continued with Afgani’s students like Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida.  
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activities since all leftist groups were considered as anti-Islam. In addition, 
most of the Muslim-populated states used Islamic groups as a counterbalance 
to prevent the rising of communist or socialist ideas within society and state. 
Furthermore, the necessity of reformation within the Islamic circle to catch up 
to the level of development in the western states can be traced back to the 
Ottoman time, but more remarkable ones would be Cemaleddin Afghani, 
Muhammed Abduh and Rashid Rida (Enayat, 1982, pp.69-82; Makris, 2007, 
pp.142-193), who were in favour of western development in state structure 
and economy, and also in social relations or lifestyles. On the other hand, 
Hasan el-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, focused 
more on a social level of Islamization starting from individual adjustments to 
core Islamic regulations (the Qur’an and Sunnah). His tradition was followed 
by comparatively more radical Muslim intellectuals, such as Sayyid Qutb who 
made a clear distinction between ‘dal ul-Islam’ (Islamic state and society) and 
‘dar ul- Harb’ (non-Islamic society and state against which Jihad is required) 
and Abu’l A’la Mawdudi (Kepel, 2002, pp.23-42). This radical distinction led 
some Islamic groups to fight against their own nation-state together with leftist 
movements. The present historical development of Islamic movements made 
themselves more explicit when Islamic states were formed in Sudan and Iran. 
The concept of ‘mujahidin’ (religious fighters), which has already consolidated 
itself in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, spread through all Muslim 
countries. These people have become a fundamental human resource in 
terms of radical ideologies, and fighting skills, within almost of all radical 
Islamic groups from Malaysia to Morocco. Nowadays, a de-radicalization 
process forces them to be a part of the democratic political process, or of 
social movements (Ashour, 2009). 
The reason why I have given a short historical summary of the Islamic 
movements is to indicate that Islamist movements can dramatically vary from 
time to time, and from country to country. Thus, in Turkey’s case, I believe that 
the phrase ‘pro-Islamic social movements’ seems to be more suitable to 
describe major Islamic movements until the 1980s and the phrase of ‘legal 
pro-Islamic political stream’ seems to fit perfectly in order to denote the Milli 
Görüş from which the AKP, the current ruling political party, was extracted.  
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In terms of Islamic movements, it is a contemporary subject, as they were 
mostly considered revolutionary in the cases of Sudan and Iran as radical 
Islamism, and in the Arab world as socialist nationalist Islamism. Since the last 
decade of the 20th century, Islamic movements have been classified by 
scholars variously: militant and political (Karawan, 1997); pragmatic and 
ideological (El-Said, 1995); conservative, radical and political (Zubaida, 2001); 
reformist and traditional (Eickelman, 2000), and social and political (Halliday, 
1995). All these classifications are either based on what methods they used, 
articulated idioms, and targeted goals. Regarding these definitions, it is 
understood that their consideration by scholars have changed, and survived 
from just labelling them as anti-western, anti-democratic, or anti-modern. Also, 
that the movements have a political party to disseminate their ideas and to 
mobilize, they are mostly considered a political social movement and seemed 
to be more acceptable than any radical and armed Islamist political group. 
Despite this, there is an understanding that Islamic groups are against 
modernism and this causes ambiguity when attempting to determine whether 
Islamic politics is modern or not. The way of they are doing politics (in the case 
that they have a political party) is actually a reinterpretation of tradition within 
the context of the modern way as a method to transform any given society 
through politics (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996, pp.22-45). In Turkish cases, 
armed radical Islamist groups have never been effective enough to become a 
social movement though they occupied Turkey’s agenda in pre and post-1980 
period for awhile.  
Based on these classifications, it is much more meaningful to put the Milli 
Görüş movement into a political Islamic movement category. Islamic 
movements in Turkey are ideologically similar to Islamic movements in 
Palestine, Pakistan and Lebanon-Hamas, Jamaat-i Islami, and Hezbollah, 
respectively, since they all originate from popular grassroots support and are 
fed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Despite this familiarity with the 
Egyptian movement, it is fundamentally different from them since it has never 
ended up with armed groups fighting against the established government. In 
addition, leaders and adherents of the political Islamic groups in Turkey were 
not religious leaders in terms of their occupation (Delibas, 2009). Yet, they, 
Necmettin Erbakan and his close associates, are professionals and 
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businessmen and in spite of their attendance in religious circles, do not have 
clerical backgrounds in their educational histories. For instance, neither 
Erbakan nor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has such training, whereas the former 
was an engineer who graduated from a German university, and the latter 
graduated from the Department of Economics in Marmara University. Even 
though leading figures of political Islamic movements also adhere to a 
nationalist secular state structure and they can be seen as byproducts of the 
system, they extracted a new conceptualization that locates between tradition 
and modernity, secularism and religion. From this perspective, to call the 
political Islamic movement in Turkey a fundamentalist movement is unlikely to 
be true though it is possible that a modern religious conscience is leading 
people to become a pious and is able to make sense of contemporary social, 
economic, cultural and religious conditions at both a national and international 
scale (Göle, 1997, p. 54). Given that changes from more religious arguments 
to a more liberal understanding and reinterpretation of the concept of laicism, it 
would be quite easy to understand how the Milli Görüş movement gave a birth 
to the AKP.  
Structure of the Thesis 
What is done in the first part, titled ‘Historical Development of Pro-Kurdish and 
Pro-Islamist Identities: From Denial to Resurface’ is that it takes the Kurdish 
nationalist and Islamist backgrounds and through analysing them separately, 
shows how these two significant social movements were suppressed by the 
Turkish government in the republican (single party) and then multi-party 
(Democrat Party) eras. The fundamental concerns of this chapter are to show 
that these two basic elements of society were denied for the sake of the 
country’s attempt to reach a perceived level of European civilization and 
modernization and historically approximate similarities until they were able to 
organize themselves as legal political actors. In terms of every aspect with the 
official state ideology, which considered them as arch-enemies, they have 
gradually consolidated themselves within the Turkish society and have 
emerged as political actors shaping contemporary Turkish politics. This 
process is basically examined through historical development of politics in 
Turkey. Eventually, this section’s main aim is to portray and analyse the 
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political history of Turkey from very early Republic until the 1980s in terms of 
specifically pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish groups. 
To move on, part two, ‘Institutionalization of Pro-Islamic and Pro-Kurdish 
Political Streams’, the main argument will be that both pro-Islamic and pro-
Kurdish political streams have gained grassroots support and so grew to 
critical mass by the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. The conditions and 
political atmosphere that led to these political streams which turned out to be a 
vital actor in Turkey, will basically be summarized. By the end of this part, I 
believe that I can draw a clear picture showing how the PKK and later on the 
legal pro-Kurdish political parties dominated the Kurdish nationalist movement, 
and on the other hand, how the Milli Görüş movement has become one of the 
crucial political actors heading to power. 
In the last part, ‘Perceptions Between Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic Political 
Streams: 1980-2011’, I have set a time period division in order to have a more 
robust evaluation in terms of changes in the political and social atmosphere 
affecting these perceptions. In each specific period, critical discourse analysis 
will be applied throughout the part three by looking at official documents of 
both streams. 
With the first sub-title of the third part, covering from the 1980s to 1991, the 
intention is to discuss the perceptions of the PKK and the Refah party. Why I 
am commencing with this is that there was no legal political group that was 
explicitly pro-Kurdish nationalist, but there was an illegal one, which is the PKK 
in Turkey until 1991 when the People’s Labour Party was formed. In this 
sense, what I am going to do in this chapter is to look for the official statement 
of the Refah Party and, if there is a counter-statement of the PKK to analyse 
the perceptions between them. In addition, the interviews with those who were 
occupying critical positions in both groups would reflect the perceptions 
between them. Furthermore, based on this perception, by looking at what 
kinds of politics they followed I will seek to identify the influence of this 
perception on Turkish politics.  
When it comes to the time period of 1991-1998, beginning with the preceding 
chapter, but continuing mainly from this chapter on, the interviews will 
determine the direction of the research. The perception is not something which 
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can be wholly found among written documents so it is necessary to ask those 
who were in charge of decision making and implementing policies. However, 
party programs and the discourse used in election campaigns will be useful 
documents for understanding perceptions. I did not mention the name of the 
Kurdish nationalist political parties because they were frequently banned by 
the constitutional court of Turkey. On the other hand, the time limitation of this 
sub-title is pertained to the soft-coup d’état conducted by official state 
ideology, which is mostly driven by the military against the Refah Party-led 
government in 1998. The coup forced the Refah-Yol (Refah Party and True 
Path Party coalition) government to resign and has changed the approach of 
political Islamists towards the politics so that some of them have chosen a 
more adaptive or moderate way.  
I will name the time period between 1998 and 2002 as a transition period 
wherein global, regional and local changes transformed the ideological 
borders of these political streams and led them to come closer in terms of the 
Kurdish question.   
Finally, the last time period from 2002 to 2011 might be considered to be the 
heart of the research because it examines the ongoing and vital process, 
which witnessed fundamental changes in the Kurdish question in Turkey so 
immediately, that it causes a change in the perception of the others. As the 
case in the preceding chapter, apart from the written documents such as party 
programs and official announcements, interviews will be crucial for this 
chapter. Relying on these significant documents to measure the perception 
between pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political steams over the Kurdish 
question will be much easier as they have extended their ideas in an inclusive 
way.  
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PART ONE: Historical Development of Pro-Kurdish and 
Pro-Islamist Identities: From Denial to Resurface 
 
Kemalism, as a core ideology, excluded opponents from the state apparatus 
including political, social and economic issues in single party era (1923-1946). 
Thanks to transformation from the single party to the multi-party political 
structure since 1946, the next term in which state policies over Kurdish and 
religious identities have gradually but not officially loosen its pressure and led 
Kurds and religiously pious people doing politics with the condition of behaving 
like a Turk and of secular has begun. Nevertheless, this relative flexibility was 
adequate to threaten the core ideology, and then military intervened into civil 
politics and restored official state ideology. While withdrawing into their 
barracks they took constitutional precautions. Since then to the 1980 coup 
d’état, ethnically Kurds and religious people have mobilized themselves with 
the leading functions of educated and immigrant peoples in metropoles. After 
that, Kurdish nationalist and Islamic social movement have institutionalized 
themselves whose most prominent figure has become the PKK (Partiya 
Karkeren Kurdistan) and Milli Görüş.  
In terms historical development of pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamist identities in 
Turkey, it could be argued that they have actually been twin sisters but with 
the condition that Kurdish one has experienced officially total denial of its 
existence. Given that official state ideology’s rigidity in secular nationalism, it 
would not be hard to imagine official pressure over alternative identities that 
definitely relied on ethically Turkish and religiously secular. Proceeding without 
mentioning Kemalism’s controlled official Islamic discourse with the 
establishment of the Directorate of religious Affairs to main body of this part 
would be unfair comparing historical development of pro-Kurdish and Pro-
Islamic identities. Yet, together with total denial of existence of all ethnic 
identities but Turkish, alternative version of Islamic understandings (ranging 
from tariqah to radicalism) have been repressed and not given a chance to 
develop before 1990s.  
Apart from mentioned general resemblance of their historical developments, in 
specific terms, they have witnessed almost the same way of repressing within 
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the same time period. To make this similarity much clearer, it is better to have 
the history of Turkey politics into three periods form the formation to the 1980 
coup d’état. The first period is going to be single party period from 1920s to 
1950, the second one is from 1950 to 1960, which can be labelled as 
democrat party era and then the third one is from 1960 to 1980 when both 
political streams consolidated their own arguments as alternative ways against 
the official state ideology (Kemalism). Each periods prominent features can be 
listed as strict repression, flexibility and mobilization (consolidation of ideas 
and political stance), respectively. 
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Chapter One: Single Party Era: Total Repression of Kurdish 
and Islamic Identities  
Introduction 
What I am examining in this chapter is how these two political groups, 
excluded from the politics, were suppressed for the purpose of demolishing 
them so that they could not be a threat to the foundation of the Turkish 
republic. As a continuation of the understanding of the Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP), Atatürk and his close associates intended to replace the 
Ottoman multi-ethnic and religion-based social structure,15 with an ethnically 
Turkish nationalist and secular republic (Mardin, 1971). In other words, this 
chapter shows the efforts to combine materialist western ideas, performed by 
using ‘a social engineering from above’ (Kadıoğlu, 1996, p.191), and inherited 
popular culture, and how these operated and clashed in terms of exclusion of 
fundamental identities—specifically ethnic Kurdishness and Islam. 
In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, nationalist discourse dramatically 
increased among not only non-Muslim, but also Muslim subjects of the 
Empire. Thanks to cooperation between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists who 
were all-aware of their distinct ethnic identity and recognized each other, a 
new struggle against domestic, namely the Armenians and foreign enemies, 
the European powers, commenced. All these struggles were fed by the idea of 
Muslim brotherhood during the War of Independence, and lasted until the 
beginning of the emergence of the modern Turkish state (Bozarslan, 2005; 
Dönmez, 2007). At the beginning of the War of Independence, in 1919, the 
Amasya Protocol was signed by the Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk 
Cemiyeti (ARMHC)16 and the Ottoman government recognizing that Turks and 
Kurds were two major components of the remnants of the Ottoman lands  
(Yeğen, 2007). At the end of the War of Independence the ruling elites of the 
new republic saw salvation in the establishment of a national and secular state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Serif Mardin`s thesis which traces the understating of Atatürk and his close associates back to the 
Young Turks seems quite reasonable. This defines the revolutionary movement led by Atatürk in 1908 as 
an official start. In this sense, the Turkish nationalist and secular conscience of Atatürk could be justified 
with the legacy of the CUP established by the Young Turks.  
16 Following the collapse of the Empire, several local associations were established to protect their 
homeland. On the 4th September of 1919, in the Sivas Congress led by Atatürk, these local societies 
came together and established ‘Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti’ (ARMHC)—The 
Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia—which was responsible for the 
implementation of the decision taken in the congress  (Ahmed, 1993).  
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as a means of not repeating Ottoman mistakes, and to raise Turkey to the 
level of the western civilization17. Thus, the established relationships based on 
Muslim brotherhood with Kurds and any other Muslim ethnic minorities were 
superseded with ethnic Turkishness. As a result, ‘the Turkish leaders did not 
fulfil their promises to the Kurds’ (Dönmez, 2007, p.50). A strong resentment 
amongst the Kurds developed, and this naturally caused a reaction which 
developed into Kurdish nationalism. By saying that ‘the major reason for the 
politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural realities of the Ottoman Empire to the nation state model’ (Yavuz, 
2001, p.1), Hakan Yavuz summarized the fundamental change that formed the 
roots of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. 
Throughout the single party era in which the Republican People Party, 
established by Atatürk, was the only ruling party, the state’s Kurdish policy 
was to deny and then to assimilate Kurdish people unless they were not 
integrated into the state which was dominated by Turkish nationalism (Yeğen, 
2007). The harsh responses to the Şeyh Sait, Ağrı and Dersim rebellions by 
the government and the settlement acts, and reports on the Kurdish people 
explicitly prove the assimilation policy of the state. As a part of the assimilation 
process, apart from the few years after the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic, voicing the word ‘Kurd’, and any phrase including this word, was 
officially and practically abandoned by the government until the beginning of 
the 1990s. This is in spite of statements made in the Turkish Assembly and at 
international conferences by ruling elites of the state, such as Atatürk 18 
himself, the first president of the Turkey, and İsmet İnönü19, the first prime 
minister of Turkey, both of whom claimed that the fundamental elements of the 
Turkish republic were Turks and Kurds (Oran, 1989; Hatipoğlu, 1992, 
respectively).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 With the proclamation of Tanzimat reforms, from the late Empire to the early Republic, ruling elites 
spent too much effort trying to modernize what was left of the Empire, with the implementation of western 
modernization including lifestyles and anything affiliated with Europe. The officially created identity later 
became an embedded status quo, which is preserved and used against possible internal threats to its 
strucutre (İrem, 2004). 
18 Due to the fact that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is not the main subject of this research, details on him will 
not be part of this chapter. The following give considerable information about him and his ideas: Macfie, 
1994;  Kazancigil & Ozbudun, 1981, and Webster, 1973. 
19 His personal life, ideas and even notable statements have been studied by Metin Heper. His study on 
İnönü published is titled ‘İsmet İnönü’ (Heper, 1998). 
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In addition to four more pillars of Kemal Atatürk’s ‘isms’—populism, 
republicanism, statist, revolutionarism—nationalism and secularism were 
strictly implemented in Turkey. By constitutionalizing these six pillars of Atatürk 
in the late 1930s, they became official state ideology which has to be followed 
by incumbent governments and were subsequently named as Kemalism 
(Dumont, 1984; Kadioglu, 1996; Tanil, 2003, p.437). That also created a new 
official identity which has to be applied to all people in either public or private 
life—e.g. ‘what people ate, how they dressed, how they looked physically 
...what language they spoke’ (Aslan, 2011, p.78). This policy naturally created 
a considerable backlash among those who were not ethically Turk and those 
who were pious religious people, whether they were Turks or Kurds. Atatürk’s 
lifetime goal was to eliminate these two dissenting viewpoints from Turkish 
politics by imposing so-called modernization reforms. 20  Atatürk and his 
foundational political party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) dominated 
Turkish politics through the integration of all party institutions with state 
institutions (Zurcher, 2009) until the end of the Second World War when 
Turkey transformed from a single party to multi-party regime.  
As a result of this dramatic change, in the first free election attendant by two 
parties- the CHP and Democrat Party (DP) in 1950, Atatürk’s CHP was 
defeated by the oppositional party, the DP, which obtained adequate votes to 
form a single party government.  During this term until 1960, dissidents found 
a channel to participate into politics with which to dissipate their grievances. In 
other words, the reign of Democrat party government was actually an invisible 
and unofficial battle between the established state structure, and the mass 
population that could not fully get used to the imposed political and social 
structure. This term was ended by the guardian of the Republic and Kemalist 
state ideology—the Turkish Army—which perceives itself as having the right to 
protect the initial state structure against internal and external threats (Cooper, 
2002).  
Due to the overarching political and social pressures against any adversarial 
ideas in the single and multi-party regimes, witnessing Kurdish nationalist or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Relying on nationalism theories, Cetin in his article claims that nations are not a product of natural 
process but a social construction, and nationalism needs a homogeneous society to build itself on it. 
That is why Atatürk sought to create a Turkish nation-state by suppressing the Ottoman remnants, which 
was associated with old Islamic and multi-ethnic characteristics of the Empire (Cetin, 2004). 
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Islamist political parties, and even legal oppositional social groups, is out of 
the question as a result of the official nationalist and secularist ideology of the 
state. Not having these parties might exclude this period from the realm of the 
research, but in terms of better understanding the emergence of Kurdish 
nationalist and political Islamist groups and then political parties in the 
following periods, it is essential to examine how the nationalist and secular 
Turkish state secured itself. As it is explicit, this chapter will have two 
significant sub-subjects: the suppression of Kurdish and of Islamist identities, 
which is at the root of either political movement’s mobilization. For a better 
illustration of the emergence and consolidation of these political oppositions, 
social movement theory will be applied these cases.  
Denial of Kurdish Identity in the Single Party Era 
Regarding ethnic nationalism, the existence of Kurds who remained in the 
border of the Republic of Turkey was officially denied by the authorities in the 
single and multi-party eras of Turkey, except for a couple of years following 
1923 when the establishment of Turkey was declared by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly. The Lausanne treaty—considered to be the founding 
treaty of modern Turkey—defines minorities according to religious affiliation 
but not ethnic origin, so Kurds were not included as a minority since they are 
predominantly Muslim (Robins, 1993, p.660). Yet, this differentiation was 
incomplete without the recognition of ethnic Kurds. That is why since the 
beginning, the Kurdish question has been one of the fundamental issues of 
Turkey. In the late Ottoman Empire Kurdish people were still recognized by 
the government, but rising Turkish nationalism prevailed and directed politics 
towards an exclusion of the Kurds, and possible Kurdish nationalism. 
Albanians, Arabs, and diverse nationalities in the Balkans succeeded at 
establishing their own national states, but Kurds and Turks mostly moved 
together in the late of the Empire and early Republican era (Yayman, 2011; 
Kirişci, et al., 1997).  
Most of the significant Kurdish groups—sheiks, tribal chiefs, agahas, and 
intellectuals—were already integrated into Ottoman politics and they continued 
the same way in the Republican era due to the mutuality of their fighting 
together against ‘infidels’ to save the sultan-caliph, and of being Ottoman 
subjects with a basis of religious sentiments. Even, as proved by archival 
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documents, on the eve of the Lausanne negotiation, both Atatürk and several 
Kurdish deputies made speeches stressing the brotherhood of Kurdish and 
Turkish people in Turkish history, and especially in the War of Independence 
(Yayman, 2011, pp.40-41). Yet, it had been realized by several important 
Kurdish elites that Turks were going to suppress Kurdish people for the sake 
of Turkish Nationalism. Thus, they choose to rebel against the Turkish 
authority as they thought that the newly established Turkish state would violate 
their right to govern themselves. 
This reason I believe which accounts for western educated Kurdish elites 
aiming at the establishment of an independent, or at least autonomous, status 
for Kurdish people. Based on this view, it is hard to say that the Kurdish mass 
was thinking of such aims which the small number of Kurdish elites sought to 
reach, as is the case in era of the late Empire. Given that significance of 
religious leaders among Kurds such as Seyh Ubeydullah and Seyh Said, what 
matters for the Kurdish mass was mostly related to religion more than ethnic 
origin. Therefore, from my point of view, Turkish nationalism gave birth to 
Kurdish nationalism as a result of an intellectual battle and suppression of 
what bound the Kurdish mass with the other ethnics in Turkey—religion— 
which caused a reaction against the Turkish regime. This combination of 
nationalism and secularism was the driving force in the acceleration of Kurdish 
resentment in Turkey. The Şeyh Said rebellion constituted a meaningful 
instance of this combination as it was organized by not only a religious leader, 
but also a positivist Kurdish nationalist group, Azadi. Under the light of the first 
considerable Kurdish rebellion in modern Turkey, by depending on reasonable 
propositions, it can be claimed that the modernization policy of Atatürk created 
this Kurdish problem. Changing the phrases from the ’people of Turkey’ in the 
1921 constitution, which was seen as the most democratic constitution of 
Turkey by Özbudun (1992), to the ‘Turkish people’, in the 1924 constitution, 
implied an enforcement of all Muslims to become primarily Turks (Yeğen, 
2011). The abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924,21 together with this, created 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The influence of the abolishment of Caliphate on Kurdish people is described by McDowall as below. 
‘On 4 March Mustafa Kemal abolished the caliphate. This was the real body blow. He deterred 
opposition by establishing 'Tribunals of Independence' with full powers of life and death and extending 
the Law of Treason to include all discussion of the caliphate or any appeal to religion in political life. This 
cut the last ideological tie Kurds felt with Turks. The closure of the religious schools, the madrasas and 
kuttabs, removed the last remaining source of education for most Kurds. By stripping Turkey of its 
religious institutions, Mustafa Kemal now made enemies of the very Kurds who had helped Turkey 
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the mortar for the building of a Kurdish nationalist wall (McDowall, 1995; Earle, 
1925, p.86).  
As a consequence, the early history of the Turkish state witnessed several 
Kurdish rebellions 22  with sources primarily being religious or nationalist 
discontent.  These two were conceptualized as dynamite at the root of the 
Turkish Republic. It is because of this that the ruling elite of Turkey, primarily 
Atatürk and his close associates, spent all their efforts establishing a secular, 
nation-state modelled on western states. Those that might harm the secular 
and nationalistic foundation of the state had to be eliminated in order to secure 
the presence of the state. The Şeyh Sait rebellion in 1925 created a suitable 
political condition for the state to fight against these two concepts because as 
much as it can be understood from the statement of Şeyh Sait, it was a mostly 
religious uprising in terms of his position, and also a nationalistic rebellion in 
terms of participation of the Kurdish nationalist Azadi (Freedom) 23  group 
against the state. The state committed itself to purge the influence of the 
Islamic legacy of the Empire as well as the existence of other possible ethic 
nationalism within the borders of the state.  
The initial indication of the intention of the fledging government of Turkey led 
by Atatürk on the Kurdish issue can be seen in the discourse performed by 
ruling Kemalist elites. The reservation for being an equal citizen and a member 
of parliament, which was to be a Turk, the concept of ethnic Turkishness, was 
placed at the core of Turkey (Barkey, et al., 1998). In the on-going years, the 
stressing on the Turkishness of the state, society, history, and culture, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
survive the years of trial, 1919-22. These were the religiously-minded, the shaykhs and the old Hamidiye 
aghas who had genuinely believed in the defence of the caliphate’  (McDowall, 2007, p.192) 
22Relying on archives of the Presidency of the General Staff (Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı), a book was 
published which is titled, ‘Uprisings in the Republican Period’ penned by Staff Colonel Reşat Hallı. The 
books show that there were 28 Kurdish rebellions in the region. Ahmet Kahraman comes up with a 
different thesis that does not accept that they were all rebellions, but only two of them, the Şeyh Said and 
Ararat were. He claims that they were mostly a form of suppression and retribution for several mutinies 
and small-scale struggles. He believes that military officers intentionally called these small-scale 
struggles rebellion to excuse their harsh and bloody reactions. Eventually, he states that there have been 
three rebellions in the whole history of the Turkish republic by adding the PKK to the list containing the 
Şeyh Said and the Ararat rebellions (Kahraman, 2007). 
23 There is no exact date on which academicians agreed that the Azadi group was established, but it is 
obvious that ex-officers and several significant Kurdish notables took part in forming such a group 
between 1921 when the Koçgiri rebellion happened, and 1923, couple of month after the declaration of 
the Turkish Republic. Its original name is Ciwata Azadi Kurd (Society for Kurdish Freedom but it is known 
as Azadi for short. As Olson states, according to British sources, it was established in 1921 by Colonel 
Halil Cibran Bey, and spread to most Kurdish cities in the East. Each branch secretly organized, and 
their leaders were generally ex-Ottoman officers and influential notables.  Its activities such as speaking 
only Kurdish, wearing Kurdish clothes and delivering Kurdish poems showed that they were undeniably 
Kurdish nationalists (Olson, 1989; Van Bruinessen, 1978). 
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increased. This conscience continued until the Şeyh Said rebellion when the 
policy of the Turkish state dramatically changed. This rebellion is considered 
to be a turning point in the realm of the Kurdish question in modern Turkey by 
academicians and historians (Jwaideh, 2006; Olson, 1989; Kirişci, et al., 1997; 
Yayman, 2011).  
As previously mentioned, most of the powerful Kurdish tribes had been purged 
by the Ottoman Empire and the power vacuum was filled by the religious 
leaders in the region starting with Şeyh Ubeydullah and many, but small, 
landlords, or aghas. This condition prevailed in the region during that time. 
Religious loyalty of the Kurdish mass led by Sheikhs and Sayyids was 
destroyed because of the abolishment of the Caliphate and caused fierce 
grievances amongst the Kurdish people (McDowall, 1995; Taspinar, 2005). By 
doing so, Atatürk eliminated one of the most profound threats to his 
modernization ideas, but also broke a crucial bond between the new state and 
the Kurdish people even when ethnic Turkish nationalism was taken into 
account. Not considering several Kurdish revolts during the War of 
Independence, such as Koçgiri,24 the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 was the 
first revolt against the Turkish government founded by Atatürk. This rebellion is 
tremendously important in the political history of the Turkish Republic as it 
reflected the strong resentments not only against Turkish nationalist ideas, but 
also demonstrated the secularist intention of the ruling elite of Turkey.  
The rebellion was driven by both Kurdish nationalist and religious sentiments. 
A Kurdish nationalist group, formed by ex-Ottoman Kurdish officers and 
Kurdish intellectuals in 1923 sought to mobilize Kurdish people in the region. 
As a result of this strategy, Sheikh Said was involved in the organization 
because of his high-ranking religious status among the Kurdish people. Both 
figures resented the abolishment of the Caliphate, and recognized the 
repressive policy of the Republic over the Kurdish people by forbidding, 
according to the new constitution declared in 1924, the use of the Kurdish 
language in public, and the teaching of it (Haig, 2003), in addition to enforced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The Koçgiri rebellion was one of the most significant Kurdish revolts led by Nuri Dersimi and Halil 
Cibran Bey (Olson, 1989).  The main objective of the revolt was to obtain autonomy from the Ankara 
government based on the Serve Treaty and Wilsonian principles. Due to lack of supports from Kurdish 
tribes around the region and policy of Ankara government, it failed and the participants of the revolt were 
crushed by Turkish military forces (Kutlay, 2011, p.270). 
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resettlement of influential Kurdish notables in the west of the country (Zürcher, 
2009). 
As a natural reaction of these repressive policy, the Sheikh Said rebellion 
erupted on the 8 February in 1925 with the trading of gunfire between the 
Sheikh`s disciples and the Gendarmerie in spite of an agreement to 
commence a rebellion in May, by the Azadi group and Sheik Said. The 
rebellion quickly permeated throughout Diyarbakır and Elazığ with the 
persuasion of the surrounding Kurdish tribes to participate, by the Sheikh. In 
this process, Alevis in Dersim province refused to join the rebellion because of 
historical resentments between the Sunni Islam and Alevi groups in the region.  
In a short time, a fierce struggle between the Sheikh`s and the government`s 
forces occurred. Some numbers might be exaggerated, but they are indicative 
of the harsh treatment of the Kurdish people: ‘206 villages were destroyed, 
8,758 houses were burned and 15,200 people were killed’ (Gunter, 1990, 
p.13; Manafy, 2005).  With the arrest of the Sheikh, the rebellion ended.  
Whether the main characteristic of the rebellion was religious or nationalist has 
been adequately discussed by historians and academicians (Jwaideh, 2006; 
Olson, 1989; Toker, 1968; Behçet, 1955), thus, instead of discussing this 
issue, I would rather discuss it as being a religio-nationalist rebellion. This is 
because of the symbols and slogans used to mobilize the Kurdish people were 
mostly religious with the aim of creating an autonomous or separate Kurdish 
political entity. What I would like is to analyse the consequences of the 
rebellion, which was tremendously significant in terms of the radical reforms 
imposed by Atatürk, and the political history of Turkey. Atatürk and his 
colleagues utilized the rebellion to eliminate the last barriers standing against 
radical reforms in an effort to elevate Turkey to a modern level.  
As soon as the significance of the rebellion was predicted by the government, 
the first thing which was done was to replace Fethi Okyar, the Prime Minister 
of that time, with İsmet İnönü who was considered capable of managing the 
situation with harsh measures. He utilized this event as an excuse to declare 
martial law on the 21st February 1925, and to pass ‘Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu’ 
(the Maintenance of Order Act) in 4 March 1925. Thanks to martial law, the 
independent tribunals were formed in Diyarbakır and Ankara, as was the case 
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during the independent war. The tribunals’ judges were chosen from amongst 
the deputies, and their verdicts were absolute—there was no appeal process. 
Based on absolute power taken from the law, firstly all papers were closed 
down, and then the opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, was 
banned by the independent tribunal after charging the members of being in 
contract with Kurdish insurgents (Ahmed, 2008). By doing so, the government 
had an absolute and unquestionable power, and as a component of this 
power, an independent tribunal sentenced Şeyh Said and his close associates 
to death, a sentence which was executed without any delay.  
As Yeğen states in his articles, the official documents of these courts expose 
the denial of Kurdish ethnic origin by defining them omitting any overt 
reference to Kurdishness. He used a quotation from the chairman of the 
Tribune to illustrate how the government considered the uprising without 
actually mentioning the Kurdishness of the situation (Yeğen, 2011, p.69). In 
the speech the chairman used the words ’banditry, sheikhs and feudal 
landlords’ instead of referring to their ethnic origins of those being tried. As 
Yeğen states, by using these words the Kurds and their existence were thus 
affiliated with the Ottoman past, which had been changed by the modern 
rulers of Turkey. This also implied that the Kurdish people in the region were 
still living in conditions of the past, which was the main reason blamed for the 
backwardness of the Empire, and which the modern state fought to replace 
with modernism.25 From these words, without including the ‘Kurdishness’ of 
the problem, the government reduced this rebellion to being a social question 
and thus denied its ethnic origin.  
With the same token, İsmet İnönü declared the official assimilation policy by 
stating that, ‘We are frankly nationalists... and nationalism is our only factor of 
cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of 
influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will 
annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le turquisme’’ in 1925 (Barkey, et 
al., 1998, p.10). In this sense, the Ankara government implemented a brutal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The responsibility to modernize Kurdish people, who were ignorant, backward, and feudal, in the east 
of Turkey was taken on by the government. As one of the means of this modernizing policy, People’s 
Houses were opened all over the country. Specifically, in the eastern provinces of Turkey, these 
institutions organized concerts, conferences, exhibitions, tea parties, field, trips, theatre play, public class 
for education to make people familiar with western lifestyles and values. For instance, in Hakkari, this 
institution sought to teach the national anthem to peasants, which led them to learn music and Turkish. 
In Elazığ, piano and violin classes, and monthly dance parties were organized (Aslan, 2011, p.79). 
35	  	  
retaliation against the rebellions to the extent that even in 1926, entrance of 
foreigners into the region was banned in order to avoid any international 
intervention. Following the rebellion, relatives of rebels and influential figures 
in the region were deported to the western part of Turkey where the Kurdish 
people were the minority. These policies were proven as a result of several 
official reports in which Kurdish regions were referred as ‘the East’ (Gorgas, 
2009, p.5).  
This was the starting point of assimilation and to reach this aim, the 
government had to extend this policy from deportation, to anything associated 
with Kurdishness. The first thing of course that comes to mind was the word of 
‘Kurd’ and its derivations, followed by abolishment of using the Kurdish 
language itself. The East Reform Report, prepared by the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs, Cemil Unaydın, the Ministry of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, and 
Mustafa Aldulhalik Renda, the Speaker of TBMM in 1925, led to development 
of an official Kurdish policy for Turkey which relied on denial and assimilation 
of the Kurdish people (Cagaptay, 2006; Elphinston, 1946, p.96). Due to this, 
the policy is actually quite profound for both Turkish and Kurdish history. It 
contained abundant suggestions pertaining to how assimilate Kurds but most 
significantly, it suggested the abolishment of Kurdish language in public, the 
deportation of important Kurdish families, and even villages to the west, the 
building of railways and roads to make access easy for military forces, the 
establishment of ‘Inspectorate General’ (Umumi Müfettişlik)26 to control the 
area, and eventually, the appointment of military governors to the region.27 
This report was directly applied to the region as soon as it was ratified by the 
government. Basic points of the report were the resettlement, assimilation and 
turkification of the Kurdish people.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The General Inspectorate was an official institution of Turkey, which was established for watching 
every activity in the eastern part of Turkey where it was highly likely to have an insurgency, or at least 
highly potential for there to be one. It was established in 1927 following the Şeyh Said Rebellion and 
stayed in operation until 1952 (Koçak, 2010). 
27 For instance, it also included the appointment of Turkish officers at any level and increased their 
salary, to prevent especially Kurdish women to speak their language, to establish boarding school and so 
on. In June 1927, the institution of Inspectorate General covering Mardin, Siirt, Hakkari, Van, Bitlis, Urfa, 
Elazığ and Diyarbakır as a centre point was established and given crucial powers to control the 
implementation of the report (Yayman, 2011) and to prevent possible Kurdish revolts (Cagaptay, 2006). 
As the report indicated, the establishment of roads and railways, the disarmament of tribes, and the 
assimilation policy reduced the power of Kurdish tribes to rebel again (Arfa, 1966). These precautions 
provided a silence for a couple of years, but of course did not prevent a reaction of Kurdish people 
forever; instead, it fuelled future revolts. 
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All precautions applied by the Turkish government, based on denial of Kurdish 
identity, did not work. In fact it accelerated Kurdish reactions. Thus, the 
remnants of the Şeyh Said Rebellion, and the left Kurdish intellectuals who 
fled to neighbouring countries, managed to establish another organization, 
called the National Kurdish League. With the assistance of Hoyboun 28 
(‘independence’, in Kurdish), it convened meetings of influential members of 
several earlier Kurdish groups (the Association for the Recovery of Kurdistan, 
Kurdish Social Committee and the Society for Kurdish Independence) in 
Lebanon in order to launch another more organized revolt, in Mount Ararat, 
(Agri Dagi) which commenced in 1929, led by Ihsan Nuri Pasha, another ex-
Ottoman military officer. The Mount Ararat revolt was crushed by the 
government.  
This revolt experienced the same result—failure—as most of the Kurdish 
uprisings did. It also caused the Turkish government to enhance its 
assimilation policy with more legal regulations. Following this uprising, the 
Kurdish region was divided into four zones: 
A. Where Turkish ethnics would be sent to increase the density of the 
Turkish population; 
B. A Turkish region to be established where Kurdish people would be 
sent to assimilate; 
C. The fertile Kurdish region from where the Kurdish people were 
deported and where Turkish immigrants would be allowed to settle 
without state assistance, and, 
D. A Kurdish region which was evacuated, or was deemed inappropriate 
to live in due to security, strategic, political, cultural, material, and 
public health reasons.  
The policy also banned the formation of new villages by people whose mother 
tongue was not Turkish. From the perspective of Celadet Ali Bedirhan, the 
leader of Hoybun29, organized in Syria, this law actually referred to Kurdish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 It was a Kurdish nationalist party formed in 1927 in Lebanon under the presidency of Celadet 
Bedirhan. Indeed, the party was consisting of ex-member of banned Kurdish organization established in 
the late of the Empire. They believed that the only war to obtain independence through an organized 
military struggle so they launched the Ağrı Rebellion (McDowall, 2007). 
 
29 Rohat Alakom’s work, Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması, is one of the more extensive studies on 
the organization. 
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and Turkish lands behind the scene of the zones divided into three and he 
claimed that it was an operation of depopulating Kurdistan, and of replacing 
them with a new population (Bedirhan, 1997). By the end of 1935 the tension 
between the Kurdish population in Dersim and the Turkish government, since 
the Koçgiri rebellion in 1921, had accelerated and reached alarming levels. 
Because of this tension, several reports on Dersim by the Inspectorate 
General and the other state institutions were prepared and presented to the 
government in order to take measures to prevent a possible revolt.30 In 1938, 
the Dersim revolt occurred and the reaction of the government was more 
brutal than ever before, so it shared the same result of previous revolts when 
the leader of the revolt, Sayyid Rıza was captured and immediately hanged.  
The denial of Kurdish identity and the harsh cracking down of Kurdish revolts 
in the region were not the only policies to assimilate the other ethnic origins 
and to ‘turkify’ them. As a part of the nationalist character of the Turkish state, 
the concept of Turkishness became portrayed as being the most valuable, 
noble race in the world through slogans such as, ‘A Turk is worth the whole 
universe’ (Bir Türk Dünyaya Bedel), ‘Happy to whome says I am a Turk’ (Ne 
Mutlu Türküm Diyene). In addition, official institutions through the ‘Turkish 
History Thesis’ and through the development and dissemination of the ‘Sun 
Language Theory’, claimed that all races were actually Turks, and that the 
Turkish language was the mother of all languages in the world, respectively. 
This proves to what extent Turkish nationalism humiliated other nations not 
only by crushing them but also by claiming Kurdish people to be actually of 
Turkish origin. Thanks to these theories, the state official discourse redefined 
Kurdish people as mountain Turks and the Kurdish language as a mixture of 
Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Armenian, at the same time as banning their use 
in public and official areas. These state produced theories were added into the 
school history curriculum and this created a Turkish nationalist generation as 
its product (Zürcher, 2009).  During this time even until as late as the 1990s, 
the words ‘Kurd’ and ‘Kurdistan’, and its derivations, were taken out all official 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The common points of these reports (the Hamdi Bey Report in 1926, the Ali Cemal Bardakçı Report in 
1926, the İbrahim Tali Öngören Report in 1930, the Fevzi Çakmak Report in 1931, the Ömer Halis 
Bıyıktay Report in 1931, the Şükrü Kaya Report in 1932 and Abdullah Alpdoğan report in 1936) were to 
suggest a strict assimilation policy through using military power against the people (Yayman, 2011). For 
instance, Ibrahim Tali Öngören stated in his report that ‘the houses and villages locating in the top of the 
mountains and dominant position should be burned and their habitants should deport to the west or to 
the places which are not maintained’ (Yayman, 2011, p.99). 
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documents, and even dictionaries (Saatçi, 2002). The state described and 
degraded the Kurdish revolts as being a reaction (Barkey, 2000) of backwards 
people and bandits (eşkiyalar) opposed to modernization. During the revolts 
years, as a part of the complete denial of Kurdish people, the Turkish media 
ceased to use the word Kurds, instead, they substituted the word ‘bandits’ 
(Alakom, 1998). 
Since the end of the 1930s to the early 1960s, it is hard to say that there was a 
Kurdish ethnic revolt despite the fact that several tiny squirmishes happened in 
the Kurdish region. It is obviously because of that, that Turkish ethno-
nationalism, and also secularism, prevailed in every aspect of the state 
apparatus in Turkey, especially politics, culture, education, military, and 
economy. The modernization policy of Turkey included centralization, 
nationalization and secularization, which left no room for any activities in which 
some Kurdishness could be found. The only place where Kurds existed was in 
parliament as deputies who were associated with state official ideology but 
who had never revealed their ethnic origins. The revolt years also saw the 
executions of many potential Kurdish leaders, the dismantling of influential 
tribes, abandoned religious orders and institutions, and deportation of 
significant notables to the west or abroad. As a natural consequence of this, 
there was no potential left for the Kurds to rise up against any nationalist or 
secularist policy of the government in the Kurdish region. Denise Natali 
emphasizes this condition by stating that, ‘The denial of Kurdish, ethnic 
identity, harsh secularization policies, prohibition of opposition groups, and 
militarization of the Kurdish regions prevented the continued evolution and 
open manifestation of nationalist sentiments’ (Natali, 2005, p.85). In addition, 
Bozarslan`s hypothesis could explain this stagnation; not only the elimination 
of Kurdish leaders and nationalist groups in Turkey, but also in Iraq with the 
Barzani rebellion in 1943, and in Iran with the collapse of Mahabad Kurdish 
Republic in 1946, created a generation who would be thinking of ‘national 
oppression’ and not of ‘national emancipation’ (Bozarslan, 2007). He states 
that ‘the national oppression had been accepted as the Kurds’ long-lasting 
existential condition’ (Bozarslan, 2007, p.45). Yet, ‘In the long term, the 
assimilation policies, and urbanization of Kurdish populations have created a 
wider and stronger Kurdish consciousness, which has expressed itself in the 
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armed, long and bloody resistance on the one side, and, although limited, a 
political movement within the Turkish political system on the other’ (Saatci, 
2002, p.558). 
Denial of Religious Identity in the Single Party Era 
Thanks to the victory gained against the Greeks instilled by the western 
powers, in the first and the second Balkan wars, Atatürk had the social and 
political power to form a new assembly representing a new Turkish State. 
During the whole struggle, social groups who helped Atatürk consisted of 
notables, western educated intellectuals, ex-Ottoman army officers, provincial 
landlords, and tribal leaders in Anatolia, whose single concentrated goal was 
to save the Sultanate and Caliphate from the invasion of Christians and 
imperialist western powers (Zürcher, 2009; Heper, 1981, p.350). This 
propaganda worked smoothly, as most of these groups still preserved the 
Ottoman legacy and understanding. The majority of the participants of the 
preceding congress in Sivas and Erzurum, and then the first assembly, were 
among from these groups who were mostly adherent of the Caliphate31. 
Different from the majority of the assembly, Atatürk and his close associates 
were eager to have a western-style, modern state rather than preserve the 
traditionalist and conservative state structure of the Empire. Claiming that the 
Sultan co-operated with the western invaders and betrayed the nation, 
reduced the popularity of the Sultanate and both modernist and conservatives 
agreed to abolish the Sultanate in 1922 (Ahmed, 1993). When it came to the 
subject of the Caliphate, Atatürk and his friends who shared the same ideas, 
realized that they did not have the power to abandon the Caliphate which was 
a title covering not only Muslim Turkey, but also throughout the world. To 
reach their aim of transformation of the state into a modern nation state, they 
formed a political party after the international recognition of the Republic of 
Turkey via the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, and then gained a 
majority of the Assembly by changing the profile of deputies in such a way as 
they were able to pass any rules without considerable opposition. When the 
Caliphate was abandoned and all members of the Ottoman dynasty were sent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  A contradiction over the regime of the state constituted among the cadre who fought in the 
independence war including Atatürk, and those thinking of nationalism and secularism as the way to 
become a western style modern state. Considerable numbers of high military officers and intellectuals in 
Istanbul, such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, Kazım Karabekir, Cafer Tayyar Eğilmez, 
Mehmet Rahmi Eyüboğlu, İsmail Canbulat, Adnan Adıvar, (Cagaptay, 2006) were still loyal to the 
Caliphate and Sultanate which they fought for to save 
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into exile, they split from the People`s Party (Halk Fırkası), established by 
Atatürk, and renamed themselves as the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) in 1924, thus establishing an opposition party, the 
Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), in the same 
year. Despite the fact that the opposition had ample common ideas on forming 
a modern state, they also ‘advocated decentralization, separation of powers 
and evolutionary rather than revolutionary change’ (Zürcher, 2009, p.168), and 
they were considered as a conservative party due to their vivid loyalty to the 
Caliphate. Atatürk’s cadre managed to obtain the majority of the assembly but 
the members of the opposition party were influential and symbolic names from 
the War of Independence, and talented military officers, resulting in the fact 
that they were still significant obstacle in front of the radical reforms to impose 
a secularist32 policy.  
In addition to the denial of Kurdish ethnic identity, the second massive barrier 
towards a modern Turkey, with its homogenization of people, was ‘religion’ 
which was believed to be one of the main obstacles preventing progress, and 
also a main reason for the perceived ‘backwardness’ of the Empire and the 
Republic. This subject might seem not related to the subject of the research 
but actually it is, because the emergence of political Islam in Turkey was a 
backlash towards a radical secular policy of the state. This policy started with 
the abolishment of the Sultanate and Caliphate after the petition sent by the 
Caliph to increase Caliphate treasure, and the letter sent by two Indian 
dignitaries, the Agha Kahn and Ameer Ali who identified the importance of the 
Caliphate institution for all Muslims in the world.  Atatürk believed that the 
institution of the Caliphate could be used as an instrument to intervene in 
internal and external Turkish politics (Berkes, 1998). The demise of the 
Sultanate and Caliphate automatically brought two more secularizing acts; one 
for abolishing the previous ministries of Şeriat ve Evkaf Bakanlığı (Shariah and 
Foundations) and then it continued with the declaration of ‘Tevhid-i Tedrisat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Niyazi Berkes`s book (1998) illustrates that the roots of secularism dated back to the beginning of 19th 
century and dramatically increased in Tanzimat era of the Ottoman Empire  (Berkes, 1998). In that era, a 
dual judicial structure was put in operation and so sharia was not the only source of justice any more. 
This term also led to the appearance of western educated bureaucrats who were close to western 
secularism and then they created a Young Turk group whose significant members, including their leader 
Ali Rıza Bey were positivist or materialist and believed that religion was one of the crucial causes for the 
backwardness of the Empire (Yavuz, 2003, p.46). Thus, it was something unknown for Kemalist cadres 
who were already familiar with the CUP terms. What Atatürk did was to radicalize secularism 
measurements against so-called backward Islam. 
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Kanunu’ (the act for unification of education) which demolished most of the 
religious educational institutions. All education and religious matters were 
taken under the control of the Ministry of National Education and ‘Diyanet İsleri 
Başkanlığı’ 33(Directorate of Religious Affairs-DRA), respectively. It meant that 
the influential power of religion over the people was reduced and taken under 
the control of the state in order to prevent the use of this potential power 
against the state. In other words, ‘Kemalist reformers refrained from using 
religion; their very target was the hold of religion [Islam] on the polity and 
society’ (Heper, 1981, p.350). 
This gives us a great clue that the Republic’s intention was not complete 
eradication of Islam, but to expand the state’s absolute authority over religion 
and religious institutions and to use religious sentiments as an instrument to 
impose nationalism. The quotation taken from Zafer Çetin’s article fits here 
meaningfully as a way to simply explain the actual aim of the state on 
secularism. ‘When the Republican state elite tried to eliminate the old-
fashioned religious practices, rituals, and institutions, they did not aim merely 
to destroy; the aim was to replace the old, disapproved rituals with new, 
secular, officially-sanctioned nationalist rites designed to express loyalty to the 
new state’ (Çetin, 2004, p.351). This policy explicitly showed itself in the 
Islamic education textbooks though not Islamic education. In the content of 
most of the books about Islam, ‘the love of fatherland, obedience to order, 
zealous work, strict compliance with military, respect for Turkish flags, 
submission to the laws and to the state requirements, sacrifice of one’s life for 
the safety of the nation’ (Taspinar, 2005, p.30) were imposed as primary 
religious duties of all Muslims in order that they become good citizens who are 
nationalist and secularist. To this end, a new educational institution, the 
schools for Preachers and Chiefs of Prayers (İmam Hatip Okulları) were 
established as a part of a ‘social engineering’ process to obtain this type of 
citizens. For instance, a committee headed by Mehmet Fuat Köprülü was 
formed by the government to modernize religion in accordance with rationality 
and science. This committee suggested that shoes should not be taken off 
while entering mosques, the instruction of prayers should be in Turkish, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı was also used to disseminate the ideas of the ‘love of homeland (vatan 
sevgisi), ‘the sacredness of military service’, ‘respect for law and order’ and hard work for development of 
Turkey’ (Yavuz, 2003, p.49). By doing so, religious sentiments were employed to promote state 
ideologies and according to requirement of the state.  
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prayer times should be rearranged according to working hours, and finally, 
church type music and pews should be used instead of recitation of the Qur’an 
(Yavuz, 2003, p.50). Except for the reciting of the Ezan34 in Turkish, most of 
these suggestions were not implemented because of the fear of a strong, 
negative reaction from the people (Taspinar, 2005). As it is obvious from the 
example above, an attempt to use religion was tried as an instrument for 
western style modernization. Afterwards, an attempt was made to replace 
Islamic values and symbols with the symbols of the European civilization.  
Due to the fact that secularism was put into the constitution and internalized by 
almost all of the state institutions by taking the statement that ‘Islam is the 
religion of the state’ out of constitution, all instruments under state control 
started to produce a Turkish nationalist and secularist state bureaucracy of 
ruling elites and also intellectuals. This is contrary to the fact that the secularist 
and nationalist state ideology had not been demanded by the people, but 
imposed by the government. As generally accepted, the direction of reforms in 
Turkey was not made from the bottom to top, but from the top to bottom. 
Bozarslan stresses a distinction to be made by the Kemalism between the 
nation, which was represented by modern, educated and westernized ruling 
elites, and the people, who were represented by the ignorant mass. This 
perception directed Kemalist elites to discipline this ignorant mass ‘by 
revolutionary reforms, and if necessary, by coercion’ (Bozarslan, 2006, p.31).  
In the light of these historical facts, Atatürk’s established state structure in 
Turkey alienated the mass from the state (Yavuz, 2003, p.48), and both the 
concept of secularism and Turkish nationalism- has each created 
oppositions—political Islamism and Kurdish nationalism, respectively. It is 
interesting enough to note that these two opposition groups actually determine 
the current foreign and internal Turkish politics through their political parties. 
As an example of new social streams, their emergence as illegal, and then 
legal, groups will be the main theme of the next chapter.  
At the end of two years of intense debate, Shariah courts, for instance, were 
also abolished, the Swiss Civil Code was approved by the Assembly in 1926, 
which was seen by the Ministry of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt as a ticket for 
entrance into what was considered to be a contemporary civilization of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34According to Islam, it is a recitation of specific phrases to indicate that the prayer time has come.  
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progress (Berkes, 1998). The implementation of this civil code, the Law of 
family name, the right of voting, and of being a candidate in elections was 
given to women at the beginning of 1930s. Moreover, the Hat Law was 
promulgated in 1925, which prohibited the wearing of any traditional clothes35 
or headwear symbolizing any religious positions or affiliations, especially the 
Fez. Atatürk himself explained what the policy was behind these radical 
changes in a speech in 1927 abolishing the Fez by stating that ‘Gentlemen, it 
was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on the heads of our nation as an 
emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism, and hatred of progress and 
civilization, to accept in its place the hat, the headgear used by the whole 
civilized world, and in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its 
mentality as on other respect, in no way diverges from civilized social life’ 
(Lewis, 2002, p.268). By saying this, he actually equated all aspects of life 
before the Republic—regardless what they were—as being equally detrimental 
to the new Republic; that is, anything reminiscent of the Empire’s social, 
religious, economic and political legacy was considered to be ignorant, fanatic 
and backwards, all of which left the people of the Empire ‘behind’ the more 
‘civilized’ European powers. Furthermore, as another example of the aim of 
halting social power of an established Islamist movement and ‘breaking its 
hold on the minds and hearts of the Turkish people’ (Lewis, 2002, p.416), the 
Aya Sofya mosque was converted into a museum. This change was significant 
because it had been one of the strongest religious symbols from the Ottoman 
legacy. The mosque, which was converted from the church, the Santa Sophia 
was seen as a monument of victory of the Islamic Ottoman Empire against 
Christian Byzantium, and converted into a museum by republican ruling elites 
as—a symbol of Europeanization.  
 In addition, the Latin alphabet was approved by the government, superseding 
the Arabic alphabet in 1928, which also was used as an excuse for taking 
Arabic and Persian words from Turkish as a part of the radical nationalist 
project of Turkey (Zürcher, 2009). What is more, the government changed the 
day of rest from Friday, which has a religious basis, to Sunday, and western 
time and weight measures were adopted (Yavuz, 2003, p.49). These changes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For instance, between the 1930s and 1940s, villagers who were coming to the capital, Ankara, with 
their traditional clothes such as salvar, were not allowed to visit main streets and were directed to back 
streets (Yavuz, 2000).   
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were actually not just to secularize modern Turkey but also to take control of 
religion. From this perspective, Turkish secularism differs from the western 
type of secularism. While the act of Unification of Education closed all 
medreses, tekkes, and religious orders (tariqah), but gave the right to the 
formation of divinity schools at the secondary education and university level, 
all these regulations were based on a secular understanding and were aimed 
at cutting all connections between the Islamic legacy of the Empire and the 
new generation of Turkey. However, the Kemalist cadre had known that the 
religious feeling had a strong social ability to mobilize people, so that they 
sought to modify religion to certain preferred way, thereby using it to arguably 
assist to transform Turkey into a contemporary modern country. For instance, 
by changing the language of Ezan, Mevluts and Friday Hutbe from Arabic to 
Turkish in 1932, they not only performed a secular but also a nationalist 
intention. In this regard, the Kemalist reforms stood against traditional 
institutionalized Islam through secularization of state, education and law, 
through replacing religious symbols with the symbols of European civilization, 
and popular Islam by secularizing social life (Zürcher, 2009). The fundamental 
result of religious reforms in Turkey was ‘to break the power of institutional 
Islam completely, and make it directly subject to the secular authorities’ 
(Stirling, 1958, p. 408). 
The Turkish History Thesis claiming that most early civilizations were 
ethnically Turkish, and the Sun Language Theory, claiming that almost every 
language is derived from Turkish, were employed to emphasize pre-Ottoman 
Turkish history and sever the connection between the Islamic legacy and 
modern Turkish history. Based on these theories, a new Turkish history that 
neglected sixth century Ottoman-Islamic history was written and became the 
official school text for the primary level. Then the Turkish language society 
was established to purge foreign words from Turkish. Foreign, of course 
meant Arabic and Persian words which were prevalent in religion and poetry in 
the Ottoman era (Mango, 1999). Using the Turkish language in religious 
practice was actually a reflection of the Atatürk government’s nationalist and 
secularist intention of Atatürk. As a result of this policy, the first time the 
Qur’an was recited in Istanbul was in the Turkish language. A group of people 
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reacted to these changes, but they were arrested and the event was described 
as a ‘hateful reactionary incident’ (Mango, 1999, p.497). 
Conclusion 
The common identity for the Turks, Kurds, and other ethnic and religious 
minorities, were by and large destroyed by the Kemalist policy in the process 
of creating a homogeneous society and state based on ethnic Turkish 
nationalism and secularism. In short, ‘The Turkish reformers’ main intention 
was to end the Ottoman multicultural and multinational legacy by melding all 
differences under the name ‘Turk’ (Çolak, 2006, p.591). According to them, 
this transformation from a religiously determined social and political structure 
to a modern, national and secular identity could only be achieved ‘by means of 
a secular state and society’ (Çolak, 2006, p.591). Therefore, the Kemalist 
elites targeted the second majority of ethnic groups (Sirkeci, 2000), the Kurds, 
and popular religious sentiments, for elimination and treated them as if they 
had never existed. 
Regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey, after a religiously formed 
brotherhood or social contract between the Kurdish and Turkish people, 
sealed by the presence of the title of Caliphate in the capital, was broken by 
the Kemalist government in their drive to reach at high level modern 
civilization, national and secular Kurdish people resisted such a state-building 
process that occupied their own land where they had lived for more than a 
millennium. The Kurdish revolts, whether they had nationalist or religious 
character, are undeniably an indication of that resistance for their identities 
(Taspinar, 2005). In addition, the radical nationalist measures taken by the 
government also automatically created its opposition in the absence of 
religious ties, Kurdish nationalism which was considered as a counter-
revolution by the Kemalist regime, and then security originated military, and 
the assimilation policy, were implemented to get rid of these barriers standing 
in front of nationalization of Turkish state. It employed the settlement laws and 
official denial of Kurdish ethnic identity by not referring to Kurdishness within 
the context of the question for assimilation, and through the deployment of a 
heavy military presence in the Kurdish region for security (Taspinar, 2005). 
Regarding to position of religion (Islam) within the society, Kemalist elites 
spent tremendous amount of efforts to reduce the influence of religion and 
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then modernize it in accordance with their modernization project. Within this 
process, religious social and political institutions along with the religious 
symbols among the societies were intentionally de-popularized by imposing 
secular nationalist characters over societies.  
From the beginning of the Republic to the 1950s, the Kemalist single party 
regime achieved its aim of silencing its crucial rivals—Kurdish ethnic 
nationalism and popular religion. By the end of this regime there was no 
indication of any possible resurface of these rivals due to the fact that party 
branches and state institutions were integrated each other so the CHP`s 
ideology became automatically that of a state ideology. Thus, they had control 
of every corner and spread a strong sense of fear among people in Turkey. At 
the end of this dramatic part of Turkish history a massive empire turned to a 
national state.  
The single party era is when both Kurdish and Islamic identities have most 
resemblances comparing forthcoming two time periods since they witnessed 
direct and official elimination their own identities not only from official arenas 
but also from social, economical and political arenas. This argument sheds 
lights on the argument of which the roots of Kurdish and Islamic questions are 
actually relying on the policies produced and applied in the single party era. 
While moving on the next time period, aforementioned radical and harsh 
precautions seem to work for a while, especially during the single party 
regime, but if the history of the Turkish republic is considered as a whole, it 
just increased the level of ethnic conscience among the Kurds and of religious 
conscience among people which initially exposed itself at the beginning of the 
multi-party regime.  
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Chapter Two: Kurdish and Islamic Identities in Democrat Party (Multi-
Party System) Era  
Transition from the Single Party to the Multi-party System 
It would be true to claim that the beginning point of social movements in 
Turkey coincided with the demolition of the single party regime whose 
ideological base had been always Kemalism, and after Turkey’s switch to a 
multi-party system.36 This vital change is not simply a regime change, but also 
a change which altered social, political, and economic conditions in Turkey, 
especially after the 1961 Turkish constitution, considered to be one of the 
most liberal. In brief, this transition paved the way for alternative voices in 
every aspect of Turkish citizens’ lives (Karpat, 1970, p.1681). 
It is an undeniable fact that the political transformation from a single party to a 
multi-party system paved the way for distinct ideas to be heard37 (Poulton, 
1997, p.131; Natali, 2005, p.92), and which would see social movements end 
up as political parties. As mentioned in preceding chapters, Islam as a religion, 
and Kurdishness as distinct ethnic origin, were sought to be taken out of the 
political, social and economic realms since, to ruling elites, they were seen as 
fundamental barriers standing in the way of the modernization process of 
Turkey. At the first opportunity, these two eliminated groups found themselves 
endorsing the Democrat Party (DP), which swept away votes in the ballot box. 
By the end of 1950s, when they were not entirely satisfied with the political 
and social conditions the Democrat Party brought, they began organizing their 
own social and political groups. As the quotation above indicates, new 
challenges have gradually, but systematically, opposed the premises of the 
Republic of Turkey. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The fundamental reasons why Turkey’s political system transformed from a single party to a multi-
party system is believed to be the changed international system, İnönü’s commitment to democracy, the 
democratic structure of the Republican People’s Party, and finally, social discontent reaching the top 
level during, and just after, the Second World War. Turkish and other scholars studied these reasons but 
none of them considered social discontent as a primary issue in this transition. On the other hand, M. 
Asim Karaömerlioğlu ’s article on this subject more or less proved that social discontent could be a 
primary reason why ruling elites of the Republic chose democracy as soon as the war ended 
(Karaömerlioğlu, 2006, pp.89-94). That is why the slogan of the Democrat Party in the 1950 general 
election, ‘Artık Yeter’ (Enough), was sensitive over people. 
37 Hugh Poulton argues that the Democrat Party reign did not have much difference from the Republican 
Party reign as the essence of the 1924 constitution remained the same, with rules to maintain an 
authoritarian state structure, and as leading members of the Democrat Party were driven from the 
Republican Party. So he argues that the authoritarian single party regime was handed over from one to 
another.   
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The Case of Kurdish Nationalism 
The Turkish government might have thought that they resolved the Eastern or 
South Eastern question for a while because of relative silence in the region, 
and the intensive use of Turkish language in Kurdish towns (Van Bruinessen, 
1984). But it was just a time of stagnation for the Kurdish people who would 
gain an ethnic conscience which did not rely on a traditional structure of its 
Kurdish people, or religious or cultural sentiments, but leftist ideas which were 
seen potentially able to solve Kurdish economic, agricultural and social 
problems as well as providing Kurds with official recognition. The 1940s had 
witnessed an international power struggle between the one side, which was 
represented by democracy, and its twin sister, capitalism, and the rival side, 
which was affiliated with fascist, authoritarian, and military regimes. By the end 
of the struggle, the Second World War occurred; Turkey sided with democracy 
by declaring war against Germany and became a charter member of the 
United Nations representing the victory of democracy, liberalism and 
capitalism. Eventually, Turkey changed its regime from a single party to a 
multi-party system with the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) founded 
by ex-republican party deputies in 1946. 
The people in Turkey, regardless of their ethnic or religious origins took a 
further step in order to remove the CHP from power because of its nationalist 
and secular policy, for the sake of being modern, despite the resentment felt 
amongst the people towards European powers. As was the case in the first 
initiative of having an opposition party, the Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (The 
Free Republican Party) in 1930, under the control and tutelary of Kemal 
Atatürk, the people’s support for the new opposition party was surprisingly 
high. In the first free general election in 1950, the DP obtained a majority of 
the votes and formed a single party government. A new opposition party 
became a centre for previously suppressed groups, especially for pious people 
and Kurdish nationalists. Regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey, the new 
government did not create or open any path through which a Kurdish 
nationalist might walk and express resentment, but it stretched the secular 
policy of the state in favour of religion, which created a massive support from 
both Kurdish and Turkish people who still adhered to the popular religion 
instead of imposing an official state religion. It also allowed exiled, important, 
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Kurdish families and tribal leaders to return home and helped them a bit in the 
recovery of what they had lost. 
In the multi-party era, as remnants of the Kurdish rebellions, some Kurdish 
aghas and tribes co-opted with the government. In the previous era, official 
Turkish politics had been washed out from most of the religious Kurdish 
figures because of secularization, and also from secular Kurdish elites 
because of nationalization, unless they cooperated with, or were integrated 
into the secular-nationalist political structure of Turkey. During this era until the 
1960s, there were no representatives of the Kurdish people except for the 
aghas in the Kurdish region, who exchanged the numbers of votes they had 
with personal privileges and basic infrastructure  (Taspinar, 2005) so that 
schools, main roads, and several more hospitals appeared in the Kurdish 
region  (Nezan, 1980). Returned agahs, and tribal leaders now became 
entrepreneurs, landlords or wholesalers, whose main concern became 
economic underdevelopment of Kurdish cities not Kurdish nationalism. 
Furthermore, by looking at the silence of the Kurdish people because of 
military suppression, it can be said that Republican Turkey ‘succeeded in 
compelling Kurds to recognize its political and military authority’ (Yeğen, 2011, 
p.71). This security based denial of Kurdish identity caused a severe economic 
underdevelopment.38 Thus, in the reign of the DP, the Kurdish question was 
perceived as that of economic backwardness of the Kurdish land, which 
created another reason for denial of Kurdish ethnic identity. When the ongoing 
feudal structure of Kurdish society was combined with this economic 
underdevelopment, the Kurdish question was named as a socio-economic 
problem of the East preserved by the feudal groups, and even in recent years 
the governments of Turkey have used this definition. Yet, there was no official 
flexibility in denial of a Kurdish ethnic identity but in practice, several small 
resentments in both Kurdish and leftist Turkish groups would cause the 
emergence of illegal Kurdish nationalist groups. The most important group and 
the one which has influenced on Kurdish politics in Turkey was the PKK which 
developed obviously as a long-terms result of the denial of Kurdish identity 
(Saatçi, 2002). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Insecurity forces people to realize that they are way out of their insecure position, which might be 
economic, social, cultural, identical, and so on. If ethnic violence is accepted as one of these ways out, 
then armed ethnic struggle can be justifiable from this perspective. For more details and a theoretical 
explanation, Icduygu, Romano and Sirkeci’s work might be explanatory (2010).  
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Eventually, regarding the Kurdish condition in the first decade of the multi-
party era of Turkey, Kurdish people were restricted in terms of ethnic identity 
and did not have a chance for any mobilization of a pro-Kurdish political group. 
Yet, under the Turkish citizenship edict, they had an opportunity to manifest 
themselves as part of conservative, and especially leftist, legal political groups 
(Natali, 2005). As mentioned, the main concern was not ethnic rights but 
economic and cultural backwardness of eastern Turkey where Kurdish people 
constituted a majority of the population. The trial of the 49’s (49’lar [in Turkish] 
referring to 49 people who were taken into custody because of a telegram they 
sent to the Parliament and the Prime Ministry concerning the speech of the 
MP Asim Eren) in 1959 can be given as an example of a continuation of denial 
of Kurdish ethnicity, in which forty-nine Kurdish intellectuals were accused of 
being part of activities involving the Kurdish question such as publishing 
poems and articles in the Kurdish language. They were tried and sentenced in 
the last year of the DP government (Güzeldere, 2010). 
Thanks to mechanization of agriculture, Turkey had a remarkable boost in 
economic growth during the initial years of the DP government, from 1950 to 
the mid-1950s. This dazzling development caused an increase in the party’s 
vote but the consequences triggered social and then political changes in 
Turkish politics (Karpat, 1962, p.311). A tremendous migration from rural 
eastern and middle Anatolia reshaped the social structure of big cities. These 
immigrants settled into suburban areas which were adjacent to central Turkey, 
and now almost fully integrated to the city, created an extensive ground from 
which Kurdish nationalist and political Islamist could get support. The more 
migrants the more politicized society which threatened military officers who 
were afraid of erosion of Kemalist reforms (Taspinar, 2005). In addition, the 
foreign debts taken to improve agriculture at the beginning of the 1950s 
caused a dramatic devaluation in currency in 1958 which led to strong 
grievances among Kemalist bureaucrats, especially the military, who had 
already resented flexibility in secular policy as they thought that the 
government was moving away from a Kemalist understanding. The Democrat 
Party experience ended with a coup d’état organized and led by the Kemalist 
military and bureaucracy. Under the leadership of General Cemal Gürsel, a 
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National Unity Committee was formed and was in power for a year and half 
until the 1961 general election (Zürcher, 2009). 
The Case of Political Islam 
Atatürk constitutionalized secularization reforms with his close associates so 
that even successor governments could not change them easily. In addition, 
these reforms, which appeared and are known as the Kemalist ‘six principles’, 
were perceived as foundation stones of the Republic and were guarded by the 
Kemalist military forces. As mentioned before, the initiative of forming an 
opposition party by Atatürk had failed because of surprising popular support. 
This could not exactly demonstrate that the reaction of the people was totally 
due to the secular policy of the government, but it would not be wrong to claim 
that it was a part of it. Şeyh Said’s reaction to the abolishment of the Caliphate 
could be a very early example of backlash against secularization as well, even 
considering it was also furnished by Kurdish nationalist sentiments. The most 
striking reaction against secularization of Turkey occurred in Menemen, which 
is still annually inaugurated by Kemalists in Turkey (Ahmad, 1991, p.7). The 
essence of the event is that when an officer named Kubilay tried to prevent a 
local dervish preaching against the regime, he was captured by the disciples 
and was beheaded. The event indicated that the reforms led by Kemalist ruling 
elites did not go as far as the roots of popular culture inherited from the Empire 
(Kadıoğlu, 1996). This event has been considered as a proof of what would 
happen if secularism had not been in operation.  
These resentments reflected during the multi-party election of 1950 in Turkey 
and resulted in the absolute victory of the Democrat Party (DP). As soon as a 
multi-party election was anticipated in the near future, by establishing more 
religious schools (İmam Hatip Okulları) and one more divinity faculty in Ankara 
University and using religious discourse, the CHP utilized religious sentiments 
to get people`s support (Poulton, 1997). Even, the türbeler, the tombs of 
religious figures, which were closed by the CHP itself, were reopened 
(Zürcher, 2009). This itself was an overt indication that even the CHP 
understood that what they had done was not at the will of the people, but their 
own modernization project. This could be understood from the principle of 
populism which could be summarized with the motto, ‘For the people, despite 
the people’ which was used by the CHP in early the 1930s and reflected a 
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massive cultural gap between the ruling elites and society (Taspinar, 2005). In 
spite of the fact that the CHP sought to appear to be tolerant towards religion 
in order to secure the vote of religious people between 1946 to the end of its 
rule in 1950, as Lewis articulates, religious figures of society in Anatolia had 
never forgiven the Kemalist regime for imposing secularization, and because 
of that, at the first opportunity, they took a stand against it (Lewis, 2002; 
Szyliowicz, 1962, p.432). The slogan of the DP in this election was quite 
meaningful, which was, ‘Yeter, Söz Milletindir’ (Enough! Now the people have 
their say) to illustrate that what had been done for the sake of modernization 
though it was not asked of the people nor demanded by the people. 
In a multi-party regime, both the CHP and DP aimed to obtain the votes of 
religious people. Because of that, the DP showed much more flexibility than 
the CHP in terms of religion. As soon as the DP gained power, the recitation of 
the Qur’an could be heard on radio stations and the language of Ezan was 
returned to Arabic. It also contacted religious groups such as Nurcus and 
exchanged religious flexibility or tolerance with votes (Zürcher, 2009). During 
its government, several demands such as returning to the Arabic alphabets 
and revitalizing the evkaf (foundations) and Shariah ministry by religious 
groups had been brought to the DP, but they were not taken seriously. It can 
be said that the DP as was the case in the late CHP era, just gave a more 
room to breathe for religion and religious people, but did not have any 
intention of going backwards from the Kemalist reforms in terms of 
secularization. For instance, some explicit Islamic publications and the Islam 
Democrat Party and also the Islamist Nation Party, which overtly called for 
returning to shariah, were banned (Poulton, 1997). 
Thanks to the tolerant appearance of the DP and considerable improvement in 
agriculture in the western and central Anatolia, the DP were provided with one 
more absolute victory in the next election. These economic developments 
created a new middle class apart from the upper class which Kemalist state 
ideology established (Lewis, 2002). At the end of the 1950s, a sort of class 
struggle between the new middle class and the Kemalist upper class, ended in 
favour of the Kemalist upper class as one of the components of Kemalism, the 
Turkish military ceased civil administration with the coup in 1960 on the 
grounds that they protected Kemalist reforms eroded by the DP.  
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Conclusion 
As a demarcation of transition from single party to multi party system in 
Turkey, the DP decade is mostly considered to be beginning point of major 
changes in Turkey. What makes this era so significant is actually that first time 
different voices had a change to be heard and suppressed identities were 
explicitly presented to those who were governing the state. That is why, this 
decade is crucial in terms of ‘political opportunity structure.  
Suppression of identities, except secular-nationalist identity led people to 
reside with any alternative options. The DP government did take these serious 
grievances into account by loosening level of pressure over excluded groups 
not constitutionally but practically. In reverse, the DP provided a political 
opportunity by which excluded groups could be integrated into the embedded 
structure. While providing such an opportunity, demands of these excluded 
groups would not met by the representatives (MPs) occupied parliamentarian 
seats from the DP quota. This can be proven with the formation of other 
political parties, such as Turkish Labour Party and New Turkey Party just after 
the 1960 coup d’état. 
It is obvious that practical pressure on both ethnically Kurdish and religiously 
Islamic identities were loosened but not applied into official regulations. That is 
the same historical experience which both identities have witnessed and 
exposed to. Considering such common pressures originated from official state 
ideology, it would not be surprising if someone argues the question of that 
these groups should have come together and combine their strength against 
metaphorically common enemy. Until 1960s and as would be touched upon 
next chapters until the early 21st century they have not, so this situation leads 
us to question of why.  That how they perceived each other so that perception 
prevented such possibility. It will be largely examined in the third part by 
applying critical discourse analysis over official party programmes of both 
political streams.  
Thanks to participating into politics through the DP local and provincial 
braches, excluded groups experienced an open way for communication with 
the state. Since then, not only Kurdish nationalist but also political Islamist 
social movements have maintained their connection with the state agencies at 
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least via a single member of parliament. Once that connection ended illegal 
social and political groups with their own organizations forced the structure to 
meet their demands while their ideas, resources and discourses were 
mobilizing. 
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Chapter Three: Mobilization of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic 
Social Movements, 1960-1980 
Mobilization of the Pro-Kurdish Social Movement 
The fundamental difference in the DP’s policies was that it presented itself as 
being respectful to religion, specifically, Islam,39 and invested in the eastern 
side of Turkey thanks to land reforms and cooperation with aghas and Sheikhs 
in the Kurdish region (McDowall, 2010, p.399). Because of these policies, DP 
obtained support from the Kurdish populated area until it was realized that DP 
had never made a concession from the official state ideology40.  As a result, 
when the first coup d’état of the multi-party term of Turkey occurred in 1960, 
much more fragmented social and political structures appeared in Turkey. Two 
of these fragmentations were Easternists41 (Doğucular) under the sovereignty 
of the leftist movement, who demanded economically, and in terms of 
citizenship, equal treatment from the government, and Islamists who 
demanded Islam to be more influential in every aspect of the state ranging 
from economic to foreign policy.  
This fragmented social structure gained more space in which to operate. 
Remaining traditional representatives of the Kurdish people42 who were/are 
sheikhs and aghas, failed to bridge the gap between what was demanded and 
received. Therefore, rival Kurdish groups consisting of university students 
stepped forward and raised the issues of Kurdish identity together with the 
economic and political issues. They realized a backwardness of the eastern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Alike Said-i Kurdi, Qadiri and Halidi religious orders supported the DP since they unconditionally 
refuse any Republican Party presence in the region and the DP discourse was more religious than its 
rival (McDowall, 2010, p.398) 
40 Naci Kutlay, one of the prominent figures in the preliminary stages of the Kurdish movement states 
that the support of Kurdish people and students towards the Democrat Party in his memoirs. He later 
would become a member of Turkish Worker Party and later on the Republican People’s Party. Yet, His 
memoirs are quite important to indicate that at the beginning of the 1950s, the Democrat Party was 
considered as a chance to get rid of the Republican’s cruelty (Kutlay, 1998, p.29). 
41 As it can be seen in most of the memories of those who witnessed the 1950s and 60s, even at 
universities, Kurdish students were called as ‘Doğulu’, not as Kurds (Kutlay, 1998, p.62).  
42 From the 1925 Seyh Sait Rebellion to the 1938 Dersim rebellion, most of the rebels, elites and notable 
Kurdish families were killed, exiled, or silenced, apart from those who co-opted with Turkish government. 
Two hundred of those co-opting with established Turkish politics and supporting DP had been arrested 
accused of being separatist Kurdists by the military government of 1960. Fifty-five of them were 
convicted and then sent to exile in the western part of the country. As soon as civil rule took power, these 
Kurdish aghas were excused and allowed to go back to their original land. As Taspinar states, this is an 
indication that Turkish civil politics needed to re-establish the traditional relationship between Ankara and 
Kurdish notables who were still able to guarantee a considerable amount of votes in elections (Taspinar, 
2005, p.89). 
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area of Turkey while they were studying in the western part of Turkey. 
Inevitably, they were influenced by communist and socialist ideologies,43 which 
was based on the concept of proletariats and workers whose rights were 
exploited by their agahs, sheiks or governments.  
Regarding relative deprivation, there was no satisfactory improvement in 
social, cultural, economic and political conditions of the Kurdish people in 
neither the Republican nor the Democrat Party era. When extreme deprivation 
in all the mentioned conditions of the Kurdish people met with the leftist 
movement in which Kurdish students were active, firstly, as a part of leftist 
movement and then separately, the Kurdish nationalist movement emerged in 
Turkey. However, at the same time, some of the sons of traditional Kurdish 
representatives—aghas, aşirets and sheikhs, whether they were deputies of 
previous political parties—became politically involved in the Kurdish 
movement. They consisted of rightist or conservative parts of the movement. 
Leftist students and intellectuals took their place in the Turkish Worker’s 
Party44 while conservative and traditional Kurdish notables formed the ‘New 
Turkey Party’45 (Yeni Türkiye Partisi) (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.107). By 
employing these deprivations as a means of propaganda over the Kurdish 
people, both sides became extremely politicized until the 1980s (Kirişçi and 
Winrow, 1997, p.106).  
In terms of economy, the Kurdish populated area remained the most 
underdeveloped area where economic life was still based on agriculture and 
livestock breeding. People who were working for their aghas, sheikhs and 
aşirets, and who did not have their own land and livestock, remained in the 
same poor conditions since there were no land reforms applied nor investment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Integration of the Kurdish movement into the leftist movement in Turkey is explained by Bozarslan 
(2012) by these statements; ‘The Kurdish movement finds a sort of legitimization in the leftist discourse. 
Why? Because the left wing movement and ‘Marxist-Leninism’ as a supposedly unified ideology insist 
strongly on the rights of the oppressed nations to determine their own future...It was thus supposed to 
allow a double emancipation: the emancipation of the Turkish working class and oppressed strata, and 
the emancipation of the Kurds.’ 
44 Kurdish intellectuals taking their place in the party used the party as a legitimate way in which they 
could change the deprived conditions of the Kurdish people and region by using basic rights advocated 
in the new constitution (Ekinci, 2004, p.268). 
45 The New Turkey Party consisted mostly of Kurdish notables from the eastern part of Turkey. An 
important point should be mentioned here is that they were already familiar with Turkish politics as they 
were in contact with previous dominant political parties—the Republican People’s Party and the 
Democrat Party. In the first election they experienced, in 1961, the party received approximately 13 
percent of the votes and more than 50 seats in the parliament. When the party became a member of a 
coalition with the CHP, it was able to help pass a law on the return of 55 Kurdish notables who were 
accused of being Kurdish nationalists and members of the Democrat party who were hen sent to exile in 
the western cities of Turkey (Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p.108; Liaras, 2009, p.5). 
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for animal breeding. Even if there were some, they were totally controlled by 
traditional rulers of the regions. Therefore, capital given to the region, and 
investment, did not directly reach the people (Bozarslan, 2002, p.17). These 
areas were still rural areas in which there was no industry apart from 
agriculture being controlled by these traditional and prominent figures of 
society. From this perspective, there was no direct political or any kind of 
relationship with the centre, as peasants were doing what they had been told 
to do by their rulers who provided peasants’ votes in exchange for political 
immunity, or key investments, from political authority. These established 
relationships were shaken during the Democrat Party era and then reshaped 
by leftist and conservative Kurdish groups after the 1961 constitution provided 
a more liberal political and social environment.  
Economic underdevelopment of Kurdish regions was not because of, as 
official state ideology articulated, a lack of natural resources and adversity of 
geographic features. Burkay refutes these arguments by bringing the 
percentage of natural resources in the Kurdish region forward. He thinks that 
this was a result of a deliberate economic policy of the state. For instance, 
Kurdish populated areas have been one of the richest areas in terms of 
petroleum, iron, chrome, copper, and coal. Despite this fact, the state did not 
invest in the Kurdish region; instead it extracted these mines and sold the 
resources to customers directly, or moved it to the western part of Turkey to 
manufacture it (Burkay, 1986, pp.113-122). Given that Kurdish areas are still 
the most economically underdeveloped areas of Turkey, adversity of 
geographic features cannot be counted as an obstacle since technological 
advancement is now able to overcome most of the natural barriers if 
somewhere is worth the investment. For instance, as Besikci argues, having 
only 3.3 per cent of tractors provided by state, 4.7 per cent of harvesting 
machines and only 6.5 per cent of transportation in the region compare to the 
western part of Turkey, indicate that there is a massive gap between economic 
investment in the east and west (Besikci, 1967, p.87). The economy’s 
worsening after the mid-1950s affected all individuals in Turkey, but the 
Kurdish populated area particularly felt it with ‘the average household income 
in the Kurdish southern provinces earning only 74.8% of the country average 
income in 1968, and the east 83.4%, while Istanbul earned 259.4%, and 
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Ankara 162.0%’ (White, 2007, p.145). This huge gap in average income 
continued until the 1980s in line with political radicalization. These inequalities 
were overtly remarkable for those who had a chance to look at the region from 
the outside and to compare. Eventually, economic deprivation would trigger 
initially the individual, but later, a social reaction to articulate the problem and 
then restore equilibrium, or at least force the authorities to do so (Natali, 2005, 
pp.100-101).  
At the same time, mechanization of agriculture46 and military pressure on the 
Kurdish people forced them to migrate to the western part of Turkey (Van 
Bruinessen, 2000). Extremely poor people in the western part became a major 
human resource for mobilization of the Kurdish movement as they were aware 
of their conditions in the region, and demanded a more comfortable life—at 
least as much as their Turkish counterparts experienced.  
Regarding social and cultural situations, due to the official assimilation policy 
of the Turkish government, the cultural distinctiveness of the Kurdish people 
was eliminated and any attempts expressing Kurdish culture was strictly 
suppressed (Taspinar, 2005, p.91). For instance, traditional Kurdish dresses 
were banned from public areas. Communication in the Kurdish language in 
city centres, and literature on the Kurds and in the Kurdish language47 were 
also forbidden. In addition, the names of Kurdish places were changed with 
the Turkish ones by military rulers of the 1960 coup d’état (Kirişçi and Winrow, 
1997, p.107). Moreover, before military rulers handed the government over, 
civil rulers, and the head of military coup, Cemal Gürsel, threatened the Kurds 
by stating, ‘The army will not hesitate to bombard towns and villages: there will 
be such a bloodbath that they (any rebels) will be swallowed up in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Before mechanization in agriculture, aghas, beys and sheiks needed human resources as their 
fundamental requirement for cultivation. Yet, mechanization dramatically reduced the number of man 
and animal power needed to cultivate the lands, lands which were mostly owned by these traditional 
leaders. This condition was a major factor increasing migration from the east to the west of Turkey 
(McDowall, 2010). 
47 In 1948, founded by Musa Anter, Hüseyin Dikici, Talat Saygın and Veli Dolu Kasımoğlu who stayed in 
Dicle Student Hostel in Istanbul, the Dicle Kaynağı newspaper is an explanatory example of pressure of 
the state on any kinds of literature, bringing key events in Kurdish history such as Zilan killings, Şeyh 
Said revolt, Ağrı, Sason and Dersim rebellions to the fore. It was closed down by the state (Anter, 2011, 
pp.116-8). Since the moment that the Democrat Party government was eliminated by the 1960 coup 
d’état, more liberal social and political conditions were established. Within this circle, Ahmet Hamdi 
Başar published Barış Dünyası magazine. The writings of Musa Anter on Kurdish issues in the magazine 
again constituted a main reason why the magazine was closed down (Anter, 2011, p.170; McDowall, 
2010, p.407). In the early years of the 1960s, Kurdish literature found a tiny space to exist, but their life 
span did not, generally, last for more then a year. For instance, Dicle-Firat Newspaper, Deng Magazine, 
and later Ileri Yurt, Roja Nu can be considered to be examples of such  (Burkay, 2002, p.144). 
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country’ on the ground that the fight between General Qasim and Molla 
Mustafa Barzani in Iraq came close to Turkey’s border (McDowall, 2010, 
p.406). Considering these social and cultural pressures with the official denial 
of Kurdish identity, and additionally, the humiliating attitudes of military officers 
and bureaucrats48 toward local Kurdish people, as if they were not even 
human beings, shows to what degree Kurdish people were deprived of equal 
rights as citizens. 
From a social perspective, the tribal social structure of Kurdish areas was 
disrupted in the late Ottoman Empire due to the centralization policy, but 
Turkish policy makers in the republican era kept this structure intact as they 
inherited, but also did not hesitate to crush, those who were against the newly 
established state structure. The fundamental relationship between the 
remaining aghas, sheiks and tribal leaders with the centre, was that their 
positions were not interfered with, in exchange for votes by the people under 
their suzerainty. In several occasions some of the notables were elected as 
members of parliament49 on the condition of accepting the established official 
ideology. It can be said that it remained the same until a real multi-party 
system was implemented in practise as well. Within this centre-periphery 
relationship, none of the Kurdish cities had met with modernization and their 
own free will to choose what was best for themselves continued to be denied. 
As much as Kurdish people, who were mostly village people, apart from 
notables and bureaucrats living in city centre, met with the new world and 
developments, their desire for these improvements forced them to do 
something. A first wave of Kurdish migration from an underdeveloped and 
socially tribal structure, to developed western city centres, and to relatively 
much more liberal areas, was achieved by high school and university students, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 At this moment, the example of a military officer would be quite meaningful. As Bozarslan mentioned in 
his book, a letter sent by the commander of Bayrambaşlı Military Station in Silvan, Diyarbakır, Mustafa 
Eski, to his friends in Ankara was released to the press, and thanks to a villager somehow obtained it. 
What is written in this letter is clear and irrefutable evidence of that how military officers saw the Kurdish 
people and region. ‘It is not too difficult to live here. As if I am vasted there. 125 piasters are not sufficient 
here. The stick is more powerful here. If you somehow felt into my hands, you could not survive without 
putting two more zeros next to the 1 (500 piaster). I am really strict. Don’t think that I am how I was there. 
I am terrifying Kurds. 19 villages and 9 mukhtars were under my command. It is very active. There is no 
work less than 1000 piaster. I bought land in Diyarbakır. I will build an apartment’ (Translation is mine, 
originally it is in Turkish) (Bozarslan, 2002, p.170). It is also published in Cumhuriyet Newspaper in the 
date of 28 December 1964. 
49 Those notables or their sons were not discriminated against due to their ethnic origin since they did not 
say or want anything in the name of their Kurdishness. İt is known that of the basis of this political 
inclination, approximately one fourth of deputies in the Grand National Assembly have always been 
ethnically Kurdish (Ergil, 2000, p.126). 
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and the second wave was carried out by rural people as a result of 
mechanization of agriculture and the cruelty they faced from aghas, tribal 
leaders and Sheiks (Ergil, 2000, p.125).  
Until the end of 20th century, social and cultural structures of Kurdish people in 
eastern Turkey had never been improved as those living there were left to the 
hands of Kurdish notables and agahs. Therefore, they initially handled any 
nationalist discourse or activities, as they were afraid of that their prominent 
position would be lessened or lost. What Kurdish people experienced under 
this social and cultural structure was one of the greatest deprivations they 
have ever experienced.  
Last, but not least, political opportunities of Kurdish people were controlled by 
their traditional leaders co-opting with the government in exchange for votes 
(Bozarslan, 2002, p.177). These notables were taking parts in Turkish political 
life but not with their original ethnic identity intact. They might become 
significant bureaucrats and even Members of Parliament in a conservative or 
leftist political party, but they were not allowed to engage in politics with their 
ethnic origin intact and they could not mention a single problem of the Kurdish 
people by stating the words  ‘Kurd’ or ‘Kurdistan’. Furthermore, there was no 
political party concentrating on Kurdish rights in which Kurdish people could 
take part and pursue their rights in legal political activities. From the relative 
deprivation perspective, it is undeniable that these accumulated deprivations 
would find a way of expressing themselves, as water finds its way out in one 
way or another. In addition to the previous suppression of the Kurdish ethnic 
identity, language and culture since 1925, these fundamental and ongoing 
deprivations mentioned above, became a source of mobilization among 
Kurdish people. These severe deprivations, compared to those of ethically 
Turkish people, were articulated by both conservative and leftist Kurdish 
groups in the name of ‘Eastism’ (Doğuculuk), just as using the word ‘Kurds’ 
was prohibited by official nationalist state ideology.  
The mobilization of Kurdish ethnic identity can be argued to have commenced 
with the ‘49s’ event which exemplifies the condition in which university 
students for the first time had officially said something. This event occurred in 
1959 when one of the Republican People’s Party’s representatives from Niğde 
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province, Asim Eren, brought a parliamentary question to be responded to by 
the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. In this question, he asked whether or not 
the Turkish government would kill the same number of Kurds in Turkey as 
Turkish men who were killed by the Kurdish in Iraq, based on the principle of 
retaliation. One hundred and two Kurdish students studying in Istanbul 
University sent a telegraph to condemn what Asim Eren said to the Prime 
Ministry and the Republican People’s Party headquarter (Çamlıbel, 2007, 
p.15). This was made public with the headline ‘102 Üniversiteli Kürtlük 
iddiasında bulundu.’ (102 University Student claimed themselves to be 
Kurdist) by Aksam newspaper in 16 April 1959. Among those who were 
arrested for so-called Kurdist activities, there was not yet a clear distinction 
between leftist or conservative groups 50 . Their common point was not 
ideological, but ethnic awareness. In his memoire, Naci Kutlay states that most 
of the inmates thought that they would have been punished severely and even 
sentenced to death. It was not because they did really something so bad, but 
they knew that Kurds had been punished for no rational reason other than just 
for being Kurds (Kutlay, 1998, p.92). This observation is meaningful in terms of 
the perception of Kurds towards official authorities.  
 
By this time, future leaders of the Kurdish nationalist movement were growing 
up in boarding schools and then universities. For instance, Kemal Burkay, 
Naci Kutlay, and Anter, were educated in boarding schools in which they 
realized their different ethnic origin and then that their basic rights were 
suppressed (Marcus, 2007, pp.26-27; Watts, 2007, p.54). While studying Law 
at Istanbul University, Musa Anter’s initiatives of student hostels, namely Fırat 
and Dicle, became a sort of meeting place for students coming from different 
parts of Kurdistan (Mango, 1994, p.978). Tarik Ziya Ekinci who later became 
secretary-general of the Turkish Worker Party, Yusuf Azizoğlu who was 
Democrat party deputy, Faik Bucak who was founder of the KDPT (Kurdistan 
Democrat Party in Turkey), Ali Karahan, Ziya Serefhanoğlu, Edip Altınakar, 
Enver Aytekin, and Necat Cemiloğlu, were all breathing the atmospheres of 
these student hostels (McDowall, 2010, p.405; Alış, 2012, p. 61). In addition, 
young Kurdish students coming from the eastern cities to major cities such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 As Naci Kutlay states in his memory, ‘Kurdish leftism and conservatism, to a degree were predicated 
on this term. It may not be an exact reality but it is mostly true….At the first stage, Kurdish inmates who 
were just Kurds separated as leftist and conservative later’ (Kutlay, 1998, p.84). 
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Istanbul and Ankara were seeking out other students coming from, specifically, 
the same city, and generally from the east. The process in which these 
students were realizing their differences in all aspects, carried them to the next 
level by organizing cultural activities, Eastern nights, unofficial associations, 
and visiting their Kurdish friends would lead to larger mobilization of ordinary 
people from the east (Gündoğan, 2011, p. 408; Kutlay, 1998). Spreading 
socialist and also nationalist ideas among Kurdish students in major cities was 
almost entirely based on personal close relationships (Burkay, 2002, p.132) 
until it would meet with the socialist political party, TWP (Turkey Worker Party- 
Türkiye Işçi Partisi). 
 
These young Kurds attending boarding schools and university would turn into 
pioneering intellectuals promulgating ethnic awareness among Kurds and 
challenging traditional notables, which would be another paramount 
component of declining tribal ties (Romano, 2006, p.42). It is an undeniable 
fact that the role of intellectuals in mobilizing people in a social movement was 
applied in the Kurdish movement as in other cases of social movements.  
 
Furthermore, news from the southern side of the Turkish border could be 
counted as another mobilizing factor among Kurds. Molla Mustafa Barzani 
returned from exile in Iran to Iraq in 1958. Even though he faced a major 
failure in the Mahabad Kurdish state in Iran, he was welcomed there like he 
was a hero. That the news of this return was articulated and written about in 
Turkish media was substantially influential in making the ‘Kurds’ a common 
word, especially under the condition that the existence of Kurds had been 
officially denied (McDowall, 2010; Watts, 2007, p.57). In addition, achievement 
of Molla Mustafa in 1970 as a result of an armed struggle with Baghdad 
explicitly would cause enthusiasm among Kurdish groups and also lead them 
to think about an armed struggle against the Turkish state as an alternative 
means of achieving their goals. These were efficient elements causing 
mobilization of Kurdish ethnicity towards a mass movement. 
 
Educated Kurdish people who had been, or were students, influenced by leftist 
ideologies since the late 1950s, participated in the Turkish Worker Party which 
was the first mass leftist political party which gave space to resentments and 
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grievances of Kurds in Turkey (Yavuz, 2001, p.9; Burkay, 2002, p.161). In the 
party they were not known as a Kurdish group, elites, or people, but known as 
the Eastern Group. They managed to have an article accepted in the party 
programme in the 4th Congress in 1970, in which the existence of Kurdish 
ethnicity was officially declared. The article suggesting that ‘there is a Kurdish 
people in Turkey...’ turned out to be an excuse for the government to close the 
party down in 1971 (Taspinar, 2005, p.92; Gunter, 1988, p.392). Kurdish 
intellectuals in the party were one of the propellant forces to promulgate the 
ethnic awareness as well as the economic deprivation of the region. By 
opening party branches even in some towns far from the centre, their 
campaigns before local and general elections more or less influenced people 
to reconsider their ethnic origin, and the positions of notables (sheiks, aghas 
and tribal leaders), and established parties’ assimilationist policies. This active 
propaganda, despite the regime’s official and unofficial barrier to prevent it, 
gradually mobilized Kurds to attend the party’s activities. For instance, 
organized by socialist or generally leftist Kurdish groups, with the help of 
Turkish Worker Party, the meetings were held in eastern cities where Kurdish 
people mostly habituated, in order to protest the government’s assimilation, 
economic and social policy over Kurds, and were known as ‘Eastern 
Meetings’51 (Doğu Mitingleri). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Eastern Meetings or the “Meeting of the East” was simultaneously and anonymously organized by 
people of the east to express cultural, economic and political dissatisfactions (Watts, 2007, p.65). In 
organizing committees, there were several illegal Kurdish student organizations as well as members of 
the Turkish Worker’s Party. The slogans chanted in the meeting could be taken as proof of a major 
reason for demanding basic rights without having an ethnically separatist knowledge (Gündoğan, 2011, 
p.414).  Thanks to these meetings, public awareness of Kurdish people rose up (Yavuz, 2001, p.10) and 
then several more Kurdish associations were formed to promote Kurdish ethnic identity, in order to 
persuade the government to recognize Kurdish ethnicity and to gain more cultural rights. The most 
effective of them was the ‘Doğu Devrimci Kültür Ocakları’ (Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East). 
The first of these meetings took place in Diyarbakır and then five in eastern Turkey and one in Ankara, 
totally, eight meetings were held. This also can be read as evidence that traditional representatives of 
the Kurdish people were gradually handing over their position to leftist and nationalist Kurdish groups 
(Kirişçi & Winrow, 1997, p.109; McDowall, 2010, p.410; Alış, 2012, p.81). 
Another one was the ‘Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu’ (The Federation of Revolutionary Youth of 
Turkey), in short, Dev-Genç, which was again a leftist organization established and based on freedom of 
association led by 1961 constitution. Its major argument was that capitalist and imperialist policies of 
Turkey had been a major reason behind the denial of Kurdish ethnicity and a lack of economic 
backwardness of Anatolia. It was concerned not only with the Kurdish people but included general 
revolutionary youth regardless of their ethnic origins. In terms of the Kurdish side, the domination of 
agahs, tribal leaders and sheiks over the Kurdish populated area was because of the same reason. 
Therefore, they believed that a leftist revolution in Turkey would bring a solution to the conservative 
established social structure and economic underdevelopment of the eastern area (Kirişçi and Winrow, 
1997, pp.109-110). It can be said that the unity of Turkish and Kurdish students and youths under a 
leftist ideology, did allow for a proliferation of Kurdish movements in these leftist organizations (Romano, 
2006, 42). As it will be touched upon, this unitedness would be broken away after the 1974 general 
amnesty into two major part; the Turkish leftist and the Kurdish leftist movements and later would be 
fragmented in themselves—nationalist, Leninist, Trockist, socialist and so on.  
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I believe that these economic, social, cultural, and political deprivations forced 
educated Kurdish elites, whether they were from leftist or conservative, to do 
something to compensate for their fellow Kurds’ deprivations. Therefore, after 
22 years of silence, since the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion, these 
deprivations were accelerated by nationalist Turkish governments. When they 
reached an unbearable level, coinciding with the most democratic constitution 
of Turkey, it was inevitable that educated leftist and conservative Kurdish 
elites would do something to change the established political, social, and 
economic structure of Turkey. As a result, several leftist and conservative 
Kurdish groups were illegally established.52 They were non-violent groups as 
they hoped the freedoms provided by the 1961 constitution could be used to 
alter the conditions in which Kurdish people were.   
During the 1960s, the educated Kurdish and elites were seen primarily in leftist 
labour unions, associations, and political parties. They were supporting leftist 
ideologies as they thought that it could be a remedy for the Kurdish question in 
Turkey. The reason why most of the Kurdish intellectuals chose leftist 
ideologies is out of the scope of this research, but it is important to give a short 
explanation as to why they thought this the route to take. Traditional Kurdish 
notables who were against nationalist and secular official state ideology had 
already rebelled against the government since 1925 when the first Kurdish 
rebellion occurred, the Şeyh Said Rebellion. From that time to 1938, these 
series of rebellion were harshly and brutally suppressed. The rest of traditional 
Kurdish representatives either kept silence or co-opted with the government. 
In addition, secularization policy eliminated the religious leaders of the Kurdish 
people, who had taken over the leadership from the Kurdish Beys and Pashas, 
governing their own region since Bedirhan Bey Rebellion. By the 1960s, none 
of the Kurdish notables or Sheiks was powerful enough to pioneer a Kurdish 
movement. The first opposition against an established state structure came 
from leftist movement53 regardless of ethnic origin, and Kurdish people had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The Rizgazi, the Kawa, the Tekosin, the UKO (National Independence Army), the PKK, the TKSP 
(Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party), as leftist Kurdish nationalist groups, and the T-KDP (Kurdistan 
Democrat Party of Turkey) and the KUK, as conservative Kurdish nationalist groups, can be given as 
examples of the fragmented structure of Kurdish nationalist movements in the 1970s. 
53Leftist nationalist movements constituted oppositions not only in Turkey but also in most of the world, 
especially in the Middle Eastern and European countries from the 1960s to 1980 (Aydınoğlu, 2007, 
p.187). The 1968 student movements were active oppositions as well. Since student protests in 1960 
against the Democrat Party government, regardless of their ethnic or religious origin, they generated 
dynamism of most of the leftist groups in Turkey. The Dev-Genç (University students) and even the Dev-
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enough from their aghas and sheiks. Therefore the driving force of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement turned to a leftist ideology which was against any kind of 
exploitation by traditional leaders and governments (Watts, 2007, p.59). 
Most of the legal means to change the deprivations of the Kurdish people were 
employed by leftists, and at that time, by some of conservative Kurdish 
groups. Yet, the response of the established state structure was not positive, 
and in 1970 another coup d’état reconsolidated the militaristic, nationalist, and 
secularist state ideology against all oppositional groups. By doing so, a 
political channel through which minority groups could enter was shut down.  
Mostly from leftist groups, but also a considerable number of people from 
rightist groups, were arrested and severely punished. Within this decade, from 
1960 to 1970, Kurdish nationalist discourse gained considerable experience in 
legal and illegal activities. It would not be wrong to claim that Kurdish groups 
employed both legal and illegal means to obtain their basic rights, especially 
the recognition of their ethnic identity yet, they could not succeed.  
As a result of that, from 1970 to 1980, illegal Kurdish groups separated 
themselves from the Turkish left since the mainstream Turkish leftist 
movement did not consider the Kurdish question as a primary one. They 
thought that Turkey’s main problem was the question of regime. As soon as a 
socialist, or to a lesser degree, communist revolution succeeded, Kurds would 
have their all rights under the new regime (Ekinci, 2004, p.28; Koca, 1999, 
p.288; Taspinar, 2005, p.90). What was expected did not occurred in the 1970 
coup d’état. On the contrary, Kurds had to face more severe precautions taken 
by the government. As Kutlay states in his memories, ‘Everything and 
everyone pertaining to Kurds and Kurdishness was taken into prison’ (Kutlay, 
1998, p.101). He might exaggerate the situation a little, but this is what 
happened in 1971 coup d’état regardless of leftist, conservative, legal, or 
illegal, ways they employed; most active Kurds were taken into custody or at 
least followed by the security forces.54 In the previous decade, massification 
and mobilization of ethnically conscious Kurdish intellectuals, and the people, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lis (Revolutionary High School student group) were active political entities in those years (Aydınoğlu, 
2007, p.249). From this perspective, it seems meaningful that, the founder of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, 
was an active university student in Ankara in the Law Faculty. 
54 As a consequence of the coup, not only Kurdish elites and associations were cracked down on, but 
also most of the Turkish leftist groups and intellectuals were removed from politics. The DDKD, the Dev-
Genç, the Turkish Worker Party, the Disk, were all outlawed and relative freedoms gained with the 1961 
constitution were removed (Romano, 2006, p.45; Aydınoğlu, 2007, p.281). 
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had already commenced. Thanks to Kurdish migrants who settled next to each 
other in city centres,55 an increased number of educated Kurdish people, and 
political activities of Kurdish members of the Turkish Worker Party in eastern 
cities, the first time a potential mass Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkish 
history—including the late Ottoman Empire—occurred.   
This potential had been manipulated by illegal Kurdish organizations and most 
of them armed themselves against nationalist state forces and also against 
radicalized Turkish nationalist groups. Within these highly politicized social 
conditions, fights between leftist and rightist groups56 became a routine event 
of everyday life in most of the cities in Turkey. In this term, social 
organizations, whether they were legal or illegal, gained much more 
importance to mobilize people for their ultimate targets. It might be claimed 
that the years from 1970 to 1980 were the years in which most of the 
university students as well as ordinary people were politicised and mobilized. 
Legal or not and Kurdish or Turkish, leftist movements had recommenced 
activities in 1974 when a general amnesty was declared and applied to all 
prisoners. By this time, politicization among youth dramatically increased. 
Kurdish leftists believed that it would be better if they organized themselves as 
separate groups from the Turkish leftist movement, and then some of the 
Kurdish leftist movement saw the solution in an armed struggle against the 
government to establish an independent Kurdish state (Ekinci, 2004, p.316). 
As a response to the government’s policy towards the Kurdish people, which 
was till then based on denial of Kurdish ethnicity, and assimilationist, most of 
the highly politicized Kurdish intellectuals and students participated in one of 
the socialist or communist Kurdish nationalist groups. Massification of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement, which began in 1960, and I believe this process 
increased in parallel with the level of politicization of Turkish and Kurdish 
society. What makes this decade distinct from the previous one is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 No matter what reason the Kurdish people migrated from rural areas to major cities, their settlement 
adjacent to each other made the Kurdish question realized by a society whose members were mostly 
Turks. (McDowall, 2010, p.404) Given that the increased number of migrants to major cities was taken 
into account, how big Kurdish communities had grown to in major cities can be imagined. For instance, 
the current political part of Kurdish nationalist movement, the BDP has two members of parliament from 
Istanbul, one from Adana and one from Mersin. 
56 By saying ‘rightist’ groups, I mean Turkish nationalist groups, namely ‘ülkücüler’. This group was 
nationalist but at the same time, they were conservative Muslims. That is why I called them rightist. In 
Turkish, ‘sağcı’ has more of a religious identity than a sense of nationalism. This might seem 
contradictory but, generally speaking ‘sağcı’ refers to Islamists as well (Poulton, 1997, p.130). 
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radically nationalist Kurdish groups, in other words, ethno-nationalist (Dönmez, 
2007, p.52), which of course can be named as ‘social movement 
organizations’, were established, and they did not have difficulty in finding 
members from every type of social strata. However, I think, the process of 
having a mass nationalist Kurdish movement would be completed by the time 
their fragmented organization structure 57  was reduced to several major 
groups, and that one of them, which would be the PKK a decade later, 
became involved in a direct armed struggle with Turkish security forces. 
Regarding resource mobilization theory, social movement organizations have 
a key role in achieving the goals of the movement. 58  One of the 
implementations of this theory is in the Kurdish case; it cannot be said that 
Kurdish nationalist social movement organizations achieved what they aimed 
for, but it is an undeniable fact that social movement organizations played a 
crucial role in massification of the movement to the level which can be called a 
mass Kurdish nationalist movement.  First of all, they refused the monopoly of 
Kurdish notable families over Kurdish, or mostly, the Eastern question, and 
became prominent pioneering figures of the movement. Today’s public 
supports of Kurdish nationalist political parties, from the People’s Labour Party 
(Halkın Emek Partisi) to the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi 
Partisi), has mostly based on PKK’s individual disciples. 
To sum up, since the mid-1950s, a ‘combination of economic deprivations, 
social injustice and physical displacement as well as ideas of ethnic identity’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Previously listed illegal Kurdish organizations were also divided into several more groups as their 
Turkish counterpart’s experience. For instance, the Ala Rizgari was derived from the Rizgari group, the 
Denge Kawa was derived from the Kawa, the Tekoşin was derived from the Kurtuluş, and the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (Kurdistan İşçi Partisi) was from the T-KDP. This fragmented structure caused intergroup 
struggles in both Turkey and Europe as several leaders of these groups escaped from the military coup 
in 1980 to Europe, and Kurdish mobilization continued there (Robins, 1993, p.663). Moreover, according 
to Ismet Imset, there were 13 Kurdish separatist illegal organizations in the 1970s in Turkey, as well as 
several more in abroad (Imset, 1992, p.379). 
58 For instance, 1977 local elections indicated that what fragmented Kurdish nationalist groups can 
success when they were got together and pursued for a common target. Mehdi Zana ran in the election 
as an independent candidate for the mayor of Diyarbakır. Despite the fact that none of the established 
political parties,-Republican People’s Party and Justice Party did not give a chance, he won the election 
and became mayor of Diyarbakır in 1977 (Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009). The same cases happened in 
Ağrı and Batman districts in which Orhan Alpaslan and Edip Solmaz became majors, respectively 
(Natali, 2005, p.106). In this success, fundamental actors were social movement organization, which 
mobilized people towards one aim by organizing active events such as meetings, brochures, propagating 
the major parties injusticeness. What is more to the point, based on local election results, neither 
established central right and left parties such as CHP and JP nor TWP which was re-established after 
the general amnesty did get what they expected since the region had already become ethnically 
politicized. Fragmented illegal Marxist or socialist Kurdish groups such as TKSP, KUK, Rizgari and 
DDKO agreed on supporting Mehdi Zana. This also shows capability of unification of these groups or 
one dominant nationalist group and can be considered a social ground on which PKK, as remained 
dominant group would grow upon (Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009).  
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(McDowall, 2010, p.404) constituted an atmosphere of revolt which manifested 
by the late 1970s. On the other hand, rightist groups including Turkish 
nationalists, and partly Islamist, were also politicized. The struggle between 
these generally leftist and rightist groups rose to an armed struggle ending 
with deaths among university students and youths. 59  Under the highly 
radicalized society— such as bureaucracy, trade unions, associations and 
even security forces (Dodd, 1990, p.47)— Turkey experienced one more coup 
d’état, in 1980, which crushed disorder for a while but did not totally sweep 
them away.  
Mobilization of the Pro-Islamist Social Movement 
Since the formation of the Republic of Turkey, it has been a unique state in 
terms of being secular despite the fact that 99% of its population is Muslim. Of 
other countries whose population is mostly Muslims, more or less nationalist 
as the Turkish Republic is—but regarded to be closest to European values—
Turkey is unique. Due to the ultimate target of the single party era, the CHP 
took religion under its control by establishing Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). As Eligür (2010) states that political transformation 
from a single party to a multi-party system revitalized the politics of the 
electorate, since then people’s votes became significant to determine who 
would have the power even because of that, the CHP took initiatives to 
change the perception of the party from anti-religious to religion-friendly by 
allowing the reestablishment of Islamic symbols and institutions. Its first 
legitimate rival, the DP, through employing religious feelings, swept the CHP 
away in the 1950 general elections.  
For a decade from 1950, as Kurdish conservative representatives integrated 
into DP politics hoping for more liberal regulations on their issues, religious 
people as well as religious groups who had gone underground during the 
single party era, re-surfaced, and supported the DP. As mentioned above, 
once it is realized that the DP did not reverse the understating of official 
Kemalist ideology suppressing religious affairs but rather, preserved it, 
religious people and groups sought for alternate ways to reach their targets. 
Although the DP was a party of established politics based on Kemalism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 According to Dodd, the estimated number of deaths in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1978 and 1980 were 
35, 90, 260, 800-100, 1500, and 3500 respectively (Dodd, 1990, p.77). Escalation of deaths is a clear 
indication of the level of violent politicization of society in the second half of the 1970s. 
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thanks to it, ordinary suppressed people and groups were brought into politics, 
and they had a chance of to articulate their demands. That was sufficient for 
the guardians of the Kemalist regime, the military, to overtake the parliament 
and supersede a shaken and loosened Kemalist official state ideology and 
politics, with a more robust one in 1960. The military Kemalist regime 
consolidated its power by putting constitutional institutions into practice—the 
National Union Committee and Constitutional Court—in spite of fighting for a 
more liberal constitution in 1961 (Eligur, 2010, p.60).  
The annihilation of the DP from Turkish politics created an extremely 
fragmented political life in Turkey. It is because of that, that the DP’s support 
obtained from all over the country, was actually based on being anti-CHP, 
since their understanding of life and ideology were overtly distinctive, apart 
from slight differences in specifically domestic agricultural, and generally 
speaking, economic policies. Once it is understood, the monopoly of the CHP 
was destroyed and a new way for every different political ideas emerged. 
Severe relative deprivation in terms of identity in a single party era induced 
people to make their living conditions better—basically, to be accepted as a 
Muslim in political, economic, and social spheres of Turkey. To do so, they 
appeared firstly in the DP, as opposed to the CHP’s anti-religious policies, and 
then after the coup in 1960, they continued to participate into politics in the 
successor to the DP, Justice Party (JP, afterwards). In early years of the 
second decade, from the mid-20th century, people desired to be heard and to 
be able to say something on their issues; this coincided with the Islamic 
discourse of the JP. This coincidence lasted until the early 1970s, when the 
very early political Islamist party appeared in Turkish political life, as the MNP 
(Milli Nizam Partisi- National Order Party) (Yavuz, 1997, p.66). For instance, 
the JP’s president, Süleyman Demirel, mostly articulated a hadiths (sayings of 
Prophet Muhammad) or verses of the Qur’an in meetings before elections, and 
accused opposition party, e.g. the CHP, of being communist and leftist which 
was considered to be anti-religion (Geyikdağı, 1984, pp.118-120). During the 
1965 general election campaign the JP, under the leadership of Süleyman 
Demirel, chose the slogan ‘We are right of centre and on the path of Allah’ 
(Ortanın Sağındayız, Allah’ın Yolundayız), while accusing the CHP of being a 
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communist party with the slogan ‘Left of the centre is the road to Moscow’ 
(Ortanın Solu Moskova Yolu) (Zurcher, 2009, p.253). 
As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the resurfacing of religious orders 
began to be active in established major political parties. The origin of most 
Islamic movements whether they are political or not, actually stems from 
religious orders (tariqahs). In the Democratic Party era, these ranged from 
Tijani orders to Naqsibendi orders, and contributed actively to gathering votes 
for the DP. Then their religious groups which stemmed from Naqsibendi orders 
such as Nurcus in general, Süleymancı, Fetullahcı60 and İskenderpaşa orders 
specifically, became integrated into power politics and so had advantage of 
getting positions in the state bureaucracy. These religious groups within and 
outside political parties presented and consolidated distinctive values and 
modern ideas to their disciples. These values were against the Kemalist 
modernity which relied on positivist ideologies, basically nationalism and 
secularism. What these religious groups accomplished was that a progressive, 
and at the same time religiously acceptable, modernity filled the gap created 
by the CHP in single party era. That is why, even in the second half of the 
1940s, the CHP itself made an effort to be considered an Islam-friendly party 
(Yavuz, 2003, p.5). Eventually, it can be said that  
‘Despite this state-led secularization policy, Islam has continued to offer a 
set of rules for regulating and constituting everyday life. Given the on-
going struggle between a militantly antireligious state elite and ideology 
and the majority of society, for many Turkish Muslims, Islam continues to 
serve as a repertoire and a site of counter statist discourse and an 
organizational framework for social mobilization to deal with the stresses 
of development’ (Yavuz, 2003, p.31). 
Khalidiyye and Naqsibendiyye61 have had a long history going back to the 
Prophet Mohammed. Religious orders’ interactions with official state authority 
have always been a major part of the Islamic past. It is the same in the Turkish 
case. From Yavuz’s point of view, religious orders have passed through three 
stages, with the last of them actively in progress in Turkey. The latter two 
stages were ‘confrontation’, represented with Sheik Said (Alam, 2009, p.360) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For more details please see, Yavuz, Hakan M. (1999). Towards an Islamic Liberalism?: The Nurcu 
Movement and Fetullah Gülen. Middle East Journal, 53 (4), pp.584-605 and Yavuz, Hakan M. & 
Esposito, John L. (2003). Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement. New York: 
Syracuse University Press. 
61 For more information, see Yavuz, H. (2003). Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. In addition, as an 
anthropological study of the Suleymancis, the most recent article of Brian Silverstein could be looked at, 
Silverstein, B. (2008). ‘Disciplines of Presence in Modern Turkey: Discourse, Companionship, and the 
Mass Mediation of Islamic Practice’. Cultural Anthropology, 23(1), pp.118-153. 
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rebellion, and ‘withdrawal’ from political scene, from rebellion to the inception 
of multi-party system. The last stage is ‘engagement’ in every aspect of the 
state, ranging from internal to foreign issues (Yavuz, 2003, p.134).  Within this 
engagement process, current major Islamic groups developed out of religious 
orders. Since the early stages of relatively more liberal political conditions in 
the 1950s, the religious orders have become intellectual bases for emerging 
urbanized Islamic dynamics, which were kept intact and developed in remote 
city centres and villages of Anatolia, and then, publicly moved to the major 
cities as waves of people migrated from Anatolia to urban centres. The former 
important figures were Abdülaziz Bekkine and Nurettin Topçu who was leader 
of Hareket movement, Abdulhakim Arvasi, Osman Yüksel, and Necip Fazıl 
who were leading figures of Büyük Doğu62 an intellectual circle that affected 
the discourse of Islamism in Turkey since 1940s (Alam, 2009, p.360). Apart 
from these leaders, there were five major branches of the Naqsibendi 
movement in Turkey: İskenderpaşa Cemaati led by Nurettin Coşan, Erenköy 
Cemaati 63 , Süleymancı 64  formed by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, İsmailağa 
Cemaati located in Fatih/İstanbul, and Menzil Cemaati centred in the 
Adıyaman province.  
In addition, one of the most effective and largest Islamic movements is the 
Nurcu movement, which was initiated by Said-i Kurdi—from Nurs village in 
Bitlis province—and is based on his writings, Risale-i Nur Külliyatı. Said-i Kurdi 
offered an alternative modernization project predicated on Islamic rules rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Born into a high-level Ottoman bureaucrat family and educated in an Ottoman school system in which 
both religion and the sciences were taught, and also who studied in Paris, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek 
established his own periodical, Büyük Doğu which was closed down several times but survived until 
1971. By writing his essays in his periodical, he was one of the most effective and prominent figures of 
Islamic intelligencia since the republican era. He was against a secular understanding of the state, but 
also more or less combined Islam as an inseparable part of Turkish identity (Atasoy, 2005, p.76). 
63 It dated back to the late 19th century as its former was Mehmet Esat Efendi, born in Arbil, Iraq and 
trained in a Naqsibendi education circle. After the Young Turks revolution in 1908 he returned to Istanbul 
and settled in Üsküdar as he was sent to exile from İstanbul to Arbil, by Abdulhamid II. After he died in 
1931, Mahmut Sami Ramazanoğlu became the leader of the movement, and his successor was Musa 
Topbaş since 1984. Due to economic opportunities in the 1990s, the movement transformed into an 
apolitical civil society with its own charity organization, educational networks, and publishing houses 
(Yavuz, 2003, p.144). 
64 It was established by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan who was a Naqsibendi Sheik (1888-1959). His 
tremendous efforts to teach the Qur’an to younger generation in order to protect them from 
contaminating ideologies such as secularism imposed by the state, resulted in political Islamism 
accelerating in 1950s in the Arab world and Shi’a and Wahhabi fractions of Islam, which all of them were 
considered hazardous towards Sunni-Hanefi Islamic understanding. His insisting on teaching the Qur’an 
to children was treated as if he had betrayed his country, by Kemalist state ideology who were taking 
Islam under control and reshaping it in line with their target. Thus he was arrested in three times and 
taken into custody many times. In the DP era, contrary to the CHP term, he was employed by the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs to train future imams, most of whom would become disciples of the 
movement (Yavuz, 2003, p.145). 
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than the Kemalist modernization project. His alternate ideas were to promote 
science and the rule of law based on Islamic law in addition to human-made 
law [secular] as Kemalist modernization had been (Atasoy, 2005, p.79). What 
distinguishes these two modernization projects is that the former originated 
from society’s deep roots and spiritual traditions, while the latter is based on a 
western modernization experience. This dualistic comparison can be extended 
as follow: ala turka versus ala franga, salon versus family room, positivist 
science versus science which is at peace with religion, the modern versus 
traditional, state-based versus society-based, top-down imposed reforms 
versus bottom-up self-leading reforms, and so on (Yavuz, 2003, p.156). In 
short, his cluster of ideas was founded on his interpretation of religious rules 
with the needs of society as a focus, and was much more suitable to take root 
in the society. In light of these discourses, he did not hesitate to support a 
multi-party system and the DP against the ruling CHP (Yavuz, 2003, p.156; 
McDowall, 2010, p.398). 
Even though it was outlawed to disseminate Said-i Kurdi’s writings, his 
network of disciples was able to take them from where he was and then copy 
them by hand, and circulate them. Hence, his writings have become regular 
material to be read in privately rented gathering houses, which were known as 
Dershane (Hakan, 1999, p.197). Continuation of, and an increasing number of 
dershanes, created an Islamic socio-political conscience among his disciples 
and resulted in a high level of societal approval. Thanks to reading and 
discussions on the writings, a new Islamic, and also cognitive, language was 
constituted, which was different from the Nurcus and from other religious 
groups. Said-i Kurdi was a member of the Naqsibendi religious order yet his 
legacy ended up founding a distinguished Islamic social movement65 as a 
result of mobilization of his ideas (Yavuz, 2003, p.165).  
Another Naqsibendi leader, Mehmet Zahit Kotku, also promoted an 
understanding of Islam, which was in favour of science and a progressive 
political movement. He became the leader of the Gümüshanevi Naqsibendi 
order as a successor of Abdulaziz Bekkin who died in 1952. While he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 After his death, his disciples divided into three major Islamic social movements, which were mostly 
crystallized after the 1980 coup d’état. They are those who follow the Fettullah Gülen, which is now 
called the Gülen Movement, the Yeni Asyaci and the Yeni Nesilciler. These major factions, as well as 
dozens of small-scale Nurcu groups, have been a part of normal life all over Turkey.   
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imam in Iskender Pasha Mosque in Fatih/Istanbul, he brought an intellectual 
circle consisting of university students into being. He can be considered as 
being one of the architects of current political life in Turkey since he taught 
most of the key figures of Turkish political life. These include: Turgut Özal, 
Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who have both been prime 
ministers, Fehim Adak, Korkut Özal, Hasan Aksay, and Lütfi Doğan, who have 
become ministers of Turkey. His ideas which favoured scientific 
improvements, technology, an open market economy, and most significantly, 
the participation of Muslims in politics, encouraged Muslim intellectuals to take 
positions in the economy, social groups, and politics. He was the one who 
directed and intellectually guided his disciples to establish the first political 
Islamist political party in Turkey—Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) and then Milli 
Selamet Partisi (MSP) (Atasoy, 2005, p.122; Yavuz, 2003, p.141; Alam, 2009, 
p.362). 
These branches of the Naqsibendi order were undeniable moral forces 
blossoming within society as a reaction of religiously sensitive people towards 
the Kemalist modernization project which imposed secularism through top-
down reforms. That is why their strong presence in society continues to be still 
active and recruits people. The re-emergence of these religious orders in the 
1950s, as a result of a relatively more liberal and democratic political 
atmosphere, applied crucial methods in order to mobilize their ideas and 
groups. This resulted in fragmented Islamic social movements whose basic 
target was to raise an Islamic conscience among people.  
First of all, as with the Kurdish case, electoral politics among embedded 
political parties created a sort of contestation which resulted in guaranteeing 
religious groups votes in their favour. This opened the gates for less political 
pressure on the groups. Therefore, adherents of religious groups found more 
political freedom to overtly publicize their ideas to a society which was ready to 
receive them. For instance, most of the fragments groups of the Nurcu 
movement supported first the DP, and then after the 1960s, divided into other 
conservative political parties including the Justice Party, the NSP and the 
nationalist conservative ‘The Republican Peasants’ Nation Party’ 
(Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi) (Zurcher, 2009, p.264; Sakalliogllu, 1996, 
p.240). Thanks to the struggle for the vote, established political parties shut 
74	  	  
their eyes to several activities of these Islamic movements which were not 
directly anti-secular, but mostly concentrated on virtue and moral issues. In the 
process of interaction between embedded political parties and Islamic groups, 
adherents of the groups infiltrated official state institutions and also had easy 
access to critical positions in the state apparatus (Kramer, 2001, pp.63-64). As 
a result, more publicly and state-founded mosques, Imam Hatip schools, and 
Qur’an courses, have been established.  
Imams of mosques appointed by the Directorate of Religious Affairs were not 
only leading crowds in prayers, but also conducted Sermons (Vaazlar) to 
increase a religious conscience of people in mosques.66 Imams who were 
adherents of one of the mentioned Islamic groups acted as a recruitment 
agency. There was a major mobilization activity of the Imams. The current 
leader of the Gülen Movement, Fetullah Gülen, known as Hoca Efendi, 
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, and Mehmet Zahit Kotku, were all imams of 
mosques in which they performed speeches highlighting Islamic values and 
virtues as well as a consistent view of Islam in the context of modern concepts 
and conditions. Furthermore, student hostels built with people’s donations by 
the Süleymancı movement were also working as hotspots where high school, 
university, and Qur’an students were taken into areas wherein the movement 
operated, in order to promote their Islamic ideas.  As a result, religious orders 
in mosques, dershanes, and dormitories (Alam, 2009, p.361) were and have 
been nurseries wherein, whether they were or are politically Islamist, or not, 
youth with Islamic consciences were encouraged and became active disciples 
disseminating what they learnt and were taught.  
Printed-base propaganda and radio station (currently newspapers, TV 
stations, journals, and any other periodicals) of religious groups focusing on 
subjects of faith and moral values ought to be included in the list of significant 
ways in which the mobilization of Islamism occurred among not only youths 
but also small-scale merchants. These instruments of mobilization have 
gradually, improved and mushroomed in numbers congruent to that of Islamic 
groups in Turkey after the 1980s. Magazines and newspapers, and books, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The quantity of mosques in Turkey went down slightly in the single Party era, apart from that, the 
number of mosques has always increased. Özcan’s research on this subject is quite indicative in which 
he finds out that between 1973 and 1999, their numbers increased from 45,152 to 75,000 (1994). 
Considering these mosques as a branch of one or another Islamist group, it would is possible to imagine 
to what degree these mosques contributed to the mobilization of Islamism. 
75	  	  
especially Risale-i Nur Külliyatı, include translated books published by other 
political religious groups in various Muslim countries, especially from the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the revolutionary Islamic movement of Iran. 
For instance, in 1967, a small educational group, Nurcus, Mihrab Publishing, 
was established and published a magazine named as ‘Ittihad’. The groups 
transferred its print-based instruments into a newspaper called ‘Yeni Asya’ 
after their previous publishing house was closed down by the 1971 military 
rulers of the coup. Under the editorial leadership of Mesut Toplayıcı, another 
magazine called ‘Köprü’ was formed, and served the same aim of generating 
‘harmony in reading and interpreting Said-i Nursi’s works’ (Yavuz, 2003, 
p.173). Moreover, the NSP’s unofficial newspaper, ‘Milli Gazete’, was 
established in 1973 and still continues to be published. Its major slogan, 
located just under the newspaper’s name, has been ‘Hak Geldi, Batıl Zail 
Oldu’67 which means, ‘The truth (Islam) has come, Vanity has been perished’ 
(Emre, 2002, p.183). The political Islamist perspective of the party could be 
traced with this slogan referring to the fact that the actual owner of the country 
has come and would take the power from West-imitated ruling elites. 
Furthermore, small but effective political Islamist magazines took their places 
in 1970s. These include: Düşünce, Şura, Tevhid, Hicret, Sebil, Milli Gençlik, 
Hareket, Diriliş, and Yeni Devir, and so on. Current prominent political Islamist 
writers and thinkers were the first writers of these magazines and journals  
Increased popularity of political Islamic movements in the Muslim world in 
general, and specifically in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia, inevitably influenced 
Muslim youth in Turkey. Most Muslim groups fought for their countries’ 
independence from western colonial states. Soon after their independence, 
Islamic features of society were, as in the case of most Muslim countries, 
ignored by the state apparatus. That is why Muslim groups created a social 
menace against established state structures—thanks to political Islamic 
groups. As Torrow argues, contemporary social movements have gained a 
transnational character crossing national borders (1996, p.61). Translations of 
prominent leaders of political Islamist groups such as Hassan al Banna (1906-
49), Sayyid Qutp (1906-64), and Abu’l A’la Mawdudi (1903-79) in the 1960s, 
and Ali Seriati and Khomeini in 1970s, have explicitly reframed political Islamic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 This quotation was articulated by the Prophet Mohammed when he was bringing down the idols after 
Mecca was conquered and he entered into the Kaaba.  
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movements’ ideas and discourse (Eligur, 2010, p.62; Göle, 1997, pp.53-57).  
Given that the Islamic revolution of Iran succeeded in 1979 by Khomeini68 
fostered this influence, as it was the first state which fought for Islamic rule and 
arguably gained victory against a secular regime.  
Migrants from Anatolian villages, small cities, and major cities were, as with 
the Kurdish nationalist case, becoming a source of human resources for the 
Islamic social movement, as most of them were still religiously devout and has 
not encountered the modernization process of cities (Alam, 2009, p.365). In 
cities’ suburban areas, Anatolian and Kurdish migrants were ‘economically 
disadvantaged, culturally disintegrated and politically isolated’ (Narli, 1999, 
p.42) and these deprivations facilitated a radical ideology rooted in their lives 
by opening the door to demonstrate their deprivations. Furthermore, graduates 
from the İmam Hatip Schools were educated in religious institutions and thus 
their raised Islamic consciousness also facilitated a mobilization of Islamic 
social movements (Aksit, 1991, p.146-152). Legally allowing graduates of 
Imam Hatip Schools to enter universities in 1973 would result in ‘the creation 
of religious counter-elites’69 (Oran, 2008, p.26; Alam, 2009, p.364). These 
elites would later integrate into state institutions as well as high positions in 
conservative companies, which would allow them to gain more economic 
importance in liberalized economic restructuring. University students, the 
same as in the Kurdish case, commenced to politicize due to the fact that they 
were also under the influence of a rising Islamic consciousness and aware of 
political Islamic discourses abroad and in their homeland. They not only had 
the opportunity to read translated books of Hasan al-Benna, Mewdudi, and 
Sayyid Qutb, but also established legal and illegal student associations. Milli 
Türk Talebe Birliği70 (MTTB, afterwards, National Turkish Students Union), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The MSP and Islamic social organizations organized a rally in Konya in 1980, just before the coup. 
The reason for this was to condemn the decision by Israel to proclaim Jerusalem as its capital instead of 
Tel- Aviv. The slogans and chants articulated in this rally were quite indicative to what extend the Milli 
Görüş was politically Islamic, and its adherents were influenced by Iranian Islamic revolution. Some of 
them were as follows: ‘Şeriat Gelecek, Zulüm Bitecek’ (Sharia will come, brutality will end), ‘Ya Şeriat, Ya 
Ölüm’ (Sharia or Death’, and ‘Bugün Iran, Yarın Türkiye’ (Today Iran, Tomorrow Turkey) (Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği, 1981, pp.187-188). 
69 As soon as the RP’s coalition government was forced to resign from power, following politicians 
together with military support passed draconian laws from the parliament to curtail the entrance of İmam 
Hatip graduates into the university in order to cut the vein of religious educated intelligencia and from the 
middle class. 
70 The MTTB’s history goes back to the late Ottoman time, the CUP government era. It was first 
established by the CUP rulers in 1916 and at that time, the pan-Turkist ideology was prevailing within the 
institution and its members until 1920. The republican Kemalist government re-opened in 1926 and 
followed the official state ideology. The organization, which began for the third time in 1946, was under 
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Milli Mücadele Birliği71 and Akıncılar72 were active political Islamist groups 
constituting the roots of the movement.  
Thanks to these mobilization opportunities, most of the Islamic groups have 
explicitly enhanced their roots in society. Since the 1970s, Necmettin Erbakan 
and his close associates, who were spiritually nurtured and encouraged to get 
involved in economics and politics by İskenderpaşa Cemaati, led by Mehmet 
Zahit Kotku, formed the NOP and its heir the NSP with the slogan of ‘Just 
Order’ (adil düzen) underscoring the significance of Islamic values, and 
refusing a strict secularist implementation of governance in Turkey (Barkey, 
1996, p.47). By doing so, I think, the party made itself politically Islamist. As 
not only Şeyh Kotku but also the rest of Naqsibendi religious orders gave 
importance to politics and economics along with moral and faith issues, none 
of them had chosen to form a political party to pursue their ideas except the 
Milli Görüş movement. Instead, they preferred to integrate into electoral 
politics with established political parties through a relationship of providing 
votes in exchange for political tutelage. This distinctive feature of the Milli 
Görüş movement compares to other religious orders and groups, which made 
the movement small but effective as a political party throughout the 1970s, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the control of leftist students and from 1965 to 1980, Islamist and nationalist discourse dominated (MTTB 
Tarihi n.d.). It was re-established in 2004 by its former Islamist members. In its previous term, the union 
was one of the centres for mobilization of Islamic conscience, which the RP wanted to use if as its youth 
organization as it did the same for the Akıncılar and the Büyük Doğu circle. 
 
71 The Milli Mücadele Birliği, established by Aykut Edibali, a university student in the law faculty at 
Istanbul University, and the Yavuz Aslan Argun, was a legal association aimed at having its members 
attain key positions in the state apparatus since all problems stemmed from mal-systemization of the 
State. That is why the association focused on training people according to religious rules. Its principles 
were against Zionism, capitalism and communism in favour of rightist and nationalism, in religious terms. 
As a part of their education system, to re-vitalize the Prophet Mohammed and his companions’ lives, 
they encouraged reading their biographies along with the Qur’an since they thought the cause of social 
depression was the move away from the Qur’an. In addition, ideological education had always been 
given with religious education. They had also followed events in other Muslim countries and read 
translated books written by the leaders of their political Islamist movements. Their cultural and art 
magazine was named Pinar, which later became a publishing house, which is still operating, and 
publishing a monthly journal, Umran (Büyükkara, 2007, p.125).  
72 As a legal organization, the Akıncılar Derneği (Riders Association) was established in the 1970s and 
was and Sporcular (sportsmen). On the other hand, several more illegal organizations such as the 
Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş Ordusu (TIKKO-Islamic Freedom Army of Turkey), the Türkiye İslam Kurtuluş 
Cephesi (TIK/C-Islamic Freedom Front of Turkey), the İslam Devriminin Acil Mücahitleri (IDAM-Rapid 
Freedom Fighters of Islamic Revolution), the İslam Kurtuluş Partisi Cephesi (IKP/C-Islamic Freedom 
Party Front) and so on were formed, and mobilized radical Islamic conscience by organizing martyrdom 
nights among Muslim youths (Eligur, 2010, p.70). Despite the revolutionary and radical expressions in 
their names, these groups did not endorse violent political activities as much as the leftist and Kurdish 
Nationalist radical groups did (Eligur, 2010, p.91). Yet, they were quite active in cooperation with the Milli 
Görüş movement and the MTTB. 
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party which has been known as the political Islamist party of Turkey73 since 
then.  
In general, the multi-party system caused the re-emergence of society’s 
religious sentiments which evolved into separate social groups by distancing 
themselves from the established political structure, and ended up with a 
distinctive Islamist social movement which mobilized from the 1950s to the 
1980s, consolidating themselves after 1980s to the present. Among these 
Islamist social streams, only one of them is considered as political Islamist, the 
Milli Görüş Movement. This movement presented with political parties 
beginning with the NOP, and continued with successor parties until the AKP 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and Development Party) since the rest of 
them generally focused on moral issues and preferred not to directly delve into 
active politics but to be part of embedded political parties in Turkey. Despite 
the fact that every single one of them followed different paths as their method 
of mobilization and political preference, their common ground was and has 
been, to increase Islamic consciousness. They might be organizationally 
fragmented, yet the whole of Islamic movements in Turkey share the 
undeniable fact that they are shaping economic, social, cultural and political 
life. The process after the 1980s to the present can be labelled as a 
consolidation of organizational framework of each Islamist group in Turkey, yet 
it is not covered by this research. Thus, the influence of social movement 
organizations in the failure or success of a social movement will not be 
examined here in order not to divert from the main subject.  
Conclusion 
The Kemalist state structure itself created its own enemies since it suppressed 
any differences which did not fit into its ideology. Deprived mainstream groups 
have developed themselves, at any chance they could throughout their 
histories. The massive mobilization of Kurdish nationalism and Islamism in 
Turkey yielded oppositional groups offering alternative modernization and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For instance, in 1976 when an international conference chaired by Necmettin Erbakan, deputy prime 
minister of Turkey and attended by foreign ministers of Muslim states, was organized by the MSP, in his 
speech, he emphasized five fundamental commonalities amongst Muslim states. These were: the United 
Nation of Muslim Countries, the Common Economic Market of Muslim Countries, the Common Defence 
Alliance of Muslim Countries, the Cultural Cooperation of Muslim Countries, and the Common currency 
among Muslim states (Ceylan, 1991).  The envisaging of a future in line with the interest of not only 
Muslims in Turkey, but also for all Muslim states, can be included in the discourse of political Islam if this 
attitude is compared to other religious movements which have co-opted with established power politics in 
Turkey. 
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social structure projects against embedded ones. In other words, as Blumer 
states, ‘Social movement can be viewed as collective enterprises seeking to 
establish a new order of life. They have their inception in a condition of unrest, 
and derive motive power on one hand, from wishes and hopes for a new 
scheme or system of living’ (Blumer, 1969, p.99). These two identities worked 
towards the day in which they could explicitly express their identity, and 
eventually, create their own social movements to fight for their thoughts, ideas, 
norms and values, which they perceived to be contradictory to official state 
ideology.  
Since early modern Turkey, the last period prominently indicates that both 
political streams have consolidated their arguments and taken their ideological 
stance towards others. It seems that not only their historical exclusion from 
political, social and economic structures of Turkey but also their ideological 
developments and consolidations is another common point which can be 
taken as a reason why indeed they should have come together to fight back 
against their common repressor. Just after the explanation of how these social 
movements institutionalized themselves, how much importance their 
ideological distinctiveness’ has had in how they perceive each other in the part 
three.  
In this chapter, it is claimed that mobilization of these mainstream political 
oppositions occurred between 1960 and 1980. They have insisted on their 
natural identity to revitalize them and struggle for these norms. By doing so, 
there is the opportunity to investigate in further chapters, why and how current 
pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish active political streams representing their 
individual identities have been constituted. 
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PART TWO: Institutionalisation of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-
islamic Political Groups 
Chapter Four: Institutionalisation of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-
Islamic Political Groups 
Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, since the 1950s to the 1980s 
Kurdish nationalists and Islamists groups have grown substantially politically, 
and in one way or another they have become embedded in Turkish politics. 
Ranging from historical denial of their identities to development of ideological 
background and event to number of internal fractions, their commonality is 
prominent. During this period there was no single group representing either of 
these social movements. Yet, from the 1980s and after, one single group 
broke free of each political movement and became seemingly unique, and 
particularly representative of each political stream. The PKK and later on pro-
Kurdish political stream began with the HEP until the BDP as pro-Kurdish, and 
the Milli Görüş Movement started with the MNP to the AKP as pro-Islamic. The 
rest of these social groups in each political stream were eliminated from or 
integrated into the established state structure. These two specific groups 
continue to project an alternative to modernization or development policy 
contrary to the official state ideology. That is why they have always been a 
part of the political development of Turkey.  
Institutionalisation of Grassroots Pro-Kurdish Political Stream 
The PKK,74 formed by Abdullah Öcalan75 and his close associates, gained its 
reputation after it survived internal dissent amongst Kurdish nationalist groups 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 I would like to mention here that the argument is that because of the PKK’s insurgents, the military 
reaction of the state was so harsh against Kurdish nationalism. I do not want to try to justify the existence 
of the PKK, but I think based on previous chapters, the PKK is an outcome of the state’s Kurdish 
policies, which relied on denial and assimilation. For instance, the armed fights between leftist and 
rightist groups were a reality of daily life during the late 1970s. This is to say that taking up arms was not 
a new phenomenon among Kurdish nationalist groups as most of them had already become armed in 
case of possible attacks coming from Turkish ultra-nationalist groups and also from rival Kurdish groups. 
75 The claim that Abdullah Öcalan was an agent of the Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT-National Intelligence 
Organization) (Mumcu, 1993) has been repeatedly articulated by several prominent Kurdish nationalist 
figures such as Kemal Burkay, Ibrahim Sahin, and Gani Sungur. I have conducted interviews with them 
and they presented their evidence that he was lead by the MIT to form the PKK. Whether it is true or not, 
as the main subject of this research is the perception between political Islamist and Kurdish nationalist 
political parties, I will not touch upon this subject. 
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(Gunter, 1990, pp.60-67) and the 1980 coup d’état, by escaping to Syria 
(Imset, 1992, p.29). News of the party came to the fore when its militants 
attacked security forces in Hakkari province in 1984. The reasons for the 
emergence of this kind of armed group are explained in previous paragraphs 
so I do not intend on delving into this subject. However, in addition to these 
reasons which I have already explained, cruel treatment of military regimes 
towards those demanding better human rights and recognition of their Kurdish 
ethnic origin during the three years military regime, following the 1980 coup 
d’état forced non-PKK supporters among the different Kurdish nationalist 
groups which were advocating none-violence, to pay attention to this 
organization. Furthermore, the PKK preserved its leading figures while most of 
the Kurdish nationalist groups were eliminated thanks to the military regime. 
Before the establishment of a legal political party stream with the HEP in 1991, 
the PKK remained the only one dominating the Kurdish nationalist movement 
from the 1980s to the 1990s.  
Although the history of the PKK might date back to the early 1970s, because 
of its founder Abdullah Öcalan’s activities in Dev-Genc, and subsequent 
meetings before the party was publicly announced, it was formally established 
in 1978 with a handful of leftist-nationalist students who formed the nucleus of 
the movement in Ankara. 76  It can be also described as an example of 
separation from the Kurdish leftist movement and from the general but Turkish 
dominated leftist movement of Turkey (Imset, 1992, pp.9-11). The PKK was in 
an expanding period to a more organized structure in Syria when the 
September 12, 1980 military coup crushed most of the leftist groups. In his 
own words, Öcalan states that, ‘in any way, our armed resistance had not yet 
expanded. In some areas the armed groups were only just coming into being 
and these were amateur groups. The armed groups were just at the point of 
developing and only newly moving out to the rural zones from the cities. Just 
when we were in such a situation, the September 12 regime took the power’ 
(Öcalan, 1991, p.20). Despite the fact that the coup considerably weakened 
the organization by taking the members of the central committee down and left 
no room for reorganization, the PKK succeeded in escaping to, and settling in, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 It is interesting to note that, within the 20th century, beside Hoybun, all of the Kurdish nationalist 
organizations were established either in Ankara or Istanbul then disseminated their presence towards the 
Kurdish-populated eastern part of Turkey. The PKK is not an exception to this. 
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Syria. Until the first attack on Hakkari province to assault the security forces 
and demolish Kurdish agahas collaborating with the Turkish government, the 
PKK re-organized itself militarily with the help of Syrian intelligence (McDowall, 
2010, p.422; Marcus, 2007, p.76), and the KDP (Taspinar, 2005, p.99). 
Furthermore, from a political perspective, it organized its first and second 
congress in 1981 and 1982, respectively. 
After the military and political developments with the help of Syrian authorities 
and the KDP (Gunter, 1991, pp.9-11), the organization came to the stage of 
implementation of their goals which was primarily to establish an independent 
Kurdish national state which was ideologically, Marxist-Leninist (Jongerden 
and Akkaya, 2011). From an ideological perspective, one of the PKK 
members, Abdurahman Kandemir, stated in a martial court, ‘our aim is to 
establish a Communist Kurdish state. This state is to be a member of the 
Warsaw Pact’ (Gunter, 1988, p.401). From 1984 to 1986, the attacks were 
directed at security forces and Kurdish agahas (Manafy, 2005, p.108) but were 
not adequate enough to establish the name of the PKK as a popular Kurdish 
nationalist group supported by Kurdish people. It was still an organized but not 
grassroots party. As the PKK militants attacked security forces in Cukurca, 
Hakkari province, and killed twelve soldiers, the response of the Turkish 
government was to bomb the PKK’s camps in Iraqi territory. Moreover, the 
village guard system has systematically and officially been applied in the 
region, which would later become one of the major targets of the PKK attacks. 
It is important to note that by 1986, the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan himself 
realized that they did not have public support from amongst Kurdish people in 
Turkish territory (Imset, 1992).  
In 1987, attacking Kurdish civilians77 in the region and revitalizing a ‘village 
guard system’ were two crucial points that contributed towards the PKK 
becoming an organization of which Kurdish people themselves were afraid. As 
a response to the guerrilla attacks on civilians, security forces and village 
guards, reaction of the military escalated and increased in its cruelty. Within 
this process, the PKK tried to get public support from local Kurdish people but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Two houses were bombed by the PKK militants in Uludere, Hakkari provinces. These houses were 
raided in a village in Mardin province, and five village guards were killed in Siirt. These attacks created 
an atmosphere where for the first time, regular Kurdish people were caught between two forces, both of 
which they were extremely frightened. 
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once it could not succeed, then it used armed attacks to attempt to get support 
based not on trust or support, but on fear and terror (Bal, 2007, pp.76-77). The 
fundamental aim of the PKK in doing this was to obtain secured areas where it 
had locals’ support in order to settle its forces in Kurdish territory in Turkey as 
the relationship between the PKK and the KDP in northern Iraq were 
deteriorating. On the other hand, the military forces, as it has been since the 
beginning of the republic, did not bother to gain people’s support. They co-
opted with remaining tribal leaders and notables in the struggle with the PKK. 
There has not been any indication of trust between gendarme forces, most of 
whom were not in the region voluntarily, but were mostly sent to the region 
and were counting remaining days to leave, and the locals who were not 
treated as human beings but were mostly humiliated. As Imset states, 
because of that, ‘villagers were squeezed in between two forces’ (Imset, 1992, 
p.60). Due to continuing foreign support and local assistance, because they 
were afraid, the PKK prevailed and actually extended its presence in the east 
of Turkey. By these years, the concept of ‘a handful of bandits’ (bir avuç 
eşkiya) developed into an organized terrorist-separatist organization which 
came to define what the PKK remains to be in the minds of Turkish politicians 
and security forces (Marcus, 2007, 129). In addition, when the intensive 
military presence were treating local people as if they were enemies (Taspinar, 
2005, p.97), combined with high level security measurements which witnessed 
scenes in which the Kurdish people saw their children78 killed by the Turkish 
military, the feelings of hatred and alienation 79  spread gradually to local 
people. Even those who had not been supporters of the PKK started to 
sympathise with their struggle (McDowall, 2010, p.427). Although the initial 
cooperation of local people with the PKK was because of fear, since the late 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 This argument might be meaningless to someone who is not familiar with the family structure and 
culture of Kurdish people. To explain, tribal relations or kinship among Kurdish people has preserved its 
importance. If at least one member of a small group of relatives is killed or tortured by security forces, it 
would be deemed appropriate for all of them to begin to hate the Turkish state and to sympathise with 
the PKK’s struggle, even though the ideology of the PKK (Marxist-Leninist leftist ideology) seems strange 
and unacceptable in their own Islamic culture. Therefore, as long as the PKK can maintain its existence, 
it is more likely that one of the relatives of the killed guerrillas would replace him or her.  Considering the 
existence of the PKK for more than thirty years, it is unimaginable to what extent this factor contributes to 
the required human recourses the PKK has needed. Considering the torture of Kurdish prisoners in 
Diyarbakır prison from the 1980s and onwards, (Zeydanlioglu, 2009) the number of people taking up 
arms against the state and siding with the PKK would innumerable. 
79 The report prepared by the SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) was quite indicative of how the 
security forces perceived locals in 1986 and was put forward by Cumhuriyet newspaper as quoted: 
‘…eastern Turkey had become a sort of concentration camp where every citizens was treated as a 
suspect, and where oppression, torture and insult by the military was the norm.’ Quoted by Taspinar 
(2005, p.100). With this information he considers this to be a fundamental reason why the PKK could 
easily recruit fresh supporters, and local support to challange the Turkish state. 
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1980s it has gradually transformed into unconditional support, at least for a 
considerable number of Kurdish people by the early 1990s (McDowall, 2010, 
p.429).  
For instance, Imset, quoted from a confidential report prepared by the 
government in Ankara, states that in Şırnak for example, while in 1987 the 
local people were referring to the PKK as ‘terrorist’, and in 1988 as ‘students’, 
in 1991 they were openly referring to them as ‘the guerrillas’ or ‘the 
resistance’. This change in language demonstrates how effectively PKK 
propaganda had improved. Sirnak is now a potential PKK stronghold and may 
soon be subjected to increased popular activity. The reason for the 
effectiveness of the PKK propaganda is partly explained by Osman Öcalan 
who states, ‘...even if the PKK has won the city of (i.e.) Cizre […] we only won 
half of it with our efforts while Turkey, with its oppressive policies, has given 
the other half to us on a silver plate’ (Imset, 1992, pp.223-224). Considering 
these two quotations together, I do not think that it is going to be difficult to 
understand to what extent the state policy of Turkey has become an influential 
factor justifying the existence of the PKK in the eyes of Kurdish people. As the 
report envisaged, in the current condition, Şırnak and Hakkari provinces of 
Turkey are now where the PKK has unquestionable public support.  
To obtain such popular support from the locals, the organizations changed 
their attitudes towards Islam by using Islamic discourse in pamphlets and 
statements where formerly it had been strictly forbidden to practice religious 
prayers at every stage of the party. This policy change can also be seen as a 
reaction to the state’s using of Islam to eliminate ethnic nationalism by 
emphasizing the brotherhood of Muslims (McDowall, 2010, p.435). The 
fundamental aim was to illustrate an argument that it was not an obligation to 
be a Marxist or generally leftist to fight back against the Turkish state, and that 
it was okay if you were religious. Also Islamic verses and sayings of Prophet 
Mohammed were used to justify their fight (Imset, 1992, p.137). Another 
dramatic change in the PKK’s strategy was to declare that federalist solutions 
might be acceptable instead of an independent Kurdish state, which would be 
extracted from current Turkish state territory (Imset, 1992, p.231). With all 
these evaluation and changing processes, eventually, by the 1990s, the PKK 
has emerged as a well-organized violent terrorist organization (Criss, 2008). It 
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established political, financial and military administration all over Turkey80 and 
Europe81  by the late 1980s and developed them right up to the present 
(Gunter, 1997, p.31; Byman, 199882).  
The early 1990s was when a legal pro-Kurdish political party was formed—the 
HEP. The local support of the PKK was automatically transferred to legal 
politics as legitimate electorates voted for pro-Kurdish political parties. From 
the first pro-Kurdish legal political party to the present one, the BDP, the more 
support the PKK obtains, the higher the percentage of votes are gained by the 
incumbent political party. The popular support of the legal pro-Kurdish political 
party movement has increased to slightly more than 6% in general elections. 
Thanks to this support, once again the candidates of this political party 
movement won a large majority in local elections. For instance, current 
representatives of this political movement, the BDP is now running 99 
mayoralties in the south eastern and eastern region of Turkey, including key 
cities and districts such as Diyarbakır, Van, and Tunceli. Furthermore, the 
banning of pro-Kurdish political parties one by one, with an accusation of links 
to the terrorist organization the PKK, removed Kurdish representatives from 
the assembly. Because of this Leyla Zana, who was elected as a MP from the 
SHP in 1991 sought to make her oath in Kurdish together with Turkish, and 
enhanced the justification of the armed struggle of the PKK with the argument 
that there is no room in the political arena in Turkey, and so armed struggle is 
the only way to obtain the fundamental rights of Kurds.  
That is why the political struggle of Kurdish nationalism has evolved together 
with the armed struggle of the PKK and has never become extinct since 
beginning. By 1991, attitudes of security forces towards Kurdish 
demonstrators, such as opening fire with real bullets over crowds (Imset, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Due to the economic hardship and evacuation of villages in the early 1990s by military forces, internal 
migration from the eastern to western provinces resulted in an accumulation of Kurdish people in specific 
districts. Ethnically conscience Kurdish people settled in major cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and 
Manisa, and they have created a suitable suburban environment for increasing the support of the PKK 
since the 1980s, and later on, for pro-Kurdish political parties (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.133). 
81 The migration from Turkey to European countries, because of political and military suppression of the 
Turkish government on Kurds (Taspinar ,2005, p.98), and work opportunities from the 1960s up until the 
present, created ethnic Kurdish ghettos, in which increased ethnic conscience gathered people together 
to form organizations, networks and communication channels. They have also become a financial source 
for the PKK since the 1980s (Saatci, 2002, p.559; Lyon and Ucarer, 2001). 
82 Daniel Byman explains the understating of ethnic terrorism from a theoretical perspective and I think 
his theory suits the case of the PKK. He claims that the actual targets of terrorist activities are not 
rivalries, but indeed their own constituencies, identity creation, creating defensive excuses, and internal 
group maintenance. 
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1992, p.241), I believe, was the time when a real mass Kurdish nationalism 
established itself with the help of the PKK and inadvertently, the Turkish 
security forces. Killing people randomly and unsolved murders of political 
Kurdish activists83 directed the Kurdish people towards a Kurdish nationalist 
movement as an act of revenge and also to obtain their basic rights (Ergil, 
2000, p.128). It is natural that people have chosen the PKK side against the 
Turkish security forces as the latter’s history has been full of assimilation, 
isolation, humiliation,84 and suppression of Kurdish people since the inception 
of the Republic. Given the previously mentioned snowball effect, which means 
that one member of the PKK who has been killed led to greater membership in 
the PKK by his or her relatives, and the endurance of the PKK for more than a 
decade, it is obvious that the number of people supporting the PKK or at least 
sympathising with it has dramatically increased. Because of that, I argue that 
the actual mass of Kurdish nationalism embraces a significant number of 
ordinary people, and was initiated by the PKK and embedded, by the 1990s, in 
Turkey. 
Institutionalisation of Grassroots Pro-Islamist Political Stream 
The political life of the political Islamist Milli Görüş movement commenced in 
1969 when Necmettin Erbakan was elected to the parliament as an 
independent member of parliament from Konya province. And then, the 
establishment of the Milli Nizam Party led the movement in politics until now 
(Dagi 2005, p.4). After the 1980 coup d’état when all political parties were 
abandoned, the Refah Partisi was established by the same political Islamist 
cadre of the MSP in 1983. It had the same political argument that the 
elimination of Islamic symbols and practices was the major source of 
fundamental problems in Turkey, (Yavuz, 1997, p.70) including the Kurdish 
question. Again, because of military intervention into the coalition government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 ‘Faili meçhul Cinayetler’ (unidentified murders) were actually identified in the eyes of local people. It is 
known that these murderers were a part secret security services. Opening fire on locals by security 
forces while a killed terrorist was being buried is a repeated example. For instance, Vedat Aydin, the 
provincial president of the HEP in Diyarbakır was killed by an unidentified assassin, but no suspects 
were taken into custody.  Moreover, at his funeral, a masked man who was accompanied by an official 
uniformed member of the police forces, opened fire on attendants from the top of Diyarbakır castle. 
Again, nobody was arrested for this action (Imset, 1992, p.253). 
84 Imset’s interviews with locals in south eastern Turkey, and in various resources, clearly indicate that 
members of security forces in the region, especially military personnel, publicly humiliate Kurdish people. 
For instance, Sergeant Recep Cömert was one of them. What locals think about him is that, ‘he not only 
harasses and frightens us, but also swears at us in an unbearable way. Taking the significance of honour 
and dignity among Kurdish people into account, the negative influence of this kind of harassment on 
Kurdish people is beyond imagination.’ To see more examples on the same issue, please look at 
Imset,1992, pp.257-276. 
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in 1998,85 the RP was closed and its all representatives were transferred to the 
next successor political party, Fazilet Partisi (FP, afterwards, the Virtue Party), 
which was also banned by the constitutional court. For the same reason that 
the RP was banned, the FP was closed down and the current political Islamist 
party, the Saadet Partisi survived until the present. The fundamental claim of 
this political movement has been that Kemalist secular nationalism emulating 
the West is not a suitable modernization project; instead, by reusing the idea 
that Islam is an obstacle for modernization and progress, an Islamic based 
modernization is possible and more applicable in a Muslim society (Gülalp, 
2002, p.30).  
Islamic vernacular discourses articulated by Necmettin Erbakan were new in 
the 1970s and suggested a different modernization project. He first of all, 
opposed the dominance of western culture in Turkish culture and economy, as 
well as the military (Dagi, 1999, pp.23-25), and offered moral and material 
improvement based on Islamic regulation that did not copy westerns. He also 
restated the glory of the Ottoman time, which endured for six centuries and 
controlled lands in three continents. For instance, in his early propaganda, he 
states, ‘Thus, the Europeans, by making us copy them blindly and without any 
understanding, trapped us in this monkey’s cage and as a result, forced us to 
abandon our personality and nobility. That is to say, he was successful in this 
because he used agents recruited from within, who felt [inferior and] disgusted 
with themselves, bringing to his knees the Turk who for centuries could not be 
defeated by the crusades and external blows’ (Erbakan, 1970, p.196). The 
movement argues that replacement of all Islamic heritages and tradition with 
western ideals is the root of all problems in Turkey, including the Kurdish 
question. In my interview with Mustafa Kamalak, the head of the current 
political party of the movement, Saadet Partisi, he also states that Kurdish 
question appeared entirely because of wrong westernization projects of the 
ruling elites of Turkey (Kamalak, 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 This time, military generals employed a unique method to overthrow the Erbakan-led government. In 
the NSC meeting which convened on the 28 February, 1997, the council made a written pact to restore 
and preserve the secular character of the state against the menace of Islamism, and forced the 
government to sign these decisions. This process has been called the ‘28 February Process’ and 
enforcement of it had it referred to as being a ‘soft coup’. These decisions targeted Islamic social, 
economic and political developments. As a result of this process, the combined forces of military, media, 
trade associations, as well as the judiciary, made a case against the RP to close it down. Eventually, the 
Erbakan-led government had to dissolve in July 1997 and the party was banned in 1998 (Dagi, 2005, 
p.7). 
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By preserving the same anti-west and westernization point of view, the second 
political party of this movement, the Milli Selamet Partisi, 86  took part in 
coalition governments with the socialist CHP led by Bülent Ecevit, later on with 
Justice Party and the Nationalist Action Party during 1970s. By doing so, the 
political movement proved that it did not have any radical ideological barriers 
to cooperation with other political parties having different ideologies. From this 
perspective, more radicalized Islamic groups criticized the party, accusing it of 
being a part of the established political system which was controlled by an 
official state ideology. At the same time, it was the main reason why the leftist 
rooted Kurdish nationalist movement, including the PKK perceived the political 
Islamist MSP and then the RP as a part of an official state ideology which has 
been used to pacify religious Kurdish people and used as a counter measure 
for ethnic Kurdish politics.   
This political stream also proposes a new way for small-scale Anatolian 
merchants who were religiously sensitive, to challenge the monopoly of certain 
firms whose owners were close to the official state ideology in the Turkish 
economic structure (Ahmad, 1991, p.16). After 1983, when Özal’s Anavatan 
Partisi87 (ANAP, the Motherland Party) came to power and applied more liberal 
and export-oriented economic policies, these small-scale Anatolian merchants 
had the opportunity to grow and compete with established large companies 
(Gülalp, 2001, p.437). This competition is represented between TÜSIAD 
(Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği) and MÜSIAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve 
İş Adamları Derneği), 88 respectively. They represented the struggle between 
official state ideology (Turkish nationalist and secular) and Islamists. Revival of 
political Islamism in economic terms generally relies on analysis of these two 
associations and close relations of MÜSIAD’s member companies with the 
Islamist political parties (Oran, 2008, p.30; Atasoy, 2005, p.172). In short, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The Party obtained 11.8 and 8.6 percent of the votes in general elections in 1973 and 1977, 
respectively and became one of the significant political actors by taking part in all coalition governments 
from 1973 to 1980 and holding several ministries (Toprak, 1984).  
87 What distinguishes between the conservative ANAP and the pro-Islamic Refah Party was best 
evaluated by Feroz Ahmad who stating that, ‘They [Turgut Özal and the men in his inner circle] may be 
‘cultural Islamists’ because of their social background and their technical education, but they are not 
reactionaries and do not approve of the Islamist wing of their party, nor does it approve of them’ (Ahmad, 
1988, pp.766-767). On the other hand, Muhittin Ataman’s article examines the ethnic policy of ANAP by 
considering Özal and his party as an extension of political Islam (Ataman, 2002). 
88 It is a voluntary association that was, at the beginning, a group of small business entrepreneurs, each 
of whom employed less than 25 workers. Its main argument has been that the state authority does not 
treat them equally in comparison to big companies whose owners are close to the political circle. Its 
members state that the current economic policy of the state favours large firms and treats them as ‘step-
children’ (Sungur ,1997, p.99). 
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economic liberalization policies since the 1980s led to Islamic finance, and 
religious Anatolian merchants and industrialists’ growth. This development 
was formulated by the RP as the concept and phrase, ‘adil ekonomik düzen’ 
(just economic order) (Salt, 1995, p.21; Cinar, 1994; Lapidot, 1996). 
The social welfare programme of the RP has to be seen as one of the sources 
of its grass root support in local and general elections. Municipalities in which 
RP candidates won local elections delivered incentives such as coal and basic 
foods 89  in pre and post election terms, and also raised an Ottoman 
consciousness by organizing events recalling the Ottoman times (Akinci, 1999, 
pp.76-77). They provided a good example through services in major cities e.g., 
by solving water problems, muddy roads of suburbian areas, and air pollution 
problems. These efforts turned into public support especially in municipal 
elections all over Turkey. As a result, the RP which won 17 municipalities with 
five per cent votes in the 1984 local elections increased the number of its 
municipalities to 100 in 1989, and in the next local election, to 327 in 1994, 
including Konya, Ankara, Istanbul, Sivas, Van, Urfa, and so on (Esmer, 2002, 
p. 76; Yavuz, 1997, p.78). Together with the corruption of incumbents’ political 
parties and mayors, which caused a major decrease in the number of votes in 
local and general elections (Gülalp, 2001, p. 438; Eligur, 2010, p. 136), the 
well-known reputation of RP municipal administrations carried the RP to a 
clear victory in the 1995 general election, with 158 representatives and 21.4 
per cent of total votes (Akinci, 1999, p.78). ‘Although they have different 
concerns and motives for supporting political Islam, these different segments 
of society are united in their common opposition to Kemalism and their 
expression of political will through the assertion of an Islamic identity’ (Gulalp, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Just before the 1994 local and 1995 general elections, the mayor of Bahçelievler from the RP, 
Muzaffer Doğan distributed one and half tons of coal in winter and grocery packages during Ramadan for 
free. The mayor of Kartal district, Mehmet Sekmen also delivered clothing and soup for the needy 
(White, 1997, p.26). Akinci states that the party worked as if it was a social welfare agency rather than a 
political party (Akinci, 1999, p.77). What makes the RP and its successor parties distinctive from the 
other political parties, as Delibas states, ‘their activism is a year round activity. They visit households on 
all social occasions and offer help in times of crisis, showing solidarity, compassion and sympathy. The 
provision of material benefits is the primary activity (37 percent) of the VP’s neighbourhood committees. 
These benefits include the supply of food, coal, clothing, bursaries for school children, health care and 
medical aid, assisting people to find jobs, or solving problems in the government offices, reflecting the 
dire socioeconomic conditions of the urban poor’ (Delibas, 2009, p.98). This feature of the Refah or 
Fazilet Parties is not limited with their case, but can be generalized for the most of the Islamist 
movements in the Middle Eastern and other Islamic societies. Espesiot’s (2002) observation on this 
issue is quite meaningful to quote: ‘Islamic movements and associations became part or parcel of 
mainstream institutional forces in civil society. Islamist activist organizations and NGOs created networks 
of mosque, hospitals, clinics, day-care centres, youth clubs, legal aid societies, foreign language 
schools, banks, drug rehabilitation programs, insurance companies, and publishing houses’ (p.147). 
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2001, p.444). In light of these figures, despite the fact that its history as a 
political party began only in 1970, it had been a party of Islamists. I would 
claim that the first time the Milli Görüş movement turned into a grassroots 
political Islamist party was the 1989 local election in which they gained 100 
municipalities. 
Explicit Islamic idioms and arguments created the movement’s ideological 
base and did not ease up until the closure of the FP in 1999. From then until 
now, the position of the movement towards the European Union has changed 
because they realized that they needed more democratization to be free of the 
Kemalist state suppression on the party (Yavuz, 1999, pp.127-128). As a 
result of this turning point, the party divided into two—traditionalists 
(Gelenekciler), on the one hand, and innovationists (Yenilikciler)90. The former 
continued its political life within the circle of the SP and the latter organized as 
the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which has been in power since 
2002, and will be discussed in a separate chapter.   
Official State Ideology and its Rivals  
Relying on the explanations above, the emerged and institutionalized mass 
pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist political movements have been represented by 
certain political parties and have created certain norms and values which 
presented an alternative to the embedded structure. I think it is reasonable to 
state that two major opponents of official state ideology have emerged and 
consolidated, and formed a mass movement to fight. Interactions, and to some 
extent armed struggle, among Kurdish nationalism, political Islam, and official 
state ideology, have definitely shaped every aspect of politics in Turkey. Due 
to the fact that legal political parties that are Kurdish-rights-centred have 
formed in the 1990s, and that the research examines the perception of these 
oppositional groups, from now until the end of next chapter a short 
examination on how the PKK and the Milli Görüş perceived each other will 
take place. 
As stated previously, nationalization of religion in Turkish culture imposed by 
official state ideology has actually been a part of Turkish politics since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In the last general Congress of SP, Abdullah GÜL representing ‘yenilikçiler’ and Recai KUTAN 
representing ‘gelenekçiler’ run for the presidency of the party. The former part slightly lost the elections. 
Then, they resigned from the party and established today’s incumbent political party, AKP (Dagi, 2005, 
p.10).  
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inception of the Republic. It might seem contradictory when on the one hand, 
dismantling Islamic symbols and institutions occurred, but on the other hand, 
the establishment of a Directorate of Religious Affairs, and accepting only 
Muslim Turkish minorities from the Balkans (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997, p.18), 
proves that religion has always been a component of official state ideology 
whether it was controlled, institutionalized (Alam, 2009, p.357), or used as a 
means to disseminate the concept of ‘the love of homeland’ and ‘respect for 
state and military’ which was imposed people as a part of Islamic faith. For 
instance, throughout the history of modern Turkey, mosques have been run, 
and a governmental institution, the DRA, has paid imams. Sacred Islamic titles 
have always been in use, such as şehit (martyr), gazi (veteran), and the 
military are called ‘peygamber ocağı’ (the heart of Prophet) (Smith, 2005, 
p.456). These features of Islam were strictly suppressed in the single party 
era, but since the multi-party system, they have been used for electoral 
purposes and used as a countermeasure against leftist movement by the state 
apparatus. That is why Sakallıoğlu suggests that, ‘the values and norm 
structures they [ethnic nationalism and religion] have maintained among their 
adherents have sometimes been ‘reinforcing’, at other times ‘conflicting’, 
considering the fact that religion has provided the indispensable ingredient of 
national identity both in Turkey and in the region’ (Sakallıoğlu, 1994, p.256). 
This institutionalized and controlled Islam became a social weapon to be used 
against leftist opposition. Since leftist movements in Turkey re-appeared in 
politics as student organizations in the late DP decade, official state ideology 
did entitle those as communist affiliated with infidels to delegitimize them in the 
minds of ordinary Muslims. As the Kurdish nationalist movement was born in 
leftist movement, any attempts to express Kurdish ethnic rights and the 
underdeveloped conditions of the Kurdish region were considered to come 
from separatist ‘heathens’ (secularists) to the general public.91 For instance, 
arrest of the forty-nine university students who telegraphed a letter to the 
prime ministry to condemn Asim Eren’s statements on Kurds were portrayed 
as belonging to communist and separatist attempts to overthrow the 
government. In addition, the decision to ban the Turkish Worker Party through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 ‘Bloody Sunday’ refers to the suppression of leftist groups protesting the American navy visiting Turkey 
in 1969, by ‘rightist’—including Islamists—in front of police forces. The police did not prevent violence but 
rather, opened a corridor for rightists against leftist. This is a good example of the partial closeness of 
Islamists to the state authority (Saylan ,1992, p.100).  
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the accusation of separatist activity, due the fact that it was the first political 
party which officially approved the existence of Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey, 
was predicated on once again, so-called separatist and leftist ideology. By 
doing so, the government facilitated its struggle against a Kurdish nationalist 
movement under the label of ‘struggle against communism’ [all leftist 
variations]. For instance, the Marxist-Leninist PKK fighting for Kurdish rights 
was branded as ‘unbelievers’ in order to keep religious Kurdish groups away 
from it (Smith, 2005, p.456; Gunter, 1988, p.394), and to legitimize the killing 
of PKK fighters in the eyes of Muslims. This strategy of using religious 
sentiments and employing religious language to balance against the leftist and 
Kurdish nationalist movement, have been used until the present, along with 
the strategy of perceiving and promoting the Kurdish issue as a security 
question and not as a human, minority, or political rights question.  
Building upon the preceding paragraph, the Turkish-Islam synthesis is a 
production of this strategy firstly put into operation, unofficially, in the 1970s, 
and then officially consolidating itself after the 1980 coup d’état (Yesilada, 
1988, p.364; Saylan, 1992, p.89; Taspinar, 2005, p.139; Kurt, 2010, p.123) 
because of the ‘National Culture Report’92 which considered the  ‘protection, 
development, and spread of a national culture based on Sunni Islam as a 
solution to the threat of communism in Turkey’ (Eligur, 2010, p.105). To this 
thesis, being Muslim and Turkish is considered as being two inseparable 
components of this identity. It is thought that muhafazakarlık 
(conservativeness) could be defined as being inextricably, Muslim and 
Turkish. Within this conception, distinct ethnic origin has been excluded from 
legitimate identities, according to official state ideology.93 At the same time, the 
synthesis excluded a political Islamist identity which could strive for a more 
Islamic state and society. Therefore, this thesis has been carried out and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 The report was prepared and declared on 8 October 1982, by the State Planning Institution by the 
order of General Kenan Evren, the president of National Security Council. 
93 Nationalization of Islam is not something created in the 1960s or 70s, but it has already been applied 
by the Islamist authors, Sebil ur-Resad, Büyük Cihat, Selamet and Serdengeçti magazine in the 1940s—
members of the Sufi religious orders (Alam, 2009, p.361; Saylan, 1992, pp.92-93). These magazines 
superseded the phrase of ‘Türkiye Müslümanları’ (Muslims of Turkey) with Müslüman Türk (Muslim 
Turkish), which echoes the changing of the phrase of ‘Türkiye Milleti’ (the nations of Turkey) to ‘Türk 
Milleti’ (Turkish Nation) by the Kemalist regime in terms of Kurdish nationalism.  
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implemented by the hands of non-political religious orders and the DRA 
(Directorate of Religious Affairs).94  
The unity of these two groups might seem contradictory. The former is not 
eager to have an extremely politicized Islamic struggle, but instead prefers a 
more convenient, gradual Islamic influence on the individual and societal faith 
and moral issues. The latter does not want to have a political challenge to its 
core existence.  Thus, on the one hand, the imams in mosques articulated an 
Islamic brotherhood of Turkish and Kurdish ethnicities which articulated 
obedience to the state as a requirement of their belief. On the other hand, 
centre right political parties, including Anavatan (ANAP) and Doğru Yol Partisi 
(DYP), religious groups such as Nurcus, especially the Gülen movement 
(Yavuz, 1999, p.126), Süleymancıs, and other tariqahs that directed people to 
be good Muslims without mentioning ethnic origins and rights as an Islamic will 
be considered. In other words, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was put forward 
as an antidote to any kind of radicalization, including leftists and Islamists, by 
advancing a limited knowledge of Islam to be taught in secondary and high 
schools, and through the claim that Islam was one of the core elements of 
Turkish culture (Toprak, 1990, p.10).  As a result, neither the political Islamist 
movement,95 including the MNP, MSP, RP, FP, nor the Kurdish ethnic rights-
centred political movement, including the HEP, ÖZDEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP 
and the DTP, escaped persecution from the Constitution Court, and 
subsequently, were outlawed. Despite this legal barrier, both political 
movements survived and their current successors, the AKP/SP and BDP 
respectively, are still operational in Turkish politics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 The DRA was constitutionalized by with the 1982 Constitution’s article 136. This article states the goal 
of the institution as being one of ‘promotion and consolidation of national solidarity and unity.’ By the 
1990s, the budget of the institution was significantly raised, and had much more subsidises even than 
the ministries of Foreign, and Interior Affairs. The numbers of personnel and mosques under the control 
of the DRI have also dramatically increased. For instance, it operated 5,000 Qur’an Courses in 1993, 
had over 90,000 staff and more than 70,000 mosques in 1999 (Oran, 2008, p.28; Poulton, 1997, p.186). 
95 Even though the synthesis excluded political Islamist and left-oriented Kurdish nationalist movements, 
it is a realty that it contributed to the mobilization of political Islamism (Eligur, 2010, p.85). Regarding the 
revival of political Islamist discourse and adherents, Ates Altinordu’s article in which he compares the 
revival of German Catholicism in the second half of the 19th century, and Turkish Islam in 1970s and 
afterwards, gives a theoretical explanation as he applies the ‘theory of Revival-Reaction-Politicization’. 
This theory argues that if the states’ response towards the revival of a religious groups is harsh and 
oppressive, then reactions of these certain religious groups to the backlash will accelerate politicization 
among these given groups (2010, pp.521-526). The stage of religious revival resembles the mobilization 
of social movements. This resemblance can be found in Altinordu’s statements arguing that, ‘Religious 
revivals increase the public visibility of religion in terms of religious dress and practice… Religious 
revivals also build the cultural and organizational capacity required for successful politicization’ 
(Altinordu, 2000, p.522) by bolstering and then diffusing religious collective identity.  
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As mentioned, the official state ideology of Turkey, Kemalism, affiliated with 
secularism and Turkish nationalism, has had an immediate and powerful 
reaction towards any sort of menace to its core existence even though these 
menaces were stemming from people’s own will. In terms of political rights, 
this natural reflex of the state’s ideology to protect itself, has always been 
employed by state apparatus. For instance, the most important one has been 
that of the military which has taken power four times (1960, 1970, 1980, and 
1998) in the name of protecting the state from separatists, communists and 
Islamists, and has re-established the order—convenient with Kemalist state 
ideology (Sakallıoğlu, 1997). In each case, the military regime crushed any 
indication of opposition, including political parties, associations, foundations, 
and illegal groups, regardless from which direction the threat comes. 96 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court of Turkey which consists of those 
following Kemalist state ideology, and which makes decisions according to 
what best protects state ideology, has been the other state agency. The court 
did tolerate the existence of neither Islamist political parties (the cases of 
Refah and Fazilet Partisi) nor political parties pursuing Kurdish rights (the 
cases of HEP, DEHAP, DEP, ÖZDEP, HADEP, and DTP) as to protect official 
state ideology (Kemalism) from any possible threats has been its duty. In 
these cases, it is explicit that the court has not intended to uphold individual 
rights over the state’s rights, or to work towards an embedded society, but has 
worked to the contrary. As Arslan states,’ [it] adopted an ideology-based 
paradigm in political party cases’ (2002, p.11).  
In both examples, judicial or military limitation does not seem applicable when 
it comes to a fundamental assumption of the state. Kogacioglu (2003) argues 
this argument in his article by examining the HEP and Refah Partisi cases 
from a legal perspective. This protective attitude of official state ideology or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 The year 1980 saw the experience of the greatest military-based coup. Generals conducting the post-
coup period for three years, through the National Security Council (NSC), created a depoliticized society 
and an authoritarian state, due to the constitution of 1982, which was prepared by academicians but 
supervised by generals. To the constitution, the civil politicians in the pre-1980 period were all banned 
from returning to politics for five years, and all labour and trade unions were abandoned except the 
TÜRK-IS. Together with the NSC, a supra-university institution, Yüksek Öğrenim Kurumu (YÖK-Higher 
Education Council) to oversee the universities and their administrators, was constitutionalized. And also 
certain professionals such as soldiers, teachers, civil servants and even high school students were 
prohibited from forming associations (Yesilada, 1988, p.351-355). 
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structure towards any initiative for pluralist democracy97 in Turkey prevented 
the inclusion of formerly excluded groups of society such as the Kurdish 
nationalist and Islamists into the state structure. Belge calls any institution or 
aspect of an established official ideology as an ‘alliance’ since it is not 
constrained by inclusion of the military and the Constitution Court, but extends 
to the universities, professions and media (Belge, 2006, p.636). The escalation 
of unacceptable Kurdish nationalist and Islamist opposition from the 1980s to 
the 1990s forced the official state apparatus to behave undemocratically. 
Given the mobilization of excluded groups since the inception of the multi-
party system is still in progress, to what degree these political groups have 
developed and arrived at the level of disrupting the embedded state ideology 
can be estimated. Eventually, the level of democratization has opened room 
for the growing political Islamist and Kurdish nationalist parties. In spite of this 
their political parties which have been removed from politics, they have 
managed to form another, and have gone further along their paths to achieve 
their goals.  
Conclusion 
This chapter of the thesis sought to illustrate that both political movements 
have become leading political actors in Turkish politics. Since early modern 
Turkey, they might take different path but experienced historically almost 
developments. As an example of this, they have created their own 
institutionalized organizations representing their own unique alternative 
political structures in contrast to the embedded official state ideology. The 
processes with which they have become grassroots organizations developed 
from the 1980s to the 1990s. The explanation above shed lights on this 
process and it can be said that they have been ready to take over the official 
state ideology and supersede it with their own social, political, economic and 
cultural projects. It is also indicative that the unrest amongst the military, by 
reducing the Kurdish question to a security issue, and anxiety amongst 
secularist elites of the state, against rising Islamist politics, forced them to take 
precautions in order to stop the resurgence of these parties. Neither military 
attacks on the PKK, nor the presence of a considerably high level of security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 A theoretically explanatory article, by Mehran Kamrava, is worth mentioning here as it defines the 
democratic system of Turkey as, ‘pseudo-democratic politics’ due to the involvement of non-civilian 
elected factors–vis-à-vis the rise and fall of the Refah Party (Kamrava, 1998). 
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forces in the region, and neither anti-terror laws, nor the efforts made to 
prevent Islamist social, economic and political agents to take power, worked 
and the state could not prevent their rising popularity.  
From the institutional theory perspective, the embedded structure of an 
organization once established, becomes one of the significant agencies for 
changing people’s minds and recruiting fresh adherents to that which the 
organization represents (Peters, 1999). In this sense, those who have been 
removed from the established organized groups are easily superseded by new 
recruits as the organization itself attracts the attention of people. For instance, 
members of the PKK who have been killed fighting with the security forces in 
the mountains, or of pro-Kurdish political parties those who have been 
arrested and sentenced to prison, have always been replaced by another 
willing recruit immediately. This is because the institution or organization has 
gained adequate human and financial resources in order to keep their 
existence alive for a prolonged period of time. Therefore, the endurance of the 
Kurdish issue, and political Islamism at least for last three decades, has a 
direct relationship with the institutionalization of these particular groups as 
political parties who have financial, cultural, social, and political branches, as 
well as unofficial media links.  
To summarize, since the 1980s, the PKK and legal political parties98 among 
Kurdish nationalist political groups, and the Milli Görüş movement99 among 
Islamist groups, have managed to become institutionalized political entities 
that have as their active successors in Turkish politics, the BDP and AKP, 
respectively. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 According to McDowall, the PKK has been the first Kurdish mass movement compare to pervious pro-
Kurdish social groups (McDowall, 2010, p.420) 
99 From Hugh Poulton’s perspective, it is clear that ‘in the 1990s the RP has managed to break out of its 
previous minority role and become a mass party attracting almost 20 per cent of the national votes 
(Poulton,1997, p.192).   
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PART THREE: How Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Islamic 
Political Streams Perceive Each Other 
Now it is time to examine the direct or indirect perceptions that representatives 
of each of these political movements have between each other with 
methodologically application of critical discourse analysis over official 
documents of each political stream. In terms of applying critical discourse 
analysis, ideological connotations of specific terms and how they define and 
see the word, region and local dynamics would play crucial role to have 
perceptions measured. To have an example of it, the phrase of ‘Eastern 
Question’ would perfectly fit as almost all of the representative parties of pro-
Islamic political stream have used this word not as a geographic literature or 
any other issues in the eastern part of Turkey but as a reference to Kurdish 
ethnic question of Turkey. On the contrary, this way of defining Kurdish 
question has never been approved by any members of pro-Kurdish political 
steam and also considered as a different version of official state ideology’s 
way of seeing the Kurds.   
This part can be divided into three chronological phases. The first phase looks 
at perceptions between the PKK and the Welfare Party, as there was no legal 
pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey from 1980 to 1991. This chronological 
distinction is based on the establishment of a legal pro-Kurdish political party 
in 1991, the HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi—the People’s Labour Party). The next 
phase covers the period that starts in 1991 and ends in 1998 when the 
coalition government of Turkey, whose Refah Party was the major partner, 
was forced to resign from the post. This caused not a fully ideological, but 
tactical transformation within the pro-Islamic political stream. The reason for 
this specific distinction, regarding the pro-Islamic political stream is that, in due 
course, there was a division of the Fazilet (Virtue) Party into the Saadet 
(Felicity) and the Adalet ve Kalkinma (Justice and Development) Parties. On 
the other hand, regarding the pro-Kurdish political stream, Abdullah Öcalan, 
the founder of the PKK, was captured in 1999 and in his first trial, stated that 
he was ready to co-operate with the state. Due to the significance of these 
events, it is better to have a detailed section for the circumstances, which led 
to both political streams’ transformation. Thus, the second phase would 
include the HEP, the DEP, the HADEP, while on the other side, the Refah 
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Partisi (RP) and the Fazilet Partisi (FP). Finally the last phase began in 2002 
and ended in 2011 when people went to the ballot box to vote in the national 
general election since the declarations in which the political parties tell people 
what their plans are for forthcoming years are crucial resources to trace the 
perception. As a result, this period covers the DEHAP, the DTP, the BDP from 
the pro-Kurdish political stream and the AKP from the pro-Islamic political 
stream. 
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Chapter Five: PKK and Welfare (Refah) Party, 1980-1991 
For the decade after 1980100 there was no legal pro-Kurdish political party, 
whereas the existence of a pro-Islamic political party commenced from 1969 
till the present. Due to this fact, it is better to examine how the PKK perceived 
Islam, and on the other hand, how the pro-Islamic political party perceived the 
Kurdish nationalist movement on the behalf of the PKK.  
The Refah party was founded in 1983 when the establishment of political 
parties was re-permitted by the military rule. As a continuation of the Milli 
Selamet Party, the Refah party was founded by Ahmet Tekdal, since 
Necmettin Erbakan was prohibited to engage in politics for five years. On the 
other hand, the PKK was illegally founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 (PKK 
Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, p.6). 
In the declaration of foundation, as a leftist revolutionary organization,101 the 
PKK explains its aim as being, ‘to liberate the Kurdish nation from the 
imperialist and colonial system, to form a democratic peoples dictatorship in 
an independent and unified Kurdistan, and eventually to realize classless 
society in the era of collapsing imperialism and rising proletariat revolutions’. In 
the document, it continues to state, ‘[the] Kurdish national independence 
struggle led by the PKK is an inseparable part of world socialist revolutions 
which are consisting of socialist countries, national independence movements 
and working class movements’ (PKK, 1978, p.37). The PKK sees western 
imperialism behind of every backwardness and poverty among Kurdish people 
as these powers divided Kurdistan into four parts and shared it among 
themselves. That is why the party does not approve of the current political 
boundaries (system). Apart from the PKK, any type of Kurdish movement 
accepting these boundaries, or engaging in legal politics within these 
boundaries is thus regarded as a part of imperialism. Relying on this idea, it 
sees the dissolution of any power groups, fascist or ‘social chauvinist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Right after the 1980 coup d’état, military rulers of the country closed down all political parties and the 
1982 constitution empowered the constitutional court to close down anti-constitutional political parties. 
This ensured that all political parties followed the constitutional pillars of Kemalism. The law of a political 
party enforces all newly established political parties to fall in line with Atatük’s principles and revolutions 
in which a united status of state and secularism are protected by the constitution (Güney & Baskan, 
2008, p.266). 
101 While he was captured and seated in the court, one of the founders of the PKK, Kemal Pir, has 
described the PKK as that ‘The movement known as the PKK, which emerged after 1972, is not an 
organization; it is an ideological and political movement. That movement has the intention to unite [the 
divided revolutionary left in Turkey]’ (Kemal Pir, Court Defence, 1981). The quotation is taken from 
Jongerden and Akkaya (2011).  
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ideologies’, which make Kurdish people commit crimes against its national 
existence, as a primary focus.  While doing this, it is legitimate to use 
revolutionary terror as a method for struggle method against the secret and 
official police, agents, and agents provocateurs.  
Not directly but indirectly, these accusation claimed by the PKK covers 
religiously sensitive people supporting a member of pro-Islamic political 
stream. It would be academically wrong if it were thought that the PKK 
accuses all religiously sensitive Kurds of being agents. Yet, it is a reality that in 
every terms all apparently conservative political parties obtained considerable 
amount of votes from the mostly Kurdish populated areas. Therefore, it would 
be true that these accusations indirectly cover electorates of any pro-Islamic or 
even conservative political parties.  
In light of this declaration, it is quite obvious that the PKK has a Marxist-
Leninist ideology at the centre of its ideology (PKK, 1978, pp.32-35). In 
addition, radical leftist discourse can be traced in all of its documents since 
there is a strong emphasis on leftist-Marxist terminology, with the use of words 
like, proletariat, feudalism, imperialism, working and village class, the First 
Imperialist Sharing War (I. Emperyalizm Paylasim Savasi), colonialism, 
revolution, and various forms of this literature. Not only in the declaration, but 
also in the PKK’s party program and regulations, any books of Abdullah 
Öcalan, the founder of the PKK, its publication Serxwebun102  and so on, 
Marxist-Leninist discourses and terminology, have prevailed in every utterance 
and certain words. 
Its core ideology reflects as to how the parties read the world, as well. An 
example follows: ‘in the mid nineteenth century, thanks to the industrial 
revolution, the bourgeoisie which had contributed to the revolutionary era 
transformed the political structure to a reactionist structure because of 
capitalism which coincided with the imperialism stage [imperialist implications]’ 
(PKK, 1978, p.5). As a result of the brutal invasion of imperialist states on 
colonies and dependent states, the PKK thinks, the national liberation 
movement by proletariats had emerged in exploited states as a result of the 
October Revolution (Öcalan, 1978, pp.46-49) in Soviet Russia, and later the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Serxwebun’s issues are available online, please see: http://www.serxwebun.org  
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revolution in Cuba, the war in Vietnam, 103  and China’s revolution (PKK 
Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, pp.19-22). Furthermore, based on the PKK’s party 
program, it is believed that NATO, the American hegemony, the European 
Economic Community, CENTO (Central Eastern Treaty Organization) were all 
created as defence alliances against socialist independent states and national 
liberation movements. This is relevant for the discussion of this region. In the 
Middle East, these imperialist powers established their figurehead or 
cooperative governments against the people’s will. Regional political systems 
were set up according to these imperialist interests, ultimately causing the 
division of the Kurdish nation into four non-Kurdish states under Turkish, 
Persian and Arab control. As a result, from a global perspective of imperialist 
monopolies, and from the local perspective of national feudal compradors, 
together they controlled not only the economy but also the social, cultural, and 
political arenas of Kurdish areas. 
These arguments also give a clue as to how the PKK is just a part of a global-
wide, national liberation movement. Then, to claim that socialist 
internationalism, in terms of liberation of all working class and nations from 
imperialist powers as being one of the key features of the PKK would not be 
wrong. This also shows that the PKK does accept a nation state system, which 
is produced and applied within the western imperial countries, but rejects the 
bourgeoisie’s hegemony over working class. I have deliberately mentioned this 
feature, as it may be compared with the concept of Ummah which, means all 
Muslims are brothers, and constitutes a single religious unity104 as advocated 
by pro-Islamic political movements, which envisages a religious view of ‘the 
state-society relations’ (Yavuz, 2001, p.10). 
This data taken from the PKK’s party program and regulations shows that the 
PKK considers ‘the Republic of Turkey’ as an enemy invading Kurdish lands, 
and as being a part of global imperialism.105 This hostility has deep historical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 To indicate how the PKK in the 1980s emulated the Cuban and Vietnam revolution, it is quite 
meaningful to give this quotation. ‘The Cuban and Vietnam revolutions proved that even the poorest and 
smallest nations, if they decide to fight, can reach revolution through a national liberation movement 
without waiting for any major war’ (PKK, 1978,  p.15). 
104 ‘Ummah’ comes originally from The Qur’an which states ‘The believers are but brothers, so make a 
settlement between your brothers. And fear Allah that you may receive mercy’ (10/49, 
http://quran.com/49) and the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings in which he uses the concept of ummah 
while addressing all Muslims not only in his time but also past and future Muslims.  .   
105 To prove that Turkey is a puppet of the ABD’s imperialism, and its regional collaborator, by sending 
troops to Korea, and its entrance to NATO, accepting Marshall Assistance and a bilateral agreement with 
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origins, from the PKK’s perception, as the PKK traces Kurdish nationalism 
back to 1000 B.C, the times of Medes106 and claims it as having been ‘a new 
invasive power [that] appeared over Kurdistan in the 11th century. This power 
was of the Oğuz Tribes [Turkic], who operated at the highest level of 
barbarism and so had gained skills for concurring [as character]107 because of 
accepting Islam’ (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü 1995, 38). As an illegal 
organization using terrorism as its method for struggle, the state never 
tolerated the PKK’s presence over the last three decades. The concept of 
state, which is dominated by official state ideology denying the existence of 
Kurds within its border, has been ideologically understood as an imperial 
structure exploiting Kurdish lands’ physical and human resources. Because of 
this, the PKK justifies armed struggle against any agents representing the 
central state. In the Party program, by stating that ‘the time period between 
1980 and 1990 which witnessed extensive resistance [by the PKK] against the 
12 September fascist-colonial regime108 and in which [our cause or resistance] 
strengthened with the 15 August 1984 attack109  is a period in which the 
hegemony of the Republic of Turkey over Kurdistan was ruptured, and the 
national liberation movement gained power in terms of warlike [askeri, in 
Turkish] and fronts [cephe in Turkish]’ (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, p.52), 
the PKK presents as if there was an ongoing war110 between equal state’s 
armies. This understanding of the state also causes an intra-Kurdish 
nationalist movement struggle since whether they are pro-Islamic or pro-leftist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the USA, were employed, and at the end this is evidence of Turkey surrendering to imperialism (Öcalan, 
1978, p.81). 
106 As an indication of primordial nationalism, the PKK and most of the nationalist groups, whether they 
are legal or illegal, seek a historical justification for their undeniable existence. By doing so, anything that 
is known historically about Kurds may be taken as the inception of their nationalist movement. That is 
why, in the PKK’s program, Kurdish history starts in the time of Medes (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, 
pp.35-36). 
107 In the manifesto, it is stated that the core aim of conquering was the enslavement of free people and 
looting of their possessions (Öcalan, 1978, p.36). This argument also makes clear that the PKK thinks 
that there is no spiritual space in Islam or religion, but that the hidden aim was always, capital. It also 
shows to what extent a materialist and positivst approach prevails in the PKK’s perception of Islam. 
108 What is meant by the 12 September Fascist-Colonial regime, is the military rule which prevailed in 
Turkey from 1980 to 1983 as a result of the 1980 coup d’état. 
109 On 15 August 1984, the PKK guerrillas attacked Eruh in Siirt province and Semdinli in Hakkari 
province in an attempt to take them under the PKK’s control. It was the first organized attack of army 
forces in Turkey, so this event became a starting point of a massive revolutionary attack amongst the 
PKK guerrillas and sympathizers as of the 15th of August, which is still being celebrated.   
110 Using the discourse of war for defining the armed struggle between the PKK and the armed forces of 
Turkey has always been employed in various publication of the PKK. One of the countless examples of 
this is a paper written in Serxwebun with the title of ‘Emperyalizmin Özel Savasi ve Türk Ordusunun 
Kürdistan’da Yürüttügü Savasin Niteligi Üzerine’ (Imperlialism’s Special War and On Qualification of the 
War Conducted by Turkish Army in Kurdistan) (Serxwebun, 1985). 
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organizations, any sort of reformist Kurdish groups111 seeking for constitutional 
recognition of Kurdish people and believing the Kurdish question might be 
solved within civil politics in Turkey were all accused of being slaves of a 
hegemonic Turkish bourgeoisie and several of those reformists were killed by 
the PKK. The fundamental reason why the PKK totally excludes them from the 
Kurdish nationalist movement is that these reformist Kurdish groups never 
intended to eliminate the state (Turkish) but rather, asked for local 
administration (Kurdish) instead of foreign administration (Turkish). Their 
utmost demand has been autonomy within the state not complete 
independence (PKK, 1978, p.31). The PKK’s perception of the state as an 
enemy resulted in the exclusion of the rest of the reformists from the Kurdish 
nationalist movement. Given that the PKK did not approve even of the 
reformist Kurdish movement, it is not then too difficult to guess its reactions 
against the pro-Islamic movement in the region, which has been seen as an 
agent of imperialism.  
Referring to imperial powers as ‘gerici gücler’ (reactionist powers) implies that 
that reactionist powers includes religious groups and identities. Since the 
concept of ‘gerici’ is another way of describing possible pro-Islamic groups or 
movements. The meaning itself has a strong connotation to religion because it 
has been used by official state ideology to describe so-called radical Islamic 
groups who wants more Islamic way of life and system. Employment of that 
concept to define all imperial powers contends religious organizations and 
these imperialist powers are the ones the PKK wants to destroy to reach 
revolution firstly in Kurdistan and then whole world. Ideological contradiction 
between the PKK as a beginning point of the pro-Islamic political stream after 
1980s and pro-Islamic political stream starts in such a general ideological 
discourse.  
Under this imperialism and its regional and local collaborators’ exploitation, it 
is claimed that a semi-proletariat of the rural and proletariat classes in urban 
areas has emerged. This has been a phenomena derived from a large number 
of young intellectuals from amongst the group, upon which a modern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Exclusion of reformist ideas from the Nationalist movement by the PKK seems to lose sharpness by 
the 1990s. I believe that it is because of the establishment of pro-Kurdish political parties, requiring help 
from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Northern Iraq (PKK Program ve Tüzüğü, 1995, p.50), and 
also of the collapsing of the Soviet Union, which contributed to the most important ideological change 
towards the PKK. 
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ideological and social structure could be built. Within this historical context, the 
PKK accuses a closed feudal socio-economic system of providing a 
continuation of local imperialism among Kurdish people. This is actually where 
the pro-leftist-oriented Kurdish movement intersects with the pro-Islamic 
discourse since this closed feudal socio-economic system consists of tribal 
leaders,112 the feudal structure, and related to the research, clerics.113 These 
groups were perceived by the PKK as a form of national denialsim (milli 
inkarcilik), submissiveness (teslimiyetçilik) and ummah (ümmetçilik), 
respectively (PKK, 1978, p.28; Öcalan, 1978, p.25). They were identified as 
being responsible for the dissemination of colonialism in term of language and 
culture.  
As mentioned above, a core Islamic concept of “Ummah’ is seen as a 
component of local imperialism. It is known that Ummah refers to all Muslims 
as a single community. Therefore, any affiliations to an Islamic organization 
whether being radical, political or moderate was considered to be fuel of 
maintained imperial order from global to local level. Such an understanding 
would undeniably impact on how the PKK saw Refah Party for a decade from 
1980 to 1990.  
Regarding legal political areas, all political parties including the MSP (the 
successor to the Refah Party) were seen as being representatives of the 
bourgeoisie, and Kurds supporting these political parties were all considered 
to be traitors.114 By overtly describing these embedded political parties as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Tribal connections among people are something that has to be eliminated to finally arrive at a 
classless society. The PKK believes that people and nations would live the most stable lives under 
socialism in the communist era. Even ethnic identities would eventually degenerate before the supra-
identity, communism (Öcalan, 1978, p.21). In addition, in the mid-1980s, several tribes were armed by 
the state against the PKK attacks. This was called as the Village Guard System (Robins, 1993, p.664). 
This also constituted another justification for destroying the tribal socio-political structure in the Kurdish 
areas. 
113 Clerics have been religious leaders (Mele in Kurdish) from certain Kurdish areas, and who have been 
quite influential over villages and certain tribes.  
114 Describing how the PKK perceived the pro-Islamic political stream, I think it is better to have the 
original version of the paragraph in Turkish in case there is a scepticism vis-à-vis the approach to 
translation. ‘Askeri, siyasi, kültürel ve ekonomik alanda ortaklasa bir sömürgeci yapıya dayanan 
burjuvazinin farklı kesimleri, kendi aralarındaki çeliskilerden kaynaklanan ideolojik ve politik 
gruplasmaları Kürdistan’a da aynen yansıtırlar. Türkiye’de burjuvazini farklı kesimlerini temsil eden AP, 
CHP, MSP, MHP vb partilerin Kürdistan’da da birer uzantıları daima vardır. Temsilcisi oldukları sınıfın 
ulusal ve toplumsal konulardaki görüslerini Kürt yandaslarına da aynen benimseten bu örgütler, 
Kürdistan gerçegi inkar temelinde yola çıkıp, Kürdistan’ı Türkiye’nin bölünmez ve dogal bir parçası olarak 
kabul ederler. TC Anayasası’na göre programına ‘Türkiye, ülkesi ve milleti ile bölünmez bir bütündür’ 
ilkesini temel almayan partilerin kurulmasına hiçbir surette izin verilmez. Legal partiler ister sag, ister sol 
bu ilkeyi kabul ederek kurulabilirler. Daha çok asiret reisleri, din adamları ve büyük toprak sahipleri gibi 
geleneksel hain Kürt kesimlerini bünyelerine alan bu partiler, günümüzde yıprandıklarından, eski ideolojik 
ve politik akımlarla sömürgeciligin gizlenmesi mümkün olamamaktadır. Kemalist ideolojinin yaratıgı yapı 
hızla bozulmakta, yerine yeni yapılar olusturulmaya çalısılmaktadır. Sosyal demokrat, fasist ve islamcı 
105	  	  
social democrats, fascist and Islamist, it is totally clear that Islam or pro-
Islamic political parties were regarded as a part of Turkish state imperialism in 
the Kurdish region (PKK, 1978, p.29).   
The position of any religions within the leftist territory is mostly seen as 
dogmatic, not open to change, development, and improvement. It is believed 
that religion closes people’s minds to any further progress. In this sense, most 
of the technological and scientific innovations are generally perceived to be 
anti-religious. In essence, alike as in most of the materialist and positivist 
approaches, religion is regarded as one of the major obstacles preventing any 
contemporary development. In most of the leftist-oriented ideology such as 
Maoism, Stalinism, Leninism or Marxist-Leninist, there is no place, or at least 
only as a cultural entity, for religion inside society. Under the influence of such 
a strict approach to religion, Abdullah Öcalan’s ideas are mostly determinative 
to examine and understand how the PKK perceives religions, specifically 
Islam. In his Marxist-Leninist approach to Islam, contrary to most of the 
communist parties in the Middle East, he suggests a ‘denial approach to the 
reality of religion, which is a broad implication of dialectic materialism, is one of 
the main reasons why Middle Eastern revolutions did not develop’ (Öcalan, 
1990, p.11). He also states that presumptions that ‘communists are atheists’ 
and ‘religion equals reactionism’ are methodologically wrong and prevent 
people’s sympathies to leftist or revolutionary movements. Indeed, he 
suggests acknowledging religion as a social reality and acting accordingly. 
These ideas are actually tactical approaches to convince the relatively 
conservative Muslim Kurdish people to side with the PKK.  
Once delving into his book, it would be much clearer how he and the PKK on 
behalf of the pro-Kurdish political stream perceive Islam. The phrase of ‘in the 
period when humanization started as a species’ indicated that there is no faith 
in creation by Allah (God) (Öcalan 1978, p.32). Based on the statement that 
‘…because conditions in which human beings emerged, only religion could be 
perceived to be a deceptive method to restrain natural forces’ (Öcalan, 1990, 
p.15). He basically believes that the environmental conditions made what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
maskelere bürünen soven Türk milliyetçiligi yeniden örgütlendirilmeye çalışılmakta, bu amaçla, para ve 
devlet görevliligi bir koz olarak kullanılmaktadır (PKK, 1978, pp.29-30). 
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human beings are now. Following a general description, he defines religion as 
a way in which human species first thought and developed spiritually when 
they encountered nature (Öcalan, 1990, p.16). Furthermore, he does not 
believe in prophecy and claims that the Prophet Muhammad refused Judaism 
and Christianity, as both religions were against commercial interests and did 
not make room for others. Thus, because of the prophecy tradition in the 
region, he claimed himself to be a prophet, even the last one, which is 
according to Öcalan, quite realistic and revolutionary. In addition, Öcalan 
argues that as a result of intensive thinking about social conditions of the time, 
the Qur’an was written by the Prophet Muhammad, and does not consider that 
it was revealed from Allah. His most remarkable evaluation of Islam is that, ‘in 
the final analysis, Islam is a religion of the most developed feudal civilization. 
That is why he thinks Islam converted a tremendous amount of lands in such a 
sort time’ (Öcalan, 1990, pp.24-26).  
This kind of understanding of Islam directs him to think that the Islamization of 
Turkish tribes caused Turkish imperialism, especially in Kurdistan. So Seljuks 
and Ottomans used their religion to establish an alignment against their 
enemies not to protect Islam, but to protect their borders against the Persians. 
In this sense, he suggests that religion was just used as an instrument in order 
to preserve their national interest, not only by the Ottomans, but also by the 
Persians and Arabs. Within this triangle, Kurdish people were all kept as a 
colony and thus could not find their own opportunity to form their own national 
state. Perhaps, the most radical discourse about Islam is used in the 
Manifesto by stating, ‘Islamism which has more of an anaesthetic effect than 
bourgeoisie ideologies means to be a satellite of an Arab hegemony and so a 
denial of the Kurd’s national past in quest for nationhood’115 (Öcalan, 1978, 
p.24). His historical reading of Islam prevailed among the PKK ranks but 
strategically changed appearance, since the military regime officially justified 
Islam as a defence against leftist and leftist-oriented separation movements 
after the 1980s. Especially, a ‘Turkish-Islam synthesis’ sought to disseminate 
this idea all around Turkey via the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) and 
educational institutions (Öcalan, 1990, p.43) in order to turkify and enslave the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Another statement in the manifesto is also quite meaningful to quote in order to understand how the 
PKK perceives Islam. It states, ‘Kurds were invaded by foreigners in terms of spiritual aspect. Islam is 
alike a Trojan horse preparing Kurds to deny their ethnic identity and playing the role of getting insight 
track’ (Öcalan, 1978, p.25). 
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Kurdish people (Öcalan, 1978, pp.102-105). He uses these developments to 
solidify his argument that Turks has been using Islam for their own national 
interests and by doing so they have also exploited Kurds for centuries.  
Abdullah Öcalan also thinks using Islam against colonized Muslim nations 
such as the Kurds is intentionally planned by imperialist America and its 
collaborators in Turkey. When he gives examples, he mentions Müslüman 
Kardesler (Ihvan-i Muslimin) in the Middle East, and interestingly, the Refah 
Partisi and the MSP. While he is portraying the situation of the Refah Party, he 
says, ‘Although they seem to advocate Islam and to be in favour of Islamic 
brotherhood, they are definitely not adhering to Islam’s revolutionary essence 
and to the Islam as a moral value for society. They are seeking to use Islamic 
traditions in a distorted and dogmatic way in order to maintain their corrupted 
exploitation and repression’ 116(Öcalan, 1990, p.44). Despite that, he confess 
that these Islamic movements have considerable amount of support, at least 
more than leftist adherents, but they are not regarded as Muslim 
achievements, but are seen as methods successful in inducing people with 
dogmatic, reactionist, and Sunni understandings of Islam. As a response to 
imperialist instruments such as tarikah (religious orders), Seyhs, Sayyids, he 
suggests that the PKK’s disciples respect Islamic codes and tells people of 
Islam’s revolutionary essence.  
On the other hand, whereas the PKK perceives religion, especially Islam, as 
an instrument of global, regional and local imperialists, in order to exploit 
Kurdish proletariats by making them traitors to their own ethnicity, the Refah 
party totally approves of the negative intentions of global imperialism since it 
spreads ethnic differences among ummah in order to eliminate the possibility 
of Islamic unity. What makes Refah’s understanding of imperialism accessible 
is to consider the capitalist western block led by the USA and the communist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Biz bu degerlendirmeleri daha çok genelde din, özelde Islam dini gerçek- ligini ortaya çıkarmak için 
yaptık. Ancak günümüz için çıkarılacak sonuç sudur: Genelde sosyalizm adına, ama kaba materyalistçe 
dinin ve Islamın yorumlanması tehlikelidir, buna kesinlikle karsı olmak gerekiyor. Islamın genelde ABD 
emperyalizmi, özelde onun Türk isbirlikçileri tarafından tehlikeli bir biçimde, Islam kökenli halkların 
uyanısını engellemek ve daha çok da Iran Islam Devrimi’nin anti-emperyalist özelliklerini bosa çıkarmak 
için kullanılması söz konusudur. Bunun yanı sıra sahte Islamcı akımlara Ortadogu monarsilerince 
muazzam parasal destek yapılmaktadır. Kısmen ‘Müslüman Kardesler’ teskilatında bu destek 
somutlasmıstır. Ve Türkiye’de de ‘Refah Partisi’nin içinde, daha önce de MSP bünyesinde bu destek 
somutlasmıstır. Islamı savunuyor gibi görünmelerine ve Islam kardesliginden yana olduklarını iddia 
etmelerine ragmen, kesinlikle Islamın devrimci özüyle, halkların bir moral degeri olarak Islamla hiçbir 
iliskileri yoktur. Kokusmus sömürü ve baskı düzenlerini sürdürmek için Islamın geleneksel etkisini çarpık 
ve dogmatik bir tarzda kullanmaya çaba sarf etmektedirler (Öcalan, 1990, p.44). 
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or socialist Eastern block led by Soviet Union, together as imperialist 
(Erbakan, 1991, p.100). Both have materialist and positivist approaches. Mr. 
Kazan, one of the prominent figures of the Refah Party and an ex-MP 
conceptualizes Refah’s way of seeing the world as that of being one wherein 
the ‘Western block embraced democracy as an open political regime and 
capitalism as an economic system, whereas the Eastern block chose 
socialism as a closed political system and communism as an economic 
system. These different choices resulted in a cold war enduring for almost 
forty years in a bipolar globe’. For instance, in the first general congregation of 
the Refah Party in 1985, Ahmet Tekdal, the president emphasized both 
Western [Europe and the USA] and Eastern [Soviet Russia] powers as 
imperialists (Tekdal, 1985, p.5). To give a more specific example from the 
same speech, he emphasized the Soviet Union as a cruel and imperialist 
power when he was talking about the invasion of Afghanistan117 then went on 
to regard the Soviet Union as communists, and Afghan fighters, as Muslim 
mujahedeen.118  
In summary, from the Refah Party’s point of view, imperial powers, whether 
they are from the west or the East, have been active in all Muslim lands in 
order to exploit their resources and to prevent Muslims from uniting. That is 
why, in the same speech, Mr. Tekdal linked the political instability and ongoing 
wars in the Middle East and the pre-1980 situation in Turkey with the 
imperialist states’ intentions (Tekdal, 1985, p.5). Mr. Erbakan summarized 
existing ideas in Turkey into three classifications. The first, and to him, the 
primary one is the Milli Görüş (National Outlook), and the other two are usurer 
(money lenderer) capitalist and leftist-Marxist ideas which have been imported 
from the western and eastern imperialists, respectively (Erbakan, 1991, 
p.120). He then emphasized that capitalism and communism both were 
bankrupt, so he thinks the only solution for Turkey and Islamic states is just 
political, economic, judicial and educational systems constituting of just order 
(Adil Düzen), towards all of these the Milli Görüş aims (Erbakan, 1991, p.148; 
Kazan, 2006, p.34; Erbakan, 2010, p.105).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 ‘While Afghanistan was being invaded by cruel and imperialist powers …’ (Tekdal, 1985, p.4) 
118 It is originally an Arabic word meaning fighters who are fighting for religiously sacred cause. 
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The Refah Party, from the MSP period to the mid-1990s, was against any form 
of agreement or international institutions such as NATO, the ECC, and the 
Warsaw Pact, as they were all regarded as being one of many instruments 
with which imperial powers could control the Muslim counties (Erbakan, 1991, 
pp.15-33). A reflection of this understanding can be seen in another statement 
of Tekdal in his speech. He argued, ‘in Bulgaria [Turkish Muslim minority 
group], the Philippines, and other Asian countries, in Eritrea, South Africa, 
torture and brutality towards human beings, especially to Muslims, were 
revealed’ (Tekdal, 1985, p.4). In this sense, the Refah party distinguishes itself 
from the rest of the political parties in terms of their targets and claims that 
they are indeed all the same parties but just appear differently. Mr. Tekdal 
consolidated this approach by refusing to be classified as either leftist or 
rightist. For one, they were based on materialist ideals and it is correct to say 
that the Refah Party represents something different, which is obviously, a 
spiritual, moral, and traditional approach that takes its cue from Islam.  
Religious-oriented discourse has prevailed in almost all official documents and 
written speeches of the Refah Party. As it is a legal obligation to mention the 
Party’s submission to the Atatürk’s principles, the party program of Refah 
starts with such statements (Refah Partisi Programı, 1983, p.3). Then it 
continues with the concept of ‘milli’ added into every suitable article in entire 
program. This milli concept is not translated into English as national, but the 
way in which Refah Party uses this phrase is not referring to ethnicity either, 
but meant to be the way used as in the 95th verse in the House of Imran (Al-i 
Imran) Chapter of Qur’an.119 In this verse, milleth was used interchangeably 
with ‘religion’. Since, according to the 58th article of the election law stating that 
the use of religious phrases and symbols is not allowed in any party publishing 
(Election Law, 1961), by using a word implying religious origin, but in current 
Turkish literature, means that the national Refah Party’s program was full of 
religious discourse. In addition, concepts of spirituality, tradition, morality, 
culture, justice (adil), and a preference for the Ottoman language literature in a 
Latin alphabet provide a religious appearance in whole document. To solidify 
these arguments, looking at the main aims of the Refah Party, written in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 It states ‘Say, ‘Allah has told the truth. So follow the religion of Abraham, inclining toward truth; and he 
was not of the polytheists.’ (http;//quran.com/3) 
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party program would be helpful. ‘Our main aim is to elevate our nation into the 
level of contemporary civilization by (a) endeavouring for the development and 
reconstruction of our country and (b) endeavouring for cultural and spiritual 
development. These endeavours are going to be done through bearing in mind 
our milli (religious) characters and features’ (Refah Partisi Programı, 1983, 
p.4). At first glance, it seems that milli meant to be national, but it should not 
be forgotten that this concept also has a religious (Islamic) connotation (Yildiz, 
2003).  
Following the above explanations on how the Refah party reads the world, and 
what ideological orientation has prevailed inside its messaging, the next 
paragraphs examine how the Refah Party perceives the state, the Republic of 
Turkey. In general, based on official documents of the Party, it can be said that 
the Refah party has never considered the state as an enemy which has to be 
fought. Yet, it is believed that the state has been in the wrong hands since the 
inception of the Republic, as the ruling elites had sought to disregard 
historically constituted state tradition, based on Islamic codes, or at least, an 
Islamic-oriented past, and had begun to copycat western style modernization 
policies. Even though strict secular implementation of the Republic has 
repressed religious institutions and removed religious people from the state 
structure, most of the Islamic groups (political or social) have not accused the 
state itself (as an abstract institution) but have accused the ruling elites for 
creating the wrong policies. Thus, more or less most Islamic organizations 
(legal, illegal, social, political or cultural) did not considered the state as an 
arch enemy. It is partly because the position of the state in orthodox Sunni 
Islam has been seen as a sacred institution, and the way to protect Islam from 
attacks. This originates from the 59th verse of the Women Chapter (Nisa 
Suresi) of the Qur’an120 in which one is ordered to obey Allah, His Prophet and 
the ûlu’l-emr (administrators). Gradually, in Sunni Islam, it is generalized as a 
rule that suggests to Muslims that they obey state leaders (Sarikaya, 1997, 
p.11).  In other words, ‘For Turkey’s Islamic tradition, the state is historically 
conceptualized as a sanctified entity, as sublime and eternal (Devlet-i Ali, 
Devlet-i Ebed-Muddet), commanding strict loyalty and obedience to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 ‘Ey iman edenler! Allah’a itaat edin, Rasulüne ve sizden olan (idareciler) e de itaat edin.’ In Turkish 
and ‘O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. 
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Al'ah and 
the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.’ In English 59/4 in the Qur’an. 
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ruler’121 (Güney, 1992, p.42). Associated with the Ottoman state system, this 
understanding took the shape of that ‘the intellectual tradition of Ottoman 
Islam has always subscribed to the unconditional obedience to the ruler, since 
the Ottoman state was regarded as the institutional embodiment of the 
principles of Islam and the caliphate’122 (Bulac, 1992, p.31).  
In my interview with Recai Kutan who has been influential in the Milli Görüş 
political movement since the late 1960s, and also became president of two 
political parties of the stream (Fazilet and Saadet Parties), as a response to 
my question as to how he perceives the state, he begins his reply by stating, 
‘You see, first of all, there is nothing such as being against the state, but only 
being against the state’s practices… As we have always mentioned, the state 
[devlet] is our state…’ (Kutan, 2012). 123  
The striking statements indicate how the Refah Party perceive the state, and 
are articulated by Sevket Kazan, who was the minister of Justice in 1974 in the 
coalition government of the MSP and the CHP. It is of course, from the pre-
1980 period, but he was still active within the predecessor pro-Islamic parties. 
In this regard, his ideas on the pre or post-1980 periods more or less 
represent the parties’ approaches to any issue. There was a general amnesty 
conducted and applied by that coalition government. My key question pertains 
to why those who had leftist ideologies, including Kurds or Kurdish 
nationalists, or Kurdish leftists, were not included in the first draft of the 
amnesty law, since later on the CHP brought this law to the constitutional court 
to make it cover all prisoners. His answer to my question was quite long but 
still worth quoting here, as it is extremely representative of the situation.  
‘The CHP in 1974, we had 48 representatives … but a 14s (14’ler) group 
was formed; they were Nurcu [disciples of the Nur movement formed by 
Said-i Nursi]. Of course there was no such thing as a Fetullahcilik [followers 
of Fetullah Gülen who formed another branch as a part of Nur 
movement]… we were [are] all Muslims. Yet, regarding amnesty, they were 
rather under the influence of nationalism, thus they considered the left as if 
it was infidelity. Now, you would form a movement with the CHP, who 
wanted to free from those convicted of leftism and we wanted to free those 
convicted by Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Law… There were 
approximately 800-1000 Muslims in jail on the other hand, more or less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Translation from Turkish to English belongs to Umit Cizre Sakalliogllu (2007, p.77). 
122 Translation from Turkish to English belongs to Umit Cizre Sakalliogllu (2007, p.77). 
123 The exact words articulated by Mr. Kutan were ‘Efendim bir defa, devlete karsi olmak diye bir sey yok, 
ancak devletin uygulamalarina karsi olmak diye… Hep ifade ettigimiz, devlet bizim devletimiz…’ as in 
Turkish. 
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2000 leftists… the only criteria we could apply were Islamic codes in order 
to convince the Nurcus. … I first looked at the Ukubat [crime and 
punishment regulations in Islamic law] chapters. … There were [some] 
crimes in the legal frameworks [Turkish penal codes] which were 
considered as crimes according to Islam, too. Then I thought we could 
include them [those who committed the crimes] into an amnesty… there 
were some crimes, which are crimes in both legal regulations and Islam, for 
example murder… And in the end, with the research I did, I drew a table; 
one line is for those, which are not a crime according to Islam … which are 
forgivable. Well then, aren’t there any crimes we cannot forgive [according 
to Islamic rules]? These were those who were convicted from the 149th 
article [of the constitution]. We decided to exclude them from the amnesty 
list partly because out of respect for these friends [Nurcus] in the group. 
That 149, those raised against the state, were bagii [disobedient to the 
state in Arabic]. I said they did not uprise against the Islamic state anyway, 
as there are some who think there was a state of Islam [dar ul-Islam], so to 
satisfy them, we can exclude them from the amnesty list’ (Kazan, 2012). 
Based on this reply to the question, those who rose up against the state using 
armed force were not capable of being forgiven, according to Islamic rules. It 
seems there is also an issue of whether there is an Islamic state or not, except 
for the sake of convincing the Nurcus within the party. This event shed lights 
on the perception of the state in the eyes of the party administrators and also 
indicates that high ranking politicians among the Refah Party do not 
distinguish leftist movements as Kurdish, or Turkish, they have a holistic 
approach to all leftist movements.  
Whether it is Islamic oriented or not, the Refah Party and other previous and 
successor political parties, have never seen the state as someone else’s. 
Because of this, this political movement has not been thinking of taking arms 
up against the state and taking it back from those who stole it from them. 
Relying on this perception of the state, any practical mistakes or wrong 
policies are not affiliated with the state, but with those who are running the 
state. In this sense, a major problem for Turkey which Mr. Erbakan accused 
Republican administrators, especially the CHP in the single party era, of 
ruining the country, and of copycat mentality in terms of deeming western style 
modernization as being the only way for development124 (Erbakan, 1991). 
Even the relatively conservative Party, the ANAP (Motherland Party) was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 The Milli Görüş movement’s approach to the Kurdish question, by accusing the single Party era of 
creating Turkey’s biggest questions, also has a religious background. This perspective is meaningfully 
summarized by Yavuz and Özcan (2006) as they argue that, ‘the Kurdish problem is not about 
nationalism but rather forced secularism and Turkish nationalism of the type enforced by Kemalist 
ideology’ (p.103). They think that this argument is also valid for the AKP’s approach to the Kurdish 
question. I agree with them but the AKP’s democracy and human rights policies should also be included 
since the AKP does not think religious ties would be enough to solve the Kurdish question. 
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accused of being a regional agent of the USA during the Gulf Crisis in the 
1990s, as the ANAP government was supporting western intervention into 
Iraq. In this sense, Mr. Kazan’s quote, taken from Yavuz Gökmen’s book, is 
strikingly meaningful. He says, ‘Özal wanted to prove that Turkey would never 
disappoint the Americans and Europe in the region. Özal wanted the war’125 
(Gökmen, 1992, p.186). This also proves that whether the party is relatively 
conservative, leftist, or secular, apart from their possible governance, the other 
of political parties (possibly the governments) have always been accused of 
supporting a copycat the modernization project. But the concept of the state 
itself has never been touched by this in a negative way, as the pro-Islamic 
political stream thinks that the state is theirs by nature, but being ruled by the 
wrong hands since the demise of the Empire.  
What is going to be done now is a comparison of these two political streams’ 
perceptions of the world and Turkey. It is now obvious that they have almost 
the same understanding of imperialism which they are both fighting against, 
politically. While reading their documents in which there are couple of 
paragraphs on imperialism, it is surprisingly difficult to determine if they are 
written by the leftist-Marxist-oriented PKK or the pro-Islamic Refah party. For 
instance, the following paragraphs are presented without any attributions in 
order to demonstrate how difficult it is to identify who is the author. I believe 
this will be rather shocking for the reader. Here is the first: 
In practice, an ongoing slave class has been established. This slave class is 
only ruled by an oppressive regime. All practices, which are against human 
rights in today’s Turkey, are actually assisting foreign powers in achieving 
their desires. This is to say, that colonial order needs repression to maintain 
itself.126 
The second is as follows: 
As an idea of the right [ideologically rightist] gives power to the upper hand, 
the west is an exploiter. Capitalism means that capital owners suppress 
proletariats. In capitalism there is a class that suppresses and a suppressed 
class. Because of this, capitalism in time has caused social explosion.’127 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The original language of the quotation is Turkish as ‘Özal, bölgede Amerika ve Avrupa’nın gözünü 
arkada bırakmayacak bir Türkiye’nin varlıgını kanıtlamak istiyordu. Özal savaş istiyordu!’ 
126 ‘Halen Türkiye’de tatbikatta ekonomik yönden bir köle düzeni kurulmuştur. Bu köle düzeni, ancak bir 
baskı rejimi ile yürütülmektedir. Bugün Türkiye’de insan haklarına aykırı olarak yapılan tatbikatin hepsi, 
aslında dış güclerin arzularına erişmesine yardımcı olmaktadır’ (Erbakan, 1991, p.166). 
127  ‘Batı’da hak arayışı kuvveti üstün tuttugu için batı sömürücüdür. Kapitalizm demek, sermaye 
sahiplerinin emekcileri ezmesi demektir, kapitalizmde bir ezen bir de ezilen sınıf mevcuttur. Onun için 
Kapitalizm zamanla sosyal patlamaya sebep olmaktadır’ (Erbakan, 1991, p.168). 
114	  	  
By looking at the discourses used in these two paragraphs it seems that they 
are articulated by a leftist person, or written for a leftist-oriented document. Yet 
they were stated by Mr. Erbakan, who was the most prominent figure in pro-
Islamic politics in Turkey, and also the founder of the Milli Görüş political 
movement. Although these two political streams explain imperialism with 
almost the same discourse. What distinguishes them from each other is that 
they see each other as an agent of imperialism. The PKK and later on the pro-
Kurdish political parties have ideologically leftist approaches, which is only 
hostile to western capitalism or imperialism, whereas the Refah Party (Milli 
Görüş) has an ideologically religious approach. This latter approach is not only 
against western capitalism, but also eastern Soviet communism, or socialism. 
The first sample considers that all conservative or Islamic political structures, 
including the Milli Görüş political parties, are organized by western imperialists 
in order to prevent the emergence of labour movements, or at least to balance 
leftist revivalism with conservatism.  The latter one regards all leftist 
movements as the foci of degeneration ruining Islamic values, beliefs, and 
tradition, within the society. 
These sharp ideological borders determine how these two political streams 
perceive the Kurdish question in Turkey, too. As mentioned at the beginning of 
the chapter, the PKK believes that Kurds and Kurdistan have been exploited 
by imperial powers and their regional agents. These agents include Turkey 
and other Kurdish populated countries (basically, Iran, Iraq, and Syria), so it is 
hardly likely that any of these countries would have sympathy for any political 
party or groups stressing the position of these states as regional agents of 
imperial powers. On the other hand, as the Refah Party believes, foreign 
powers do not want a religious and developed Turkey. This is why they are 
always promoting Kurdish separatism as a way of keeping Turkey 
preoccupied, so that it would not find its way to development and return to its 
core ideas in terms of religion. In common with each other, both sides indeed 
acknowledge the existence of the problem, but where they see the root of the 
question, the solutions they offer are totally different. Regarding the solution, 
the PKK thought that separation, as an independent Kurdish state128 from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 In the PKK’s documents, a final target of establishing an independent and united state is still 
articulated, but in 1992, Abdullah Öcalan himself states the possibility of a federation in Turkey when he 
was interviewed by Mehmed Ali Birand. 
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Turkey, is the only solution, while the Refah Party considers correcting the 
mistakes of previous governments, which only they are able to do, as a 
solution. More than a thousand years of brotherhood,129 based on Islamic ties, 
is still active in the hearts of Turkish and Kurdish Muslims. This provides a 
suitable ground upon which solidarity can be rebuilt between them. In 
opposition to this argument, the PKK’s perception of religion (Islam) as an 
instrument of applied imperialism in the region is from the ground up rejected. 
Moreover, these two political streams believe that once they have achieved 
their final targets—revolution from the PKK perspective (internationalism), and 
an Islamic state from the pro-Islamic perspective (ümmetcilik)—the Kurdish 
question will naturally be solved. The final classless global society and Islamic 
unity among all ethnically different nations, respectively would give all the 
rights Kurdish people naturally needs to have, and as much as other ethnic 
nationalities possess. In this regard, it can be said that their global perspective 
and eventual target has already been established by the Kurds. Nevertheless, 
the Kurdish leftist-oriented nationalist movement separated itself from the 
general Turkish left, since whenever the Kurds touched upon their ethnic 
rights, they received the response that ‘it was not time to talk about as it 
divides our power in achieving a revolution in which Kurds eventually would 
get all their rights.’  
On the other hand, within the pro-Islamic stream whenever Kurds talk about 
their rights or state oppression over Kurdish people, the way they respond is 
almost identical to the reply the leftist Kurds receive. In Islamic perspective, 
they were told, is that once the final target, an Islamic state, is achieved, all 
Kurds will get their rights, but it was not the time to divide power, but rather, 
the political stream needed to focus on obtaining an Islamic state. This 
situation can be regarded in both negative and positive ways. It might be 
argued that leftist and Islamic ideologies actually served for the continuation of 
oppression of Kurds, and from a positive point of view, these ideologies made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 The brotherhood has always been articulated in official documents of the pro-Islamic political parties. 
One of the articulations of that can be seen in the Mr. Tekdal’s speech in the general congress of Refah 
Party. He ended his speech by stating that, ‘Go forward for a Turkey in which people are safe with each 
other and 50 million are brothers and love each other! (Tekdal, 1985, p.41). The discourse of the Islamic 
brotherhood presented by the Refah party as a solution of the Kurdish question is comprehensively 
examined by Ahmet Yildiz (2003, p.188). 
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the Kurdish people realize their ethnic identity as being different from Turkish, 
which raised their ethnic awareness. 
Taking the political atmosphere of the late 1970s through to the 1980s into 
consideration, having such strict and firm ideological boundaries from which 
there was no permission to go through, or a concession to, any other 
ideologies, might seem understandable. Thus, eventually to argue that this is 
the main reason behind why these groups, which have been oppressed by 
official state ideology (Kemalism), never came together and did something to 
tackle the Kurdish question, or at least to lessen the pressure on the Kurds. In 
light of the data extracted from the parties’ party programs, it seems that in 
practice, they resemblance one another far more than they differ. Yet, their 
core ideological approaches to the issues, specifically the Kurdish question, 
keep these political streams poles apart. 
When it comes to the legal pro-Kurdish political parties in the early 1990s, 
such an ideological polarization has seemed to be more flexible compared to 
the 1980s, but still, the main barrier preventing these two political groups 
centres around how to deal with the Kurds and the Kurdish question in Turkey. 
Furthermore, according to the records of the state, the PKK has been a 
terrorist organization, and despite the fact that several pro-Kurdish legal 
political parties were banned by the constitutional court with the accusation 
that they had assisted the PKK and breached the principle of indivisible unity 
of the country. These parties could not be accused of such an argument until 
the court’s decision. In due course they became totally legal political parties to 
which the Refah Party could speak. I believe it is the same reasons why the 
legal pro-Islamic and legal pro-Kurdish parties did not, or could not, unite on 
the subject of the Kurdish question.  
117	  	  
Chapter Six: The Perception between Pro-Kurdish and Pro-
Islamic Political Streams, 1991-1998 
In the last decade of the 20th century, a pro-Kurdish political party was 
eventually established and took its place in Turkish political history. As a result 
of closure of all political parties by the 1980 coup d’état, social democrats 
sought for an alternative leadership to follow. In this sense, the merging of the 
Populist Party (Halkçi Party) formed by Necdet Calp, and the Social 
Democracy Party led by Erdal Inönü, the SHP emerged in Turkish politics 
together with another social democrat party, the Democratic Left Party 
(Demokratik Sol Partisi), led by Bülent Ecevit. In this political atmosphere, the 
leftist movement divided into two against the rightist (Dogru Yol Partisi-Right 
Parth Party, Anavatan Partisi-Motherlan Party) and pro-Islamic parties (Refah 
Partisi). In the words of Eyüp Demir, ‘The SHP is the address of left, who were 
inconvenient to the system. Within this extensive base, there were various 
people ranging from Kemalists to social democrats and from socialists to 
Kurds’ (Demir, 2005, p.55).  
Kurds adhering to social democrat ideas within the SHP’s cadres became 
much more visible by the end of the 1980s. The first of this was Ibrahim 
Aksoy’s exclusion from politics for two years for his speech in the European 
Community Joint Parliament in 1989, in which he was accused of being a 
separatist (Demir, 2005, pp.61-64). The core message of his speech was that 
Kurds are a different nation. Once such a tense atmosphere within the SHP 
around the issue of the Kurdish question, the last event inducing separation of 
legal Kurdish figures from a social democratic political structure, was the Paris 
Kurdish Conference organized by the Paris Kurdish Institute in 14-15 October 
1989, which was aiming at, as Kendal Nezan, president of the Institute 
expressed, making the Kurdish issue an international one (Balli, 1991, p.592). 
Seven Members of Parliament 130  who attended the conference were all 
dismissed from the party. As a backlash to this decision taken by the Central 
Discipline Assembly of the SHP, 12 provincial and various district 
organizations resigned from their positions, and also six more MPs resigned: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Those MPs were Ahmet Türk, Mahmut Alınak, Adnan Ekmen, Mehmet Ali Eren, Salih Sümer, Ismail 
Hakkı Önal, Kenan Sönmez and Ibrahim Aksoy. 
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Abdullah Baştürk (Istanbul), Mehmet Kahraman (Diyarbakır), Ilhami Binici 
(Bingöl), Fehmi Işıklar (Bursa), Cüneyt Canver (Adana) and Arif Sag (Ankara). 
Those MPs who resigned sought a real social democrat political structure, 
dissimilar to that of the SHP, which they thought was not pursuing an actual 
socialist democracy, specifically through ignoring the reality of the Kurdish 
issue, and cooperating with the official state ideology denying the ethnic origin 
of Kurdish people. This political condition directed them to bring a new party 
into existence in the Turkish politics, which did not neglect the Kurdish issues, 
a party with the motto of being social democrat, or a socialist democracy, 
ideologically. However, this new political desire was not considered, as being 
Kurdish-dominated enough, but rather, was primarily that of socialist solidarity. 
That is why under the name of a ‘new democratic formation’ (yeni demokratik 
oluşum), a congress was held in Ankara in March 1990. Despite the fact that 
the congress was enthusiastic, due to several disagreements and the 
prevalence of Kurds in the congress, this131new socialist block including, Turks 
and Kurds, entered onto a path of being an ideologically socialist pro-Kurdish 
political party132 (Demir, 2005, pp.82-84). Eventually, pro-leftist but considering 
the Kurdish question as their priority, the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP)133 was 
founded on 7 June 1990 and presided over by Ahmet Fehmi Işıklar.  
Following the first party meeting, at the press conference Işıklar defined the 
HEP as ‘the only party in the left’ by considering the rest of the political parties 
as parties of [an embedded] political system (düzen partisi).134 The concept of 
the ideologically leftist-orientation and how the world and Turkey has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Establishments and closures of pro-Kurdish political parties by the constitutional court is a massive 
research area. That is why this research is not going to delve into this area but will focus on the 
perception between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political parties in Turkey. For details on this massive 
area of study, please look at Eyüp Demir’s book (2005), Yasal Kürtler; Güney & Baskan, 2008, pp.272-
276. 
132 It might be irrelevant to the scope of the thesis, but I could not pass up mentioning this. General leftist 
streams tended to take up arms against the imperialist state in the 1970s and were divided into Turkish 
and Kurdish lefts. The failure of a new democratic formation and the congress could be regarded as 
another missed opportunity for uniting leftist streams, but at this time, it was thought that democratic 
ways could tackle the Kurdish question. 
133 The priority of the Kurdish question appears in almost every political party of the mainstream. For 
instance, the DEP party program states that ‘Türkiye’de demokrasinin ve Barış ortamının gerçekleşmesi, 
Kürt Sorunun adil bir biçimde çözümü ile mümkündür. (To have democracy and peace in Turkey is only 
possible with solving the Kurdish question justly.) (DEP, 1993, p.3). In addition, ÖZDEP’s program 
argues that ‘ÖZDEP approves the solution of Kurdish question as basis of democracy.’ (Özgürlük ve 
Demokrasi Partisi Kürt Sorunun çözüme kavuşturulmasını demokrasinin temeli kabul eder.) (ÖZDEP, 
1992, p.23). 
134 This way of seeing all other political parties continued until the mid-1990s as the HADEP’s declaration 
of the 1995 general election contends, the same definition for the other political parties, including the pro-
Islamic Refah Party (HADEP, 1995). 
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approached, can be seen in every single political party within the pro-Kurdish 
political stream (HEP, 1990, p.5; ÖZDEP, 1992, pp.5-12; DEP, 1993; DEHAP, 
1997, p.3; HADEP, 1994 and 2001). Nevertheless the HEP135 claimed that it 
was a Turkey party; yet Kurds in Turkey regarded it as their party136 (Demir, 
2005, p.99) so that the rest of the political parties considered it to be a Kurds’ 
Party. In addition, despite the fact that there were explicit organizational 
differences between the PKK and pro-Kurdish political parties, and some high-
ranking members of these parties ideologically supported the PKK, it is 
claimed that there is an organic relationship between the PKK and their legal 
political parties apart from the electoral base (Watts, 2006, p.127). That is why 
an evaluation of the HEP as a pro-Kurdish political party perfectly fits. The 
Refah Party is included in this category along with the rest of the political 
parties. In specific terms, the Refah party has a special position among the 
rest of the political parties in Turkey, as it does not perfectly fit with the 
definition of imperialist, fascist, or ultra-nationalist. The only possible way of 
defining the Refah Party from a pro-Kurdish perspective is ‘reactionist’137 
(gerici), which has been the one definition the official state ideology has used 
for all rival Islamic movements.  
From the pro-Islamic perspective, terrorism and its political extension is 
something unacceptable within Islamic rules. Although it is thought that as 
long as a political party does not involve itself with terrorism and separatism, 
legal pro-Kurdish political parties always approached this with reservations, 
since the official ideology (the state) had sought to make these parties a 
political branch of the PKK. Despite the fact that from the beginning with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 To find out more about how the PKK received the establishment of such a pro-Kurdish political party, 
please look at an interview conducted by Yalcin Kücük with Abdullah Öcalan (Küçük & Öcalan, 1993; 
Demir, 2005, p.101). 
136 Regarding the question of whether the HEP was a Kurdish or leftist party, given that Hamit Bozarslan 
has tremendous support in the Kurdish movement in Turkey then his statements can be taken as a 
reference. He states that ‘The HEP is above all a Kurdish party, plus a leftwing party. I think that says a 
lot. What is this ‘plus’? It means the party is saying ‘we are in the front of any kind of social fight, the 
trade unions fights, the fights for women’s rights… we are the most democratic party of Turkey’ but at the 
heart there is this Kurdish thickness. That is also the case for DEP. It will be the case for all the parties. 
What makes the HEP a popular party is that before everything else it is a Kurdish party’ (Bozarslan, 
2012). On the other hand, Murat Somer’s article analyzing the discursive transformation of media on the 
Kurds from 1984 to 1998 is quite explanatory about the how the Kurds and Kurdish related political 
parties were considered by the mainstream media (Somer, 2005).  
137 To give an example, the ÖZDEP’s program states that ‘the ÖZDEP is party advocating labourers’ 
government and interests against imperialism, colonialism, fascism, and other sorts of reactionism 
(ÖZDEP, 1992, p.12). The reactionism sometimes is defined in different ways but it is obvious that it is 
changeable within context. For instance, in the HADEP’s declaration for the 1995 general election, the 
pro-Islamist party was defined as ‘conservative’ (muhafazakar) while other rightist political parties 
evaluated as militarist (HADEP, 1995).   
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HEP to the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-Peace and Democracy Party), 
the current representative of the pro-Kurdish political party stream argues that 
they are not a political branch of the PKK, but just that they have support from 
the same political base, sympathizers of the PKK, and from the electorates of 
this political stream (Demirtaş, 2012). This argument does not seem to have 
worked; almost all of the mainstream political parties more or less regard the 
pro-Kurdish political streams as having an organic relationship with the PKK 
(Ergil, 2000, pp.129-130).  
In addition, the perception of leftism with reference to the Refah Party has 
hardly changed. It is an undeniable fact that the HEP’s party program is full of 
leftist discourse (HEP, 1990) and includes definitions such as evaluating the 
society based on class and exploitation of the proletariats in Turkey. To solidify 
this argument, a speech of Mr. Erbakan can be taken as evidence. In this he 
states,  
‘humanity looks for a new order. Communism, Capitalism and National 
Outlook (Milli Görüş)… the decay of communism was obvious. Because 
both interests ([Islamically] unrightful income) and profits (rightful income) 
have been abandoned. It was understatement. … On the other hand, 
capitalism legitimates both unrightfully income, which is interest and 
rightful income [islamically] profit. It is very excessive and does the rich 
richer and the poor poorer.’  
Based on this argument, apart from the Milli Görüş, all of the political parties in 
Turkey are considered to have a copycat mentality either from capitalism or 
socialism. As it is explicitly explained, the Refah Party is against capitalism 
and communism (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.2). In this regard, the Refah Party has 
a common ideological ground as being anti-capitalist, but opposite ideas about 
communism or socialism, and leftism in general. Given that the HEP and the 
parties who operated within the last decade of the 20th century were all in favor 
of a leftist ideology, then it is more understandable that there would be an 
ideological conflict. In other words, the way they have seen the world, Turkey, 
and people, is significantly different from each other, even though they have 
practically identical demands with regard to certain issues.  
By the 1990s, the Refah Party gradually increased its political support and so 
gained districts and provincial mayoralties across Turkey, including the 
Kurdish-dominated areas of eastern and southeastern Turkey. In the 1991 
general elections, neither the Refah nor the HEP was supported enough to 
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transcend the 10 per cent threshold. Thus, they preferred to get involved in 
coalitions in the election. Actually, this election was a cornerstone which 
shaped the perception between these two political streams from the 1990s to 
the present. From the HEP’s side, it was as though that there was no way of 
forming a coalition with the ANAP and the DYP, so only the SHP and the RP 
appeared as a possibility (Demir, 2005, p.129). Due to the possibility of such a 
coalition, Mr. Ahmet Türk visited the headquarters of the Refah Party in 
Ankara, but the negotiation did not end with a positive result. In his words: 
[with] the Kurdish question, we can not say that the Refah Party operates 
quite a clear policy by confirming Kurdish rights. … Yet, in realizing Kurds’ 
[electoral] power, it was an approach based on getting somewhere with this 
power. For instance, once there was no 10 per cent threshold, they never 
entered into a dialogue with Kurds. Nevertheless, when they saw they could 
not pass the threshold, that is to say, with the Kurds’ support to do so, when 
we looked at it, there is no just partnership but a mentality to pass the 
threshold with a couple of Kurds. Even, further to that, on the one hand, 
they were doing these negotiations with Kurds, on the other hand, they were 
thinking of entering the election together with Türkeş’s Party. We kept these 
meetings and even we told them about it, they said yes, when they said we 
were talking with them as well, we replied that there is no way to come 
together with Türkeş’s party [a political party which is integrated into the 
politics of Turkey]. Your attitude is not honest; you just want to be a group 
[within the general assembly] (Türk, 2013).  
Eventually, the Refah Party established a coalition with the Turkish nationalist 
MCP and IDP, and the HEP formed its coalition with the SHP. Taking the 
ideological bases of the coalitions into account, to what extent ideological 
similarities are influential even with approaches to the Kurdish question would 
be understood. The MCP and IDP might have nationalist character as a 
primary identity, but still they were partly conservative, and on the other hand, 
the SHP also might have a nationalist character in line with the official state 
ideology, but its social democrat feature prevailed. Under these conditions, it 
looked very natural to have such a political coalition based on ideological 
resemblance: leftist and conservative, respectively.  
One of the striking points driven from such a meeting is that this was the first 
time representatives of each political stream visited each other. The reason for 
this was the national election, which has vital importance. Despite the fact that 
the coalition initiative failed, electoral politics created a suitable political 
atmosphere in which each group met, and at least discussed a possibility of a 
coalition. In this sense, the flexibility of an official state ideology in terms of 
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dominance should be paid attention to. Once it is done, it is quite crucial that 
civilian politics might be able to create its own political solution to its core 
problems, that is to say, denial of the Kurdish question and repression of 
Islamic elements. The more electoral politics prevail without the influence of 
any armed conflict, whether coming from the PKK or the state of Turkey, the 
more possibility of representatives from these two political streams would 
prefer negotiations rather than any sorts of armed struggle. Eventually, since 
the 1990s, general and local elections gradually forced each groups to think 
about their counter-politics in terms of electoral politics. This point might 
notably have solidified in the first decade of the 21st century, yet it is 
meaningful to mention here that it actually started by the 1990s. In addition, it 
is the first time representatives of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic legal political 
streams participated into an election.  
The way in which the Refah Party considers the Kurdish question is mostly 
hidden within the Islamic discourse of brotherhood. This hiddenness has been 
articulated with the discourse of ‘60 Milyon Kardeşiz’ (We are 60 Millions 
Brothers), 138 ‘Devlet Millet Kaynaşmasi’ (State-Nation Amalgamation), ‘Barış, 
Hoşgörü ve Kardeşlik’ (Peace, Tolerance, and Brotherhood), ‘Baskı ve Zulüm 
Değil, Hizmet’ (Not Repression and Cruelty, the Service) and Herkese Refah 
‘Welfare for Everyone’ (Erbakan, 1991, p.18). The core idea of this 
understanding can be traced back to the inception of the Republic. It is thought 
that strict secular policies of the Republic broke the Islamic ties between Turks 
and other ethnicities including the Kurds, Arabs, and Circassians, etc., and 
when it was reinforced with ethnic Turkish nationalism, the ethnic question has 
emerged. Along the same line, relying on Houston’s ideas (2003), Bahcheli 
and Noles argue that ‘Islamist discourse views Kurds essentially as fellow 
victims of the secular Kemalist republic and acknowledges them as a people 
with a language and identity of their own.’ Furthermore, the idea of the Muslim 
brotherhood and eventually transforming the state towards an Islamic-oriented 
state structure was the dominant and prevailing aim. It was thought that any 
other problems, especially the Kurdish question, might divert their energy to 
the secondary important issues, so that their eventual aim might be harmed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 This slogan has always accorded with the total population of Turkey so the figure can change for time 
periods. 
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That is why pro-Islamic stream ‘calls for subordination of such an identity 
[ethnic Kurdish] to an Islamic one’ (Houston, 2003, p.157). 
On the other hand, contrary to the Refah Party, from the first pro-Kurdish 
political party, the HEP to current one, the BDP, these parties have all 
expressed that the capitalist system is causing all problems in the world, and 
specifically, that the Kurdish problem is the core of all issues in Turkey, 
associating with politics, society, culture, economy and so on. They also 
consider these problems from the leftist perspective based on reading 
societies in Turkey, as classes. Together with mentioning that people are 
under political, religious and ethnical pressure (HEP, 1990, p.5), it is claimed 
that the capitalist mentality of Turkey preserves the aghas and Seyhs, which 
are, to them, the main obstacle barring industrialization and development of 
people. In terms of the Kurdish question, HEP’s party program states: 
In the east and southeast, repression and assimilation policies are being 
applied. The state of emergency has become a proctored administrative 
regime; people neither have security of their lives nor of property. The news 
of destroyed villages, people forced to migrate, illegal arrests, torture and 
killings has become usual. The region has been ruled through unlawful 
enactments. The way of going to court is closed and these enactments are 
free from judicial control. The precautions claimed to be brought forward for 
the southeast affects all of Turkey. From now on, it is not possible to talk 
about the state of law, nor human rights and liberties (p.9).  
This kind of discourse continues by suggesting that, ‘through cultural and 
education institutions, labourer’s demands and observations are diverted by 
channelling them into chauvinistic nationalism and religious ideologies’ (HEP, 
1990, p.9). In this sense, it is perceived that religious and ultra-Turkish 
nationalist structures are fundamental barriers preventing people who are 
labourers, to see their rights and to fight to obtain them. Based on that, Turkish 
nationalism by assimilation of the Kurdish people through convincing them that 
they are actually Turkish, and a religious discourse that emphasizes religious 
brotherhood instead of ethnic awareness, or separation, are totally rejected 
since these ideas are still more or less alive and find support amongst the 
Kurdish people. In this respect, the HEP seems to be totally correct because 
by the 1990s, embedded political parties including leftist, rightists and 
Islamists (RP), obtained a considerable amount of votes in general and local 
elections. That is why, in the HEP’s party program, it is argued that ‘whether 
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they are leftist or rightist, all political parties and cadres in Turkey continue the 
path of Ittihat ve Terakki’s139 tradition and mentality’ (HEP, 1990, p.10). 
In the same vain, the Refah Party accused all political parties of intentionally, 
or unintentionally, copying western ideals. Whether they define themselves as 
leftist or social democrat, or liberal or capitalist, or rightist, or nationalist or 
conservative, no matter what they say, the result is that they are parties 
copying the west (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.7).  It is crucially argued that these 
parties [apart from the RP] cannot solve even a tiny problem of Turkey, and 
actually cause only problems rather than solution, e.g. inflation, 
unemployment, the headscarf, and the Southeast (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.27). 
What is meant by stating ‘Southeast’ in the list of problems, is obviously the 
Kurdish question. It is importantly, the first time a concept implying the Kurdish 
question has been used among party documents without linking it with 
terrorism.  The declaration gives profoundly significant clues pertaining to the 
Kurdish question in Turkey. Conceptually, it is argued that because of the 
application of wrong policies, terrorist activities accelerated. With the claim of 
preventing these activities, repression, unjustness, and excessive state 
terrorism against innocent people, are wrong policies, and are copycat of the 
ANAP government.140  After an explanation of such an understanding, the 
paragraph ends by stating that there is no southeast issue in Turkey, but 
rather, it is a question of regime. This denotes that a political regime is the 
origin of the problem. Eventually, in case the party is elected and gets power, 
then the establishment of a new civilization would emerge (Refah Partisi, 
1991, p.79) in which spiritual values would be made a higher priority and then 
naturally religious ties between Turkish and Kurdish people would cement 
relationships, and not ethnic identities (Yildiz, 2003, p.189).   
Practical Examination 
General perceptions between the pro-Kurdish (HEP, DEP, ÖZDEP, HADEP 
and DEHAP) and the pro-Islamic political stream (Refah Party) are as above. 
For better understanding and examination in detail, a practical evaluation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ittihat ve Terakki refers to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). For more, please look at 
historical background in the introduction of the thesis.  
140 As it is quite important how the Refah Party perceived the Kurdish question, it is better to have an 
original context in Turkish. ‘Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’da, uygulanan yanlış politikalardan dolayı terrör 
eylemleri tırmanmaktadır. Bu eylemleri önlemek iddiasiyla, aşırılıga kaçarak, yapılan baskı ve 
haksızlıkları, masum halka uygulanan devlet terörünü de, taklitçilerin ve ANAP’ın hatalı politikaları olarak 
görmekteyiz. Güney Doğu Meselesi Yoktur, Rejim Meselesi Vardir (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.31).  
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noting what these political parties promise to its electorates seems required. 
This is done through looking at party programs and declarations published, 
and made, just before elections. By doing so, it is possible to trace changes in 
party promises according to time periods. As mentioned above, these two 
political streams emerged as a rival to applications of the single party policies 
developed by the inception of the Republic of Turkey. In many terms, they are 
against the applications seeking to preserve the prevalence of the official state 
ideology (Kemalism). Thus, it is going to be surprising at the tremendous 
number of common promises these political parties make in order to get 
people’s votes.  
First of all, both streams are against human rights violations (HEP, 1990, p.14; 
ÖZDEP, 1992, p.14; Refah Partisi, 1991, p.32). Primarily violations emphasize 
the denial of Kurdish ethnicity on the pro-Kurdish side, and repression on 
implementation of Islamic codes in public spheres (e.g. the headscarf) on the 
pro-Islamic side. In essence, they have the same concerns in terms of the 
official state ideology’s legal restrictions. Yet, the pro-Kurdish one considers 
more democratization as a way of solving the Kurdish question (HEP, 1990, 
p.12), whereas the pro-Islamic one thinks that ‘Just Order’ (Adil Düzen) is the 
only way to correct wrong policies (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.32). One of the 
slogans, at the end of the human rights section of the Refah Party’s 
declaration in the 1991 general election, is quite meaningful because of 
implying the right to speak in one’s mother tongue, especially Kurdish. It is 
stated that, ‘İstediğin Gibi İnan, Örgütlen, Konuş’ (Believe, Associate, Speak 
Whatever You Want) (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.35). In addition, they were also 
against:  
1. The new anti-terrorist law on the grounds that it still limits basic 
human rights and narrows liberties;  
2. The law of political parties on the grounds that it restricts ethnic and 
religious propaganda during elections;  
3. The law of association on the grounds that it restrains Kurdish and 
religious people from forming associations in line with their 
concerns;  
4. The law of election because of the 10% election thresholds;  
5. The law of the TRT due to biased broadcasting, and  
6. The law against demonstration.  
Even though they have almost an identical discourse in terms of meaning and 
aim, while the initial one almost justifies taking arms against human rights 
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violations, implicitly referring to the PKK (HEP, 1990, p.15), the Refah Party 
sees a solution in taking the state power away from the wrong hands and 
giving it to its actual owners—in general Muslims, and in specific terms, the 
Milli Görüş.  
Willing to join into the European Community (EC) differs in the context of pro-
Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams. The HEP presents the EC with 
reference to solving the Kurdish question within democratic methods, but the 
Refah Party still rejects joining the EC on the grounds that this sort of western 
organization is actually intending to obstruct development of Turkey by 
degenerating the sovereignty of the state. This approach to the EC and later 
the European Union (EU) would be effective with regard to the perception of 
pro-Islamic political streams until the Refah Party government was taken out of 
power via a soft coup (Fazilet Partisi, 1999, p.45).141 This is also another 
indication of ideological differences; the HEP and other pro-Kurdish political 
parties are based on a nation-state structure, which dominated the entire world 
for the last two centuries. This mentality is indeed relying on western 
modernism theories originating from a positivist secular ideology. Regarding 
this issue, the leftist-centred approach of the pro-Kurdish political stream, 
which is against the western capitalist system, was given secondary 
significance as nationalist ideals overweighed it. Despite this ideological 
contradiction, the legal pro-Kurdish political stream has always sided with 
European values in terms of ethnic minority rights. 
Ideological reactions of the Refah Party against the western powers’ malicious 
intention to always keep Turkey busy with internal instability, so that Turkey 
could never rise its head and look around, constitutes another approach to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 This subject is actually another issue requiring separate research. Until the Refah Party was taken 
over from the government, the pro-Islamic political streams had always been against western 
organizations. As a result of this coup d’état, successor parties of the streams changed their minds 
towards the EU as it was thought that the only way of eliminating dominancy of an official state ideology 
was to support the EU since this process might remove military influence on civilian politics. Since the 
beginning of the Republic of Turkey, the military has taken the responsibility of protection of an official 
state ideology (Kemalism) against external and internal (Kurdish separatism and Islamism) threats. 
Recently, the law letting military officers to be judged in the civil courts for their possible crimes related to 
civilians and civil politics opened the way to arresting the military general attempting to take over the civil 
governments (Kaya, 2012; Kuru, 2012). The most prominent one is the Ergenekon case, which has just 
finalized and in which a considerable number of military officers were sentenced for long time prison. 
Because of that, Ümit Cizre argues that the AKP’s initiatives to solve the Kurdish question through 
democratic means started after the Ergenekon case, which paved the way for the emergence of the 
government’s solid Kurdish policy (Cizre, 2009 and Cizre & Walker, 2010). For a short perspective of the 
influence of the  relations between Ergenekon case (Turkey’s Deep State) and democratization process, 
please see, Park, B. (2008). Turkey’s Deep State: Ergenekon and the Threat to Democratisation in the 
Republic. Rusi, 153(5), pp.54-59. 
127	  	  
Kurdish question. It is believed that PKK terrorism is being operated under the 
control of western powers. Because of that, the Refah Party defines the PKK 
as an externally supported terrorist organization seeking to divide Turkey in 
two. The most solid expression of such an understanding shows itself within 
the fifty-fourth government’s142 program in which Mr. Erbakan outlined the 
program in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). He states that, 
‘externally supported separatist terror is still continuing to menace our internal 
security. According to the rules written in the constitution and most 
pertinaciously, by preserving unitary-national state structure; it would be 
determinately fought against terror both inside and outside.’ 143  (Erbakan 
Hükümeti Programı, 1996) After highlighting this kind of determinacy, he also 
emphasized that the concepts of ‘unity, solidarity, and brotherhood’ be 
consolidated.  
Secondly, each party’s perception for desired social order seems to be quite 
close in terms of content, despite the fact that these demands are driven from 
different ideological backgrounds. In spite of that they have a distinctive state 
understanding regarding social order; the HEP highlights the concept of social 
state governed by rule of law (HEP, 1990, pp.12-23) while the Refah party 
emphasizes ‘Adil Sosyal Düzen’ (Just Social Order) (Refah Partisi, 1991, 
pp.73-79).  Within these chapters of the documents, peace, equality, freedom, 
justice and etc. occupy a considerable amount of space and are given primary 
significance. The contexts are more or less the same. Even if the leftist 
discourse and literature was switched, it might have been impossible to 
separate which one was pro-Kurdish or pro-Islamic. In addition, the Refah 
Party promise that the ‘Milli Görüş’ has the power to make 60 million people 
brothers thanks to the promised just social order which originates from 
religious ideals.  
Associated with social order, a specific example might be very helpful to 
understand the closeness of the two parties’ promises. The Refah party, 
following that the official language of the state is Turkish, advocates that local 
assemblies would be able to choose another language to learn alongside with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 The 54th government of Turkey was formed with the coalition of the Refah Party and the Doğru Yol 
Partisi (DYP-True Path Party) in 1996.  
143 In the original language, ‘Dış kaynaklı bölücü terrör, iç güvenliğimizi tehdide devam etmektedir. 
Anayasamızda yer alan esaslar ve bilhassa üniter-milli devlet yapısı muhafaza edilerek terörle; içte ve 
dışta kararlılıkla mücadele edilecektir.’ 
128	  	  
Turkish (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.91). It is not overtly expressed, but for one who 
is familiar with the politics in Turkey, it is not difficult at first glance to 
understand that the implied language is Kurdish. This is despite the fact that 
education in the Kurdish language is something the Refah Party has always 
been against, yet in local terms, it is acceptable. This promise, however, is 
quite significant, once the political conditions of the early 1990s are taken into 
account.  
From the economic perspective, thirdly, they both have an anti-imperialist 
approach which disapproves of capitalism. In the HEP’s party program, it is 
argued that ‘international monopolies and their local collaborative monopolies 
prevail economy in Turkey. Unemployment, high inflation, forcing consumers 
to buy expensive and poor quality goods, and not providing economic 
development, are all results of a hegemony of monopolies in the economy’ 
(HEP, 1990, p.61). On the other hand, the Refah party’s declaration of the 
1991 general election argues that the ‘ANAP government’s and similar parties’ 
economic policies can be defined with these words: rise in unemployment, 
inflation, waste, injustice, and cruelty’ (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.37). As these two 
political streams have their own leftist and religious discourse, they might use 
different words, but what they mean is approximately the same. The most 
remarkable resemblance between these two political streams in terms of the 
economy is that they have almost the same subtitles under the main title, 
‘Economy’. Strikingly, they give quite much significance to the eastern parts of 
Turkey, with different names but which carry the same meaning. To solidify it, 
the economic problems of Kurdish populated areas is expressed with the 
subtitle of ‘Bölgeler Arası Dengesizlik’ (imbalances among the regions) in the 
HEP’s party program (HEP, 1990, p.64), and on the other hand with the 
subtitle of ‘Geri Kalmış Bölgeler’ (underdeveloped regions) (Refah Partisi, 
1991, p.48). Within the concept of these titles, they both accuse the state for 
the economic underdevelopment of the Kurdish populated areas, and promise 
development once they get power.  
Next, but at the same time, as one of the most important issues, administrative 
decentralization is another common point between these two political streams 
despite the fact that they have a slight difference in the authorities which would 
be transferred from the centre to the local administration. As is the case in the 
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HEP’s party program, all local or regional administrative positions would come 
to power through election so that people’s actual free will would come into 
existence. To achieve that, related legal regulations would be all changed in 
favour of local demands. For instance, it is stated that, ‘provincial and districts 
governors, as with mayors, would come to power through election, from 
among those who have attained a certain level of education. Village and small 
city headmen (muhtar) and the assembly would be elected by local people’ 
(HEP, 1990, p.24; DEP, 1993, p.5; ÖZDEP, 1992, p.24; DEHAP, 1997, p.17). 
In the same vain, the DEP program emphasizes the abolition of anti-
democratic institutions and regulations in which appointed governors have 
much more power than elected ones (DEP, 1993, p.4). On the other hand, the 
Refah Party approves the election of provincial governors, but the rest of the 
sub-administrative positions would be appointed by those elected governors. 
Instead of filling low-level administrative positions via elections, the Refah 
Party suggests giving them special training associated with how the best 
governing could be done. Of course, the qualifications which those provincial 
or low level governors should have is also emphasized by stating that, ‘the 
high ranking administrators would be raised and sensitively elected, with a 
high level of morality, bound to our national and spiritual values, and wishing 
to serve the people’ (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.93). By the same token, when the 
Refah party got into power in 1996, Mr. Erbakan gave a decentralization policy 
in his government’s program in which promises were made mainly for a new 
administration law handing over certain responsibilities of the centre to local 
authorities (Erbakan Hükümeti Programı, 1996). The initial decentralization 
model is based on current western style administration, while the latter seems 
to be derived from a traditional Ottoman administrative model shaped during a 
time of harsh administrative reform throughout 19th century. This common 
point is crucially significant as it indeed aims to solve the Kurdish question by 
applying democratic ways rather than through an armed struggle between the 
Turkish military and the PKK.144  
Finally, several more common points can be added to this list. Before moving 
on to list them, it is important to note that in each of them an ideological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 This issue is going to be major way of solving Kurdish question in the name of a peace process as a 
part of the democratization process of Turkey. Examination of this issue will come in the next section in 
detail, while the perception between pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams covering the DEHAP, 
the DTP, the BDP and the AKP, respectively. 
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background has always been expressed via their discourse, or their 
approaches, to religion, leftism, separatism, and vice versa. The pro-Kurdish 
political stream wants to remove Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu (YÖK- Higher 
Education Organization) as it sees this institution as a partially military tutelage 
over that of educational (HEP, 1990, p.59), whereas the Refah party is willing 
to reform it instead of totally removal (Refah Partisi, 1991, p.106). 
Furthermore, they promise judicial reforms with which Turkish nationalist and 
secular characteristics create fundamental barriers in their struggle against the 
official state ideology. This complication I think requires a bit more explanation. 
The left-oriented Kurdish political stream is in essence advocating secularism, 
but against Turkish nationalism, yet, the pro-Islamic legal political stream is 
against secularism while not totally supporting, but at least partly approving 
Turkish nationalism for the sake of preserving a state structure, which is 
almost entirely made up by Turks. That is why, for their own interests they are 
in legal terms fighting against an official state structure. However, it does not 
mean that they are not rivals, in contrary; they are actually fighting each other 
behind the scenes. Another common point might be the implication of the state 
of emergency in the Kurdish populated areas, which are the east and south 
eastern parts of Turkey (HEP, 1990, p.25; Refah Partisi, 1991, p.31).  
This amount of resemblances in terms of election promises enforces us to 
think about why these political streams did not have a chance to work together 
against the official state ideology from which they both suffer. As a response to 
such a question, their perceptions of state and religion, colored by ideological 
distinctiveness, prevents them at least fighting for the elimination of an official 
state structure or ideology within a legitimate legislative framework. To make 
this clearer, this example will be touched upon. Even though they both 
arguably believe in the concept of state terrorism in the eastern part of Turkey, 
the initial one uses this as a justification of their struggle. The latter employs 
this as proof that the state apparatus is in the wrong hands and that is why the 
state follows the wrong policies regarding the Kurdish issue. Within this 
context, the Refah Party’s declaration in the 1995 general election states that, 
‘The state’s presence is for serving people. Not for tyranny, not for oppression’ 
(Refah Party, 1995, p.19). The results might be same in how this issue might 
be solved; yet, the reasons at the centre of the problem differ according to 
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their ideological approach. This example can be applied to all common points, 
but ideological differences, in other words, core ideals shaping their 
perceptions, would remain far from each other. This apparent distance 
continues to remain important even in current politics in Turkey.  
Eventually, the pro-Kurdish legal political stream sees the solution of the 
Kurdish question in terms of ethnic equal rights and voluntary togetherness 
(ÖZDEP, 1992, p.23) within a democratic regime145 (HADEP, 1994). These 
words on paper seem quite acceptable. Yet, given that a strictly embedded 
official state ideology was still prevailing, and the PKK’s terrorist activities 
aimed at a revolutionary people’s war (Devrimci Halk Savaşı) was going on, 
these peaceful words require more theoretical and practical explanations. Pro-
Kurdish legal parties affiliate almost all of the problems in Turkey with the 
Kurdish question (DEHAP, 1997, p.7). Ethnic-centred equal citizenship rights 
within a leftist-designed state and social structure might be summarized as the 
envisaged solution for the Kurdish question. On the other hand, the Refah 
Party sees the core problem as causing all other problems in Turkey in a 
strictly secular and ultra-nationalist understating of such policy 
implementations. The pro-Islamic legal political stream then considers a more 
religiously oriented society as the solution. It is because of this that ethnicities 
are not a primary identity in such a state and social structure as much as an 
Islamic brotherhood146 which would help to overcome the Kurdish question, 
together with removing oppression and denial of ethnic identity, which is 
against Islamic codes. Moreover, Islam does not negate or deny any ethnic 
identity but promotes them as a facilitator for interaction among races.147 
Adding this very different and counterargument in solving the Kurdish question 
to the dominancy of an official state ideology which is based on Turkish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Although pro-Kurdish political parties have always preferred to solve the Kurdish question within the 
borders of a democratic regime, their perception in the eyes of other political parties, and almost none of 
the Kurds, has mostly been that a Kurdish party is an extension of the PKK’s political branch. This reality 
was articulated by the president of the HADEP, Murat Bozlak in an interview with Derya Sazak, a 
journalist from the Milliyet daily newspaper. He states that, ‘It was claimed that HADEP has been the 
political arm of the PKK. It is not true… HADEP is not a separatist party. Neither is it an ordinary 
nationalist party. Ours is a leftist mass party. We have never perceived ourselves as a Kurdish Party’ 
(Bozlak, 2001, Translation is quoted from Güney & Baskan, 2008, p.274). 
146 The Islamic brotherhood has given much more importance to blood ties among brothers. This rule 
comes from a verse in the Qur’an, which says, ‘The believers are but brothers, so make settlement 
between your brothers. And fear Allah that you may receive mercy.’ 49/10, http://quran.com/49 
147 This Islamic code also comes from a verse in the Qur’an, which says, ‘O mankind, indeed We have 
created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. 
Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing 
and Acquainted.’ 49/13, http://quran.com/49   
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nationalism and secularism over the politics in Turkey, is actually an 
ideological battle in which it is almost impossible to determine who is fighting 
whome. 
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Chapter Seven: Transition Period for Both Streams, 1998-2002 
In the last decade of the 20th century, along with several pro-Kurdish political 
parties and pro-Islamic political parties, the Refah Party were closed by the 
constitutional court on the grounds of being foci points of separatism and 
being core points of activities against laicism, respectively. Military tutelage 
was the triggering point for the closure of the Refah Party due to the 28 
February decisions taken by National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, 
MGK), which were all about fundamental Islamic and reactionist activities. In 
addition, reactionist activities (irticai faaliyetler) were placed side by side with 
the separatist terror (PKK) as primary internal menaces against unitary and 
secular state structure in the national security document (milli güvenlik belgesi) 
(Bilgin, 2005, p.192). As a result, the Refah Party was closed down in January 
1998 and superseded by the Fazilet Party (Virtue Party), which was already 
established in December 1997, as a spare political party in case the Refah 
Party would be closed. This political manoeuvre did not work as the Fazilet 
Party was also closed down in 2001 as being an extension of the Refah Party. 
The embedded idea of secularism during the process would be considered 
influential against the AKP governments not by the military itself, but by 
secular oppositional parties (Çinar, 2010). Since the positivist ideological 
understanding of the pro-Kurdish political stream sided with secular 
opposition, rather than with democratic values which has to be applied to pro-
Islamic political stream as much as to pro-Kurdish ones asks for, the 
ideological centres of the pro-Kurdish political stream has resurfaced until 
military tutelage was weakened. For instance, a prominent figure of the pro-
Kurdish political stream, Mr. Ahmet Türk’s statement that, ‘we are at the same 
side in terms of laicism’ and approving the concept of ‘common enemy’148 
(Kürt Sorunu, 2009) in the time of military critiqueing the AKP’s Islamist 
tendency, is quite indicative.  
The reason why this period is analyzed separately is that within such a short 
political history of Turkey, pro-Islamic political parties have changed their ideas 
as methods to be used to get the power. Because of this, Ahmet Yildiz does 
not place the Virtue (Fazilet) party among the parties with a national outlook 
(Milli Görüş) (Yildiz, 2003). To make it clearer, instead of being totally against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 http://www.haksozhaber.net/okul/article_print.php?id=5831  
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western organizations (EU, NATO, IMF and so on) and rejecting all practical 
indications of official state ideology guarded by the military,149 the idea of 
being more adaptive and playing the game according to its rules, gained much 
more support. This is to say that the only way of getting power and to be able 
to stay there is to go slowly in changing legal regulations on which official state 
ideology lean.150  To summarize this transition period from the Refah to the AK 
Party, as a pro-Islamic political stream, ‘In the process, religious preferences 
have not been abandoned, but have been reframed to engage the political 
regime on its own terms’ (Mecham, 2004, p.340). In addition to internal ones, 
transforming from an anti-western position to visiting US politicians and Jewish 
lobbies in America in 1999, by the Virtue Party, and later Erdogan’s visit to the 
USA could be taken as solid indications of such transformation in terms of 
international politics.151 
This political maneuver is actually valid for both sides. Grassroots support of 
the Refah Party, as well as a pro-Kurdish political party, can also be taken as 
proof that official state ideology had to be more flexible when presenting their 
ideas to the masses. That is why the military preferred to have a soft-coup 
rather than a direct military intervention into civil politics. It is of course 
undeniable that global developments and the market economy also have an 
effect on this choice, but still it is impossible to deny mass support to 
alternative ways being embedded into societies within Turkey.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Experience of the 28 February Process in Turkey, which was a soft-coup led by the military forced the 
pro-Islamic political party to behave not in the same way with the Refah policies, but in a more 
progressive manner in terms of western values. This understanding was not for nothing, as then General 
Chief of Staff of Turkish Military Forces, Mr. Hilmi Özkök implicitly threated the AKP government in 2003 
by stating that, ‘The February 28 process was the consequence of certain developments in Turkey. The 
effect would not be different if the causes continue to exist’ (Heper, 2005 and 2011, p.243). This 
understanding of the military in Turkey was not new but can be said to have consolidated itself after the 
1980 coup d’etat and prevailed until the end of the first decade of the 21st century. As proof of that, 
General Kenan Evren, the conductor general of the 12 Spetember 1980 coup d’etat argues that, ‘We 
were afraid that if, following the military interventions, a political party leader we would not approve of 
comes to power everything that we had worked so hard to achieve may be done away with’ (Heper & 
Güney, 1996, p.623). 
150 Sefa Şimşek takes the changes within this transition period into account of new social movement 
theory. In his essay, it is claimed that contradictory ideologies or ideas have been more conciliatory at 
societal level, especially in terms of invisible ideological struggle among pro-Kurdish, pro-Islamic and 
Kemalist understandings (Şimşek, 2004). For instance, societies are quite developed to approve Kurdish 
ethnicity without separation, Islamist politics without asking for implementing sharia law, traditional 
Islamic practices (headscarf) without official state ideology’s pressure.  
151 This change has been analysed by Ahmet Kuru whose article claims that globalization has diversified 
the Islamist movements in Turkey through theoretically, an international political opportunity structure 
(Kuru, 2005, pp.271-272). In addition, Hasan Kosebalan’s article should also be looked at in terms of 
understanding the influence of globalization on changes in the core ideas of the political Islamist 
movement including the AKP in Turkey; Kosebalan, H. (2005). The Impact of Globalization on Islamic 
Political Identity: The case of Turkey. World Affairs, 168 (1), pp.27-37. 
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These developments affected internal discussions within the pro-Islamic 
political party. As a result, two divisions have emerged as traditionalists 
(gelenekçiler) and modernists or reformists (yenilikçiler) (Mecham, 2004, 
pp.349-350). After the closure of the Fazilet Party, another successor political 
party, the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)152 was established. Reflection of such 
a division showed itself in the first general congress of the party to elect a new 
president of the Party. On the one side, Recai Kutan represented 
traditionalists who were actually following the former Prime Minister, Mr. 
Erbakan’s directives, behind the scenes and on the other, Abdullah Gül was 
the presidential candidate of modernists or reformists (Duran, 2010, p.15). 
This congress was a historical turning point as it was the first time two 
candidates competed for the presidency of a pro-Islamic political party. Recai 
Kutan was elected as the new president of the Saadet Party, which made the 
division deeper, and eventually caused the creation of a new political party, 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP), 
formed along with the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2001 
(Güney and Baskan, 2008, p.270). It would be true to argue that the AKP has 
a more extensive approach to electorate policy, but the Saadet Party 
maintained its strict Islamic-oriented discourse and policy. The AKP redefined 
itself as a ‘conservative democrat party’ and sought to justify itself by 
comparison with European conservative democrat parties. Even though such 
a definition was made to separate itself from the ‘Milli Görüş’ movement and to 
address not only religious or conservative people, but everyone else, it means 
to be a center-right party,153 the core ideas and founders of the party have 
remained intact. I will continue to examine pro-Islamic political streams over 
the AKP as I think it is a continuation of the Milli Görüş movement, but a more 
adapted version of it to the world’s and Turkey’s realities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Translation of Fazilet might be different in literature as sometimes it is translated into English as 
‘prosperity’. 
153 As Ersin Kalaycioglu’s researchs on the general election in 2007, which AKP gradually increased its 
votes, indicates that not only religious appearance of the party but also ethnicities, and economic 
developments are significant determinants of vote preference in favor of the AKP (Kalaycioglu, 2010). It 
is quite meaningful to argue that AKP has a religious appearance due to political history of its founders 
and religious agenda adapted to the global developments but it addresses other identities within the 
society. Before that, he also emphasized significance of ‘Muhafazakarlık’ (Conservatism) in electoral 
preferences in Turkey (Kalaycioglu, 2007). Related with the issue, Birol Yesilada and Peter Noordijk’s 
findings, which based on the world value surveys, show that religiosity has been increasing since 1995 in 
Turkey (2010, p.24).  
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From Ziya Önis’s point of view (Önis, 2001 and 2006), the AKP’s party 
program is more likely to be a center-right or center-left political party’s 
program and lacks a religious character, unlike its predecessors. As well, it 
seems to follow pro-western economic and foreign policy. These arguments 
are more or less true but the AKP’s program is still full of Islamic discourse in 
terms of religious-affiliated words and discourse of a civilization whose core 
points are coming from Islam (Duran, 2013). The AKP can still be considered 
as one of the pro-Islamic political streams. Taking the Fazilet and the Saadet 
Parties’ party programs, they have also been more pro-western in terms of 
promising actual democracy and economic integration of Turkey into a global, 
open market, economic system (Fazilet Partisi, 1999, p.56; Saadet Partisi, 
2001). The AK Party’s definition of itself, I think, is quite indicative to take as a 
reference. In the declaration of the November 2002 general election, the AK 
Party defines itself as, ‘democrat, conservative, progressive, contemporary’ 
(AK Parti 2 Kasim 2002 Seçim Beyannamesi, 2002, p.11). From this 
perspective, as mentioned above, the AKP can be considered as one of the 
political parties of the pro-Islamic political stream. 
On the other hand, intensive discussion of Turkish nationalism throughout the 
1990s as a result of the PKK’s ongoing armed attacks, and a gradually 
appearance of a Kurdish ethnic identity since the Gulf war in northern Iraq, 
caused a ‘major break’ (Yeğen, 2006, p.137), increasing ethnic separation in 
mentalities and forcing mainstream Turkish politics to accept the existence of 
Kurds with an ethnic and cultural identity. In addition to the internationalization 
of a Kurdish identity via Iraqi Kurds154, and the PKK’s struggle in the region, a 
leftist-oriented ideology backed by a Soviet model has also diminished once 
socialist satellite states in Eastern Europe dramatically turned their face to 
Western Europe. Regime changes within these states, from socialism to 
capitalist-dominated democracy, have loosened rigid ideological barriers 
preventing any flexibility on the Kurdish question. At the same time, unarmed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Until the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, partly including the AKP governments, Turkey’s 
official position towards Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq was almost exactly what 
Bill Park prescribed; ‘Turkey feared the KRG might serve as a pole of attraction for Turkey’s restive 
Kurds, or that it might become emboldened enough to lend them direct support. It could garner 
international sympathy for the idea of wider Kurdish national self-determination, possibly leading 
ultimately to a sovereign Kurdish state’ (Park, 2004, p.22). Within recent peace process on-going 
between the Turkish state and the PKK through negotiations with imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan and 
economic relations formed with the KRG have created a new approach diverted from fear to hope of 
togetherness.  
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legal political activities of the pro-Kurdish political stream such as celebrations 
(Newroz), cultural events, Kurdish language studies, funerals (e.g. of those 
killed guerillas of the PKK), and parliamentary experiences, has put Kurdish 
ethnic rights and security issues at the centre of agendas of all major Turkish 
institutions (Watts 2006, p.134). Thanks to these developments, Kurds, 
Kurdishness, and all things related to Kurds have occupied a considerable 
amount of space within media and official agendas. Obtaining local and district 
mayoralties in the local elections allows the pro-Kurdish political stream to gain 
experience and engage with the political atmosphere in Turkey, and gives its 
members a chance to present themselves at practical level. This also 
facilitates the adoptive integration of legal pro-Kurdish politics into the general 
politics of Turkey by forcing the prevailing official state ideology in political 
terms.  
Another aspect making this period a sort of transition one is that Abdullah 
Öcalan was forced to leave Syria in 1998 and was captured155  in 1999. 
Despite the fact that the PKK called on all Kurds to attack the Turkish state, in 
his first interview with a journalist as well as in his first trial, he stated that, ‘I 
really love Turkey and the Turkish people. My mother is Turkish. Sincerely, I 
will do all I can to be of service to the Turkish state’. These events shed light 
on two basic arguments—the first is that the armed forces of the PKK has 
always been willing to fight till ultimate victory, and the second is that what 
Öcalan said encourages legal politics through democratic ways. In addition, 
although harsh state suppression of pro-Kurdish legal politics in the 1990s 
(Watts, 2006, p.126), and the stream’s parties were closed down one by one, 
the pro-Kurdish political party solidified its popular support by obtaining around 
seven per cent of the general vote, and dominated Kurdish inhabited areas. 
The PKK’s approach to reformist pro-Kurdish groups, whether they were legal 
or illegal, deemed them as unacceptable, even sometimes as betrayal, but 
had changed their views by the end of the 1990s and a two–way co-operative 
struggle developed an armed struggle in the mountains, and a legal struggle 
on the plains. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Those who are interested in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan might be interested in some of the 
allegations indicating that he was delivered by the USA to Turkey. 
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Furthermore, tremendous efforts made by the Republic of Turkey to join the 
EU have gradually paved the way for more space in which both pro-Kurdish 
and pro-Islamic political parties mobilize. 156   In the 1980s, both political 
streams were totally against western economic or political organizations due to 
their own ideological attitudes to the west, and western values. By the 1990s, 
the pro-Kurdish political stream advocated (Casier, 2010) European values in 
terms of obtaining more ethnic recognition and cultural rights through 
democratization, whereas the Refah Party insisted on the west’s ill intentions, 
and used these international organizations only as an instrument with which to 
achieve their targeting of Turkey. By the end of the 1990s, especially after 
experiencing a soft-coup d’état against the Refah-Yol (coalition between RP 
and DYP) government, even in terms of religious rights, European values 
might have seemed to be helpful vis-à-vis a policy without crackdowns by an 
official state ideology whose core values have been constituted in accordance 
with Kemalism (Mardin, 1973). In 1999, the Helsinki Submit approved Turkey 
as a candidate for joining the EU with a reservation of attunement to the 
Copenhagen criteria which requires ample reforms in legal, social, and state 
structures, as well as a solution for ‘Southeast’ question through peaceful 
means (Ikizler, 2011, pp.11-20; Ulusoy, 2009). In brief, the EU stands for not 
only more democratic rights both for the ethnic minority and religious lives, but 
also for reducing the military influence over Turkish civilian politics. That is 
why, the less military involvement in the state apparatus, the more the 
possibility that commonalities of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams 
could create a new democratic atmosphere in which together they can solve 
the Kurdish question once and for all.  
As a result of these developments, representations of pro-Kurdish and pro-
Islamic political streams have been going through several changes in their 
respective documents. As mentioned before, the most dramatic change in the 
pro-Islamic political streams was the removal of their anti-EU stances, and 
accusing the EU of being a ‘Christian club’ implicitly seeking to prevent the 
development of Turkey as a means of regaining for regional power (Fazilet 
Partisi, 1999, p.45). It can be seen in one of the Fazilet Party’s development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Nowadays, the EU accession process is likely to end in a political stalemate, it is mostly approved 
that the EU process has provided convincing arguments, as both pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political 
streams follow in terms of ethnic and religious rights and paved the way for ‘political space for Islamism 
and ethno-nationalism’ (Gökalp & Unsar, 2008, pp.93-95) 
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programs emphasizing ‘actual democracy’ (1998, p.3), and international 
agreements on human rights such as the ‘Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, Paris Conventions, and 
Helsinki Final Act (1998, p.5) and finally instead of pioneering ‘Just Economic 
Order’ (Adil Ekonomik Düzen), highlighting the need for a global open market 
system as a requirement of economic development (1998, pp.15-18). 
Furthermore, by stating that ‘instead of sanctity of the state, immunity of 
human rights and freedoms are prioritized’ (Fazilet Partisi, 1998, p.29), 
protection of the state as a way of protecting Islamic codes are rendered to be 
more flexible and in favor of human rights. Regarding the Kurdish question, it 
is still defined as the ‘Southeast’ question, and for the party, became not only 
a security question, but also it was recognized that urgent economic and social 
programs should be prepared and applied in the region157  as a solution 
(Fazilet Partisi, 1998, pp.32-33). Lastly, a document examining 
decentralization and increased authority for local governors was published 
which gives the authority to choose the language to be studied and used in 
education and in the local assemblies. This is also worth mentioning as an 
indication of changes in the mentality of the pro-Islamic political stream. Within 
this issue, the Fazilet Party went further and even stated the concept of 
‘autonomy or self-determination’ (özerklik), while decentralization was touched 
upon (Fazilet Partisi, 1999, p.15).  
On the side of the pro-Kurdish political stream, the HADEP’s new program is 
quite indicative in terms of the transition period. First of all the statement that, 
‘the parties which are able to transform themselves in accordance with social 
requirements could not save themselves from marginalization within a vicious 
circle’ (HADEP, 2001, p.1), makes sense regarding that. Following that, the 
program itself explains why they have made such a change by suggesting, 
‘Either we make ourselves as an alternative for attaining power through a new 
program and by extending ourselves through the democratic struggle, or by 
continuing with an old, outmoded program which is not able to address current 
problems, we would enter into a situation in which we would be a marginal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Under the title of ‘Internal Security and Public Order’, after emphasizing again the concepts of 
friendship, brotherhood and solidarity among citizens of the country’ it is stated in Turkish that ‘Partimiz 
Güneydoğu sorununu salt bir güvenlik sorunu olarak görmemektedir. Bu sorunu ortadan kaldırmak için, 
bölgeye yönelik acil ekonomik ve sosyal politikalar hazırlanmasıve uygulamaya konulması ziyadesiyle 
önem arz etmektedir.’ 
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player, dealing with our internal problems’ (HADEP, 2001, p.1). The first and 
second pages of this new program are full of explanations why they need to 
change their approach to Turkey’s questions. It is quite obvious that the pro-
Kurdish political stream is so eager to change the perception of itself from 
being a Kurdish party to a ‘Turkey party’. It does not mean that while doing so 
the political streams would change their priority on the Kurdish question, but it 
means that they would work harder to cover all problems as one of the political 
parties integrated into the political atmosphere in Turkey. Furthermore, there 
are considerable number of critics of what the real-socialism is that 
underscores the need for a new socialist approach in opposing the central 
state structure against a new world order that degenerates national values 
(HADEP, 2001, pp.3-4). Within this context, this global development reduces 
the importance and sovereignty of national states so that the struggle must 
continue in democratic ways at the social level. These ideas have been 
underscored with the argument that that particular era of revolution did not 
end, but that the world entered a deeper and esthetic social, cultural, spiritual, 
and ethical set of revolutions (p.6).  
In summary, the socialist approach to reading the world, the regions, and 
Turkey, have not been altered but new global developments had to be taken 
into account while participating in politics. The most remarkable indication of 
such a transition is that ever since the HEP was established, all the party 
programs of political parties within the pro-Kurdish political stream, began with 
an evaluation of the world, region and lastly, with Turkey, in which the leftist 
ideology discourse can be found throughout the documents. The current pro-
Kurdish political party’s (BDP- Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) program did not 
start with such an evaluation but with a page of introduction evaluating Turkey, 
and then delved into the political principles of the party (BDP, 2008, pp.116-
118). 
The most salient argument taken from this transition period could be that as 
long as the ideological barriers of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic streams 
loosened, as within this time period, the possibility of merging to solve the 
Kurdish question in Turkey has increased. How these political streams see the 
world, region, and Turkey, and also to what degree they support 
decentralization and authorizing local governors elected by people, would be 
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basic determinants of future negotiations between the government of Turkey, 
led by pro-Islamic AKP, and on the other hand, the PKK, and legal pro-Kurdish 
political parties, currently, the BDP. In specific terms, in case a holistic 
perception of a pro-Kurdish political stream towards pro-Islamic politics as 
being that of religious bigotry, and of a pro-Islamic political stream towards 
pro-Kurdish politics as being that of communists and separatists, could be 
broadened; their common points which differ only in terms of their intensity, 
might result in a civilized negotiation around the table instead of armed fighting 
in the region.  
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Chapter Eight: The Perception between Pro-Kurdish and Pro-
Islamic Political Streams, 2002-2011 
On the one hand, representatives of the pro-Kurdish political stream, the 
DEHAP, and on the other, the representative of the pro-Islamic political 
stream, the AKP, 158  went to the 2002 general election with experience 
obtained in the last decade of the 20th century. Along with that, perceptions of 
each other preserved their central ideas, but as indicated above, they have 
both become closer to general, globally accepted values. For instance, the 
AKP has become one of the most prominent advocates of the EU, and at the 
same time stressed acceptance of a changing world by ceding its strident 
ideological approaches (AK Parti 2 Kasim 2002 Seçim Beyannamesi, 2002, 
p.7). The DEHAP has sought to deal with all other questions of Turkey rather 
than primarily focusing on only the Kurdish question in its desire to change its 
appearance to being perceived as a Turkey party (Türkiye Partisi). As proof of 
that, the DEHAP entered into the 3 November 2002 election as part of a 
coalition, named the ‘Emek-Barış-Demokrasi Bloku’ 159  (Labour -Peace-
Democracy Block). It also stated, after highlighting various provinces from both 
western and eastern Turkey, that the ‘DEHAP is embracing Turkey. It 
represents brotherhood and unity of the country amongst Turks, Kurds, Lazs, 
Arabs, and Circassians’ (DEHAP, 2002). Within this section will be an analysis 
of how these two political streams perceive each other by relying on their party 
programs and declarations from their general elections. 
First of all, both streams approve the requirements of change in their 
documents. While the DEHAP’s declaration for the 2002 general election 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Since then till now, AK party has preserved its electoral legitimacy by increasing its votes in three 
general elections, which nowadays causes a discussion of dictatorship of AKP (Bac-Muftuler & Keyman, 
2012), especially Mr. Erdoğan, of gaining statist characters due to preservation of state’s position over its 
citizens. Despite these kinds of criticism, the party still holds the most democratic appearance of Turkey 
since the beginning. That is why by 2002 when the AKP first came to power, it is thought that a new path 
emerged in the political history of Turkey (Ziya & Keyman, 2003; Insel, 2003). Evaluation of the 
personality of the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, over the concepts of Islam, modernity and 
democracy is subject to an article by Metin Heper and Sule Toktas (2003). It is worth to have a look in 
case of more detail is required. 
159 This initiative has indeed established in orderto entre into the parliament through an independent 
candidacy for general elections because of a ten per cent threshold. Components of the coalition are 
mostly ideologically socialist oriented and this coalition has continued up until now, and lastly applied in 
the 2011 general election. It is currently consisting of Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Demokrasi Partisi, 
Demokrasi ve Özgürlük Hareketi, Devrimci Sosyalist Işçi Partisi, Emek Partisi, Emekçi Hareket Partisi, 
Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, Işçi Cephesi, Işçilerin Sosyalist Partisi, Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi, Katılımcı 
Demokrasi Partisi, Koz, Sosyalist Birlik Hareketi, Sosyalist Dayanışma Platformu, Sosyalist Demokrasi 
Partisi, Sosyalist Gelecek Parti Hareketi, Toplumsal Özgürlük Platformu, Türkiye Gerçegi, Uluslararası 
Işçi Dayanışmasi Dernegi, and Partizan. 
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states that, ‘[the] 3 November election is the expected change. Nobody 
consents to live the same as before’ The AKP’s party program160 starts with 
stating that, ‘Turkey has a strong desire to change during such a painful time 
period.’ The only way of getting rid of this condition is through political will, 
which would begin to initiate economic development, fix imbalances in income 
distribution, end poverty, and dissipate resentment, would be through a 
synthesis, through all embracing policies thus obtaining social peace, which 
will be new and dynamic’ (AKP, 2001). These statements from the beginning 
constitute one of the common points between the two streams, in the political 
atmosphere of the early years of 21st century. This would offer alternative 
ways with which people could become hopeful. Yet, this also proves that 
ideological connections are still much more active in forming coalitions rather 
than political interests.  
The AK party regulations explain fundamental principles of the party within 15 
points. In the first one it states, ‘[The] AK Party believes that the most 
important achievement of the Turkish nation is the Republic, and sovereignty 
unconditionally, belongs to the nation. The only determinative power is the 
‘Milli Irade’ (National Will). … the National will, the rule of law, intellect, 
science, experience, democracy, individual fundamental rights and freedoms 
and morality are approved as main references of the political ruling mentality 
(AKP Tüzüğü, 2006, pp.11-12).  In this sense, it can be said that global values 
which are effective in making certain social, economic and political policies, 
are, and would be, all taken into account while the party rules the country. 
What is meant by emphasizing ‘national will’ is actually that the party that 
gained the national election should rule the country, and this ruling should not 
have any intervention by other state apparatus such as the military—which 
had done so a couple of times, and recently, in the 28 February process. In 
other words, the way in which the official state ideology’s reflex to preserve 
itself against the national will is unacceptable. Based on this argument, it can 
be said that the AKP does not want a revolution in order to change the state, 
but rather, an evolution through replacing the official state ideology with the 
national will (Milli Irade).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 It is not possible to give a page number for referencing the AK Party’s party program as it is just 
available online not as hardcopy. Please see the link for it, http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-
programi  
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The next points are also significant in terms of approaching the Kurdish 
question, stating that the ‘AK Party advocates that the Turkish nation’s country 
and state are indivisible.’ In the fourth point, it is stated that the ‘AK Party 
knows and respects that people have different faiths, thoughts, race, 
languages, expressions, associations and lifestyles, which is with them from 
birth. It accepts that these differences are not a separation, but rather, a 
reinforcing of cultural richness’ (AKP Tüzüğü, 2006, p.11). The rest of the 
points also show that the AKP favors a social state understanding, the family 
as core of its society, moral development among people, representative 
democracy with participatory and competitive qualifications, and referendum 
as a way of participatory democracy. In light of these points, it seems obvious 
that the AKP is also against separatism of any type, but quite eager to socially, 
though not legally, approve of any differences amongst societies constituting 
Turkey (AKP, 2001). By perceiving any sort of differences as cultural richness, 
it is quite emphatic in this regard. Then, the question to consider is if a pro-
Kurdish political party demands legal regulations approving the existence of 
Kurdish ethnic identity, or constitutional recognition for Kurds whose name has 
never been articulated in any constitution in the history of Turkey, then what 
would happen?  
While the AK party preserved these basic understandings of the pro-Islamic 
political stream, in practical terms and discourse, it seems to be more adaptive 
to change. The AK party disapproves using an ideological approach to the 
main questions of Turkey, but supports discussing them in the context of a 
platform of contemporary democratic values without paying attention to 
gender, ethnic identity, beliefs, and the worldview of all citizens (AKP, 2001). 
This philosophy might pave the way for a much more hopeful negotiation 
process to solve the Kurdish question in Turkey. Regarding the Kurdish 
question, the AK Party’s party program presents a considerable number of 
clues on the subject under the title, ‘Doğu ve Güneydoğu’ (East and 
Southeast). The title itself means that the AK Party still perceives the Kurdish 
question on a regional basis, but the context contends much more than that. It 
starts with a definition of the problem, but unfortunately it is ambiguous. It 
states that ‘the event which some of us call the Southeast, some as the 
Kurdish question, and some as the terror question, is unfortunately a reality of 
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Turkey’ (AKP, 2001). This ambiguous definition implies that there is no exact 
definition in their minds so that the solution which is argued in the program is 
also ambiguous. It states that, ‘By acknowledging the negativities this problem 
causes in our social lives, the Party would follow a policy intending to 
completely and permanently solve the problem through respecting the 
society’s sensibilities, and through paying attention to people’s happiness, 
welfare,161 rights and freedoms in the region and of protecting Turkey’s unitary 
state structure along with not creating weakness through the struggle with 
terrorism’ (AKP, 2001). The BDP’s intention also, as a way of a democratic 
solution, pertains not only to citizenship, but is a constitutional one. The BDP 
offers, in its party program, ‘Instead of a single race, single language, single 
culture and male-dominated understanding, ‘the citizenship of the Republic of 
Turkey’162 would be taken as a fundamental, and thus, supra-identity163 which 
would be defined as constitutional citizenship as a way of including all ethnic, 
cultural, faiths, and gender differences’ (BDP, 2008, p.121).  
In light of this solution’s method, it can be said that the AK party still makes a 
clear distinction between terrorism, implying the PKK, and the region’s cultural, 
economic and social problems. This understanding of the party can also be 
seen in the agenda embedded in the language, which as mentioned, is a part 
of cultural differences. The party program states that, ‘With the condition that 
Turkish would remain the official language and the language of education, 
cultural activities, including broadcasting in languages apart from Turkish, all 
are to be considered as an enforcing and recuperative richness, not as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 In terms of social assistance such as delivering cools in winters, food packages in Ramadan, 
providing major electrical home-equipment, etc. welfare dimension of social issues are still occupying 
great amount of place in both pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political stream’s agenda. On the one hand, 
Pro-Kurdish political parties think that the AKP misuse its power to convince to people to vote for the 
party by providing social assistance to Kurdish people all over the country, not only in the east and 
southeast. Whereas the AK Party argues that this social assistance is a sort of bribery used to obtain 
people’s votes, and is just because of these people’s need. Regarding this issue, Erdem Yörük’s article 
is worth having a look at as it is about using social assistance as political containment, especially in the 
Kurdish case (Yörük, 2012). 
162 Promising more or less the same concept in terms of citizenship, the BDP and the AKP made an 
agreement in the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, established for preparing a new civil 
constitution in the parliament. Another point that should not be passed without mentioning, is that by 
almost using the words used in the direct quotation in the paragraph, has also been articulated in the 
DTP’s party program. Thus, it can be considered as a demand of the pro-Kurdish political stream 
produced in the first decade of the 21st century. 
163 Supra identity as begun in Turkey (Türkiyeli), and sub-identity as Turks, Kurds, and so on, were 
brought forward by Prime Minister Erdoğan, yet again these arguments were harshly criticized by the 
state apparatus, especially the military and opposition parties for endangering national (Turkish) identity 
(Yavuz & Özcan, 2006, p.112). In this sense, the definition of citizenship in the constitution occupies a 
massive place within this discussion. Ayse Kadioglu delves into this discussion with her historically 
compehensive article, ‘Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience’ (Kadioglu, 2007). 
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factor harming togetherness and the unity of our country.’ In addition to the 
arguments that terrorism in the region has gained external supports, 
unemployment should be dramatically reduced through investment in the 
region, recovering and compensation programs for those who have suffered 
from terrorism should be applied, and a new state mentality respecting basic 
rights and freedoms should be formulated instead of repression of people in 
the region. This section of the program ends with a crucial point, which states 
that, ‘the awareness of being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is the cement 
of our society’s unity and togetherness’ (AKP, 2001). It seems that the AKP 
has no problem in providing a social, cultural, political and economic 
atmosphere in which Kurds can practice what they are doing in these areas as 
being known as Kurdish, but in legal terms there are still concerns which can 
be extracted from emphasizing cultural aspects of Kurds—though not 
constitutional or legal recognition.  
On the other hand, the DEHAP’s declaration for the November 2002 general 
election continues highlighting economic aspects of Turkey in which it is 
claimed that all of the political parties, apart from itself, consider the IMF’s 
(International Monetary Funds) programs to regulate the economy of Turkey 
as their own program. This claim is also seen as a fundamental reason why 
people are suffering from increased unemployment, ruined industry and 
agriculture, an anxious future, and finally the dependence of Turkey on foreign 
powers in the fields of economy and politics. Furthermore, ‘Led by the USA, 
the efforts of capitalist-imperialist powers to reorganize the world in 
accordance with the requirement of global capitals’ has been the core point of 
another pro-Kurdish political party (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.5). This way of 
reading the then political atmosphere and political parties is quite obviously a 
leftist way of seeing the world. One of their main characteristics is the 
economic-oriented and social class-based analysis of a society that exists in 
all party-programs and declarations of pro-Kurdish political parties, within the 
first decade of 21st century. Where they see the solution for Turkey’s problems 
is through employing Turkey’s resources in favor of people and not of 
moneylenders and fraudulence, and through social unjustness by fortifying 
democratic regime. 
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Regarding the Kurdish question, the document suggests a solution in 
accordance with peaceful and democratic ways (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, pp.13-
20) with the conditions of abolishing village guard systems, and OHAL 
(Olağanüstü Hal- the state of emergency), in Kurdish-dominated regions.  
Before coming to the end of the document, a different interpretation of laicism 
is worthy of attention. To the DEHAP, while being impartial towards all faiths 
and strictly separating religious and state affairs, in the eyes of the AKP it is 
the responsibility of the state to protect all religious rights within democratic 
conditions, and in a state where religious and state affairs are already 
separated. The document finalizes with a prodigious argument stating that, ‘we 
unite Turkey, who has lost its self-trust because of the fears of ‘bölünme’ 
(separation) and ‘dış düşman’ (external enemy). We protect the brotherhood 
between Turks and Kurds and between Kurds and Turks.’ The reason why this 
quotation is important is that the argument accords with the claim of the pro-
Kurdish political streams as being a ‘Turkey Party’ (Türkiye Partisi) rather than 
being only a Kurdish party. At the same time, it might be a different approach, 
but still extends this argument in opposition to official state ideology in which 
‘separation’ and ‘external enemy’ threats have always been utilized as a 
counter-argument of demands of the pro-Kurdish political stream. 
The political regime in demand, is summarized in Özgür Toplum Partisi’s 
(ÖZGÜR Party) program in which it is argued that the Özgür Toplum Party 
believes that today’s main contradictions can only be resolved by taking 
democratic socialism as the basis, and a high degree of awareness of 
democracy, organization and life style. Our democratic socialist understanding 
would rely on the science and would reject all sorts of base materialism 
[capitalism], dogmatic [religion] and predestinarian [religion] understanding’ 
(ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.4). This discourse is applied in the preceding quotation 
and has a tendency to restrict Islamic core ideas, as within a scientific 
approach, religion is a dogmatic set of systems, and predestinarianism is 
something unacceptable. In the same token, during the analysis of the Middle 
East, dogmatic tendencies of countries are regarded as the nation’s 
fundamental problem, and interestingly argued that without abandoning 
dogmatism (religion-Islam), it is not possible to have a renaissance (ÖZGÜR 
Parti, 2003, p.7). From this perspective, the positivist feature of any variations 
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of leftist ideas, as in the case of democratic socialism, has been prevailed 
within the pro-Kurdish political stream. As a result of renaissance, 
enlightenment would not happen in the Middle East unless dogmatism 
(religion) was abandoned. Thus, it can be concluded that this approach to 
religion seems to cease peaceful initiatives coming from the pro-Islamic 
stream when tackling the Kurdish question. In other words, the issues between 
these two streams are not focusing on the Kurdish question, but reflecting their 
ideologies into the real politics of Turkey.  
Within the same program, official state ideology also takes its share, which is 
defined as an oligarchical system. Historical examples of the attitudes of the 
Kemalist ruling elites of Turkey towards the Kurds have been considered as a 
major reason as to why the Kurdish question has become so complicated 
(ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, pp.8-9). Within this examination of the history of Turkey’s 
politics, the dominance of the military among civilian politics is also reflected in 
the language as being a protector and implementer of Turkish nationalism. In 
the Demokratik Toplum Partisi’s (DTP-Democratic Society Party) party 
program, this issue receives a bit more space. It classifies the political history 
of Turkey in two; the single party and the multi-party eras. Being a Turkish 
nationalist is considered to be a common point of these two eras but quite 
importantly, in the second era, it is claimed that, ‘Türk-Islam synthesis, 
chauvinist-fascist focal points, and Islamist in religious orders [tarikah] type 
have found places within the state. The nationalism in terms of M. Kemal and 
Ismet Inonu was fed by western culture, while after the 1950’s, because of the 
USA’s anti-communist policies, nationalism was supported with fascist and 
religiously reactionist ideologies.’ These striking statements indicate that the 
pro-Kurdish political stream, even in 2005 while the AKP held power, thinks 
Islamism is an instrument of official state ideology against a leftist and leftist-
oriented Kurdish political stream, by considering all pro-Islamic streams as the 
same and as being a single entity.  
At the end of the section from which the above quotation was taken, the DTP’s 
intention to cooperate with Turkey’s democratic powers was only to develop a 
democratization process for Turkey. For the sake of this, it means that 
consideration of the pro-Islamic political stream as an instrument of official 
state ideology could prevent the formation of a coalition with them, in practical 
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terms, the AKP, since in the DTP’s eyes, the pro-Islamic political stream is not 
a part of democratic forces in Turkey but a part of official state ideology which 
is the main obstacle before democracy. Yet, first of all, the AKP, since its very 
earliest days, has always emphasized democracy and fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. In that case, how could such a coalition with the AKP be 
achieved? There are two options, which might present an answer to that 
question. Either the pro-Kurdish political stream does not approve of any pro-
Islamic political parties such as democrats, as the religion itself is dogmatic, or 
still sees all pro-Islamic organizations as a way of exploiting the Kurds’ minds 
because they are reactionary, not progressive, and most importantly, still 
preserve Turkish nationalist characteristics. Regarding the second option, it is 
hard to be sure that other leftist or social democrat organizations which are 
believed to be more appropriate to form a coalition would not have a Turkish 
nationalist character. As a result, positivism as a core idea of leftist ideologies 
is still active among social democrats or leftist factions, whether they are 
Turkish or Kurdish, making any sort of coalition possible within the Turkish 
political structure, but which seems highly unlikely with pro-Islamic political 
organizations, at least in order to solve the Kurdish question.  
These general perceptions of the AK Party, if looked at closely, they have 
more or less the same perceptions of the pro-Kurdish political parties about 
the Kurdish question. After explaining the pro-Kurdish political stream’s 
perceptions on the issue, it would be much clearer to see what makes the two 
political streams so different in appearance. A practical examination, based on 
promises given in the party programs and general election declarations, would 
provide an extensive arena with which to see their common and distinctive 
points.  
Practical Examination 
Compared to the first two decades of the post-1980 process, a loosening of 
sharp ideological dominancy over the discourse and official documents has 
relatively changed the parties’ focal point from leftist and Islamic promises to 
reflecting people’s demands. In this regard, the claim of the pro-Kurdish 
political parties to be a ‘Turkey Party’ has degenerated as immediately after a 
promise was made in party programs, that promise became connected with 
the Kurdish question, or the Kurds in one way or another. From their 
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perspective, all of their problems such as health, social, political, human rights, 
environmental, unemployment, and women’s rights and so on, in the region 
are said to have been caused by the Kurdish question and imperialism. Within 
this type of approach to the problems, it is hard to say that pro-Kurdish political 
parties are a Turkey Party, but rather, that they are a Kurdish or Kurds’ 
political party.  To compare, the way the AK Party’s approach is that Turkey 
has a tremendous number of problems, which should immediately be met, and 
they are all connected to each other. The AKP puts neither the problems of 
rough secularist implementations nor the Kurdish question at the centre of all 
of its problems. That is why the AKP manages to be, generally speaking, a 
centre-right cadre political party in the politics of Turkey, due to the fact that its 
electorate profile consists of people from almost all social and ideological 
groups (Toprak, Uslu and King, 2009).  
Following their different approaches to the fundamental problems of Turkey, 
the essence of their promises are more or less the same, especially in certain 
issues. The initial point should be the concept of democracy, what kind of 
democracy, and how they think democracy would help solve Turkey’s 
fundamental questions, especially the Kurdish question. 
From the Özgür Party’s point of view, as a member of the pro-Kurdish political 
stream, the state itself must be democratized in order to have social 
reconciliation and development. And then, the way of preserving such a state 
is seen in pluralism relying on multiculturalism, and decision makers at the 
local, provincial, and state level should be elected by the society in which there 
are suitable conditions so that people are totally free to express their ethnic 
and cultural distinctiveness, faiths, ideas and political structures. Thanks to 
this method, a way of presenting all kinds of different ideas within the state 
structure could be achieved. As soon as such a democratic concept has been 
articulated, the solution of the Kurdish question has depended on that kind of 
democracy in which nationalist and racist mentality is rejected, and where the 
historical brotherhood of Turks and Kurds is emphasized, and human rights 
are protected. In addition, within such democracy recognition of the existence 
of Kurds as much as of Turks, because of equality principles must be 
approved, non-governmental organizations would all be permitted and bans on 
the right of association would be abandoned. Finally, a new constitution 
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replacing the 1982 constitution should be put into operation, with the new 
democracy, the laws of election and of political parties, as well as that a justice 
system should be reformed in line with the democratic criteria. The new 
constitution should also approve a liberal democratic laicism that is 
superseded with decentralization instead of central state structure (ÖZGÜR 
Parti, 2003, pp.13-20). These requirements for democracy are all almost 
identically articulated in the DTP’s (2005) and the BDP’s (2008, pp.134-155) in 
their individual party programs.  
By demanding this kind of democracy, the BDP is implicitly criticizing the AKP 
government for trying to remove all opposition political groups, closing down 
all opportunities for negotiation and reconciliation, and indirectly forcing them 
to obey. The BDP also claims that the state has been turned into be a huge 
organizational structure with massive power and authority and thinks that the 
state has been run in accordance with a small group of ruling elites’ interests 
(2008, p.134). To overcome such a state structure, and form a much more 
democratic one, the BDP sees participatory democracy, in which people would 
be involved in the decision making process, as a path heading towards a 
democratic state. The party does this by stating that ‘improving participatory 
democracy, opportunities and allowing people to reflect their ideas, a state 
government would be created’ (2008, p.136). Within such a democracy, the 
BDP believes that local authorities should be redesigned according to 
liberalist, egalitarian, pluralist, and participatory principles. Thus, local 
societies’ individual demands and needs would be met within democratic 
autonomy structure.164 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Democratic autonomy is a current and popular system the BDP is demanding not only for Kurdish-
dominated areas in the east of Turkey but also for its western parts. Historical justification of such 
autonomy is expressed by the BDP within two paragraphs in their party program. To understand what 
they mean and what discourse is prevailing within these two paragraphs, I think it is going to be 
meaningful to quote them in their original language. ‘Tarihte yerel ve bölgesel özerklik politikaları hep 
olagelmiş, ahlakî ve politik toplumun varlığını sürdürmesinde önemli rol oynamışlardır. Tarih boyunca 
dağlar, çöller ve ormanlık alanlar başta olmak üzere, yeryüzünün çok geniş bir coğrafyasında kabile, 
aşiret, köy ve kent toplumu halinde yaşayan halklar ve uluslar, demokratik-özgürlükçü olmayan güçlere 
karşı sürekli özerklik ve bağımsızlık politikaları ile direniş sergilemişlerdir. İdari yönetim bağlamında yerel 
özerklik ve demokrasi taleplerinin giderek artması, günümüzde katı merkeziyetçi yönetim modellerinin 
terk edilerek, âdem-i merkeziyetçiliği esas alan ve yerellerde halkın karar süreçlerine doğrudan 
katılımının önünü açan güçlendirilmiş yerel yönetimler modeline geçişi beraberinde getirmiştir. Ülkemizde 
ise, katı merkeziyetçi, hantal yönetim yapısı halen varlığını sürdürmekte ve yerel demokrasinin 
gelişiminin önünü kesmektedir. Bu anlamda yerel yönetimleri demokrasinin beşiği olarak kabul eden 
temel paradigmadan hareketle siyasal yönetimin katılımcılığı temelinde, ekolojik dengenin esas alındığı 
yerinden yönetimle, yerel toplumun özgül talep ve ihtiyaçlarına dayanan demokratik 
özerklik geliştirilecektir.’ (BDP, 2008, pp.137-138). It is also available in the Party’s offcial website, 
http://www.bdp.org.tr/devam/17-bdp-program.aspx  
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As mentioned before, the AK party is also a fierce supporter of more 
democratization in every aspect of the state and social structure. The starting 
point of the AK party’s conceptualization of democracy is accepting the current 
operating democracy. Yet, it acknowledges that it has to be re-accorded basic 
human rights and freedoms, and global rule of law. That is why, in the early 
years of the AKP governments, neither in party programs nor in the 
declarations of the November general election are there separate titles 
pertaining to democracy (AKP, 2001; AK Parti, 2002). Democracy has been 
touched upon under the title of fundamental rights and freedoms. Later on, in 
the declaration of the 2007 general election (AK Parti, 2007), the word 
democracy could be seen in the table of contents, and even in the declaration 
of the 2011 general election, the concept of ‘advanced democracy’ (Ileri 
demokrasi) is used for a separate chapter (AK Parti, 2011, p.7). In the initial 
years of the AKP government, it can be said that it did not identify any 
particular ‘question’s’ name, such as the Kurdish question, but all of the social 
unrest is linked to the lack of implementation of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. In the declaration of the 2007 general election, the AK party defines 
democracy as, ‘a political regime in which sovereignty belongs to nation’, and 
‘pluralist governance’ (AK Parti, 2007, p.10). At the same time, the 
participatory feature of democracy is also advocated, but the emphasized 
methods are through consultation and reconciliation with the people as much 
as possible, rather than the people’s direct involvement in the decision making 
process via local governance—the model offered by the BDP. Similarly, the 
pro-Kurdish political stream’s demand within the democratic model which they 
offered, the AK party is seen as being also a supporter of a new constitution, 
prepared by and approved by civilians, not by the military. This results in a 
more effective civil society through changes in the laws of association, and of 
reforms in judicial fields. Differently from the pro-Kurdish political stream, it 
aims to disempower the sources of terror, while at the same time, to improve 
the sense of belonging amongst citizens (AK Parti, 2007, p.23). Despite many 
more common points in their policies, based on their different ways in which 
they support aspects of democracy, it would not be wrong to claim that 
different approaches of the pro-Islamic and the pro-Kurdish political streams 
towards the PKK, and its existence, outweighs a lot of more common points.  
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In terms of the current political atmosphere in Turkey, the concept of 
‘advanced democracy’ seems to be making pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish 
political streams closer regarding what they understand as being democracy. 
Because of that, the AK party also emphasizes significantly, a pluralist and 
participatory democracy,165 and the empowerment of local administration as 
an indispensable component of democracy166 (AK Parti, 2011, p.8), as the 
BDP highlights in the declaration of the 2011 general election. Nevertheless, 
by stating, ‘To simultaneously and complementarily meet the demand for 
democracy and security of our nation is our main target. Actual peace and 
security is only possible in a society in which freedom and justice are actually 
being provided’ (AK Parti, 2011, p.108), the AK party implicitly has 
reservations around the PKK’s terrorism when it comes to political relations 
with the pro-Kurdish political stream, but recently, it seems to have changed.  
Within more than a decade’s governance, the AK party has fulfilled previous 
demands of the pro-Kurdish political stream of the 1990s. Remarkable 
examples include the removal of the OHAL (state of emergency in the east 
and south of Turkey), changes in the law of associations and the law of 
meeting and demonstration, legal changes in torture and assault, removal of 
the state security courts167 (devlet güvenlik mahkemeleri), removal of the law 
prohibiting the broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, and legal 
changes allowing high-ranking military personnel to be judged in civil court (AK 
Parti, 2011, p.9). These improvements are all that pro-Kurdish political parties 
wanted to see changed in the 1990s.  
The language issue is nowadays the only critical issue determining 
perceptions between pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams. The BDP 
still insists on using Kurdish as its language for education in Kurdish-
dominated areas, but on the other hand, the AKP wants to keep the Kurdish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 For the full text of the declaration in Turkish, please look at the link,  
http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname2011.pdf  
166 Regarding decentralization, even in the declaration of the 2011 general election, the AKP admits, 
‘Despite all our efforts, public administration in Turkey could not be freed from its extremely centralized 
and lumpish structure’ (AK Parti, 2007, p.153) although AK Party promised to overcome strictly 
centralizsed and hyrarcical state struture and replace it with more participatory and accontibility (AK 
Parti, 2002, p.34).  
167 State security courts was representing official state ideology and charging those acting against it. 
That is why members of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams or social groups were all put on 
trial there. The most prominent case of this trial was the case of MPs from pro-Kurdish political parties—
the HEP and the DEP’s representatives were accused of behaving against an indivisible unitedness, and 
of helping the separatist PKK and those parties, as being its legal extension. 
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language as an elective course in the schools. This is in schools which those 
who wish to, can attend, and the rest of the population does not have to attend 
the courses. The pro-Kurdish political stream has concerns that without 
making Kurdish language mandatory in education, the Kurdish culture, as 
language, is a fundamental part of culture and is also important in preventing 
the extinction of the Kurdish culture, which would slowly fade away and be 
forgotten. Whereas the AKP perceives the Kurdish language as a part of the 
cultural richness of Turkey, so it is okay if someone wants to take a Kurdish 
course, but it should be optional and not mandatory. When the AKP talks 
about its democratization efforts (AK Parti, 2011, p.10), the abolition of bans 
against using the Kurdish language in media and political propaganda, and in 
opening private Kurdish language schools, are all mentioned as a dramatic 
improvement. But they did not talk about Kurdish language education in public 
schools.168 In this regard, the BDP accuses the AKP of behaving like the 
official state ideology since it does not accept Kurds and the Kurdish language 
in an official way.  
The project of national unity and togetherness169  (milli birlik ve beraberlik 
projesi), is also worth mentioning here, as the first time it is offered as a totally 
political solution within democratic ways. That initiative, to Kerim Yildiz, 
indicates the government’s ‘new and clear willingness to solve the Kurdish 
conflict’ (Yildiz, 2012, p.156). In name, it covers almost every problem of 
Turkey ranging from issues of alleviates (a religions minority group), Kurds, 
religious orders, the headscarf, to Romany and non-Muslim minorities, with 
priority given to the Kurdish question (AK Parti, 2011, p.11-12). Within the last 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Cuma Cicek’s article presents a different perspective on the limitation of the AKP towards the Kurdish 
question especially the mother tongue, by taking a political atmosphere such as the closure of the DTP in 
2009, and arresting the members of the KCK (Union of Communities in Kurdistan) into consideration 
(Cicek, 2011, pp.21-23). On the other, it is remarkable that state-society relations in Kurdish-dominated 
areas, especially the southeast of Turkey, has dramatically changed within the last decade, compared to 
the 1990s (Watts, 2009). 
169 This project was held due to harsh criticism as if it was a declaration of division of Turkey not 
togetherness by pioneering forces of official state ideology and Turkish nationalists. Due to given primary 
importance to Kurdish question, this project was perceived by some anti-AKP oppositions groups 
including MHP and CHP, military and certain medias as ‘Kurdish Opening’ (Kürt Açılımı) for refusing its 
legitimacy. To indicate this contradiction, Somer and Liaras suggest that some ‘religious-conservative 
elites’ became more pluralist but some ‘secular elites became more cynical…’ (Somer & Liaras, 2010, 
p.152). Yet, this project has resurfaced with different name as ‘Peace Process’ (Barış Süreci) after the 
disclosure of Oslo negotiation between the PKK and the state representatives under the arbitrary of the 
third state. This process is also covering other fundamental issues but as it is obvious again the primary 
subject is Kurdish question. While these letters are being typed a new reform package, namely, 
democratization package, would be declared by the AK Party government. Peace process is not included 
into the thesis because of time limitation and not mentioned neither in party programs and declaration of 
general election, yet due to its significance, conclusion chapter will have place for the evaluation of the 
process.  
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two initiatives, to tackle the Kurdish question, the PKK is indirectly seen as a 
part of the negotiation table. These developments indicate that as a pro-
Islamic political party, the AK party gradually has withdrawn its reservations of 
the PKK, while approaching the pro-Kurdish political stream.  It can eventually 
be argued that the level of democratization in Turkey assists in the degree of 
closeness between these two political streams under the political conditions 
that the official state ideology’s dominance has been reduced.  
Last but not least, the concept of laicism appears to be more or less the same, 
but indeed different from an ideological perspective so that its implementation 
would change accordingly. It is totally surprising that the AK Party’s program, 
and three declarations for general elections,170 did not have a specific section 
presenting what the party thinks about or perceives of laicism. This is despite 
of the fact that strict secularist implementation of official state ideology closed 
down two previous parties (Refah and Fazilet) within the pro-Islamic political 
stream. The most directly related statements are the ones in the party program 
under the title of fundamental rights and freedoms. It is suggested that, ‘Our 
Party accepts religion as the most important institution of humanity, and 
laicism as an indispensable condition of democracy and guarantee for the 
freedom of religion and conscience.’ And it claims that laicism has been 
wrongly understood as it actually does not mean to be hostile to religion, but it 
means that both believers and non-believers have the right to express their 
ideas and the freedom of practicing religions acts (AKP, 2001). In addition, in 
the declaration of the 22 July 2007 general election, a considerable amount of 
space is given to the Directorate of Religious Affairs by highlighting its primary 
responsibility to tell people about religion, correctly, without entering any 
political arenas (AK Parti, 2007, p.112-113). In this sense, the declaration 
admits religion’s role to organize society and its influence on social order. 
Thus, indirectly, the AK Party governments would declare employment of 
religion (Islam) among people and societies as a precaution to prevent several 
social problems such as any kind of discrimination, violation of women’s rights, 
homeless children, and so on.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 There is no section titled as laicism or secularism in the declaration for 2011 general election, it is just 
touched upon by articulating freedom of religion, which means everyone, is free to practice their religion 
in the content of basic human rights and freedoms in intended new constitution (AK Parti, 2011, p.17). 
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Regarding the Pro-Kurdish political stream’s perception about laicism, the title 
of the sub-section within its documents is quite meaningful. It is, ‘Libertarian 
Democratic Laicism’ (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.19; DTP, 2005). The next 
sentence might seem quite non-academic but, in terms of Turkey’s reality, it 
makes sense. The title and the content of the section is as if implying that 
religion is dogmatic and conservative so that people should be freed from its 
influence. The statement within the section, which is, ‘Scientific struggle 
against dogmatism and conservatism is the most difficult point in improving 
society to a democratic level (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003, p.19) makes such an 
impression.  This statement was taken from the rest of the document of the 
pro-Kurdish political parties, while most of the paragraphs have been kept 
exactly the same, as it might indicate a reduction of ideological influence over 
party politics and documents. All of the documents of the pro-Kurdish political 
stream begin the section with criticizing the official state ideology’s 
enforcement in homogenising the society in terms of religion and keeping 
people from practicing their religion (ÖZGÜR Parti, 2003; DTP, 2005; BDP, 
2008, p.127). From this perspective, there is quite a lot of resemblance with 
the pro-Islamic perspective. The section differs from the perspective of the 
pro-Islamic political stream when it comes to the position of the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs. The Directorate is accused of being Sunni and a hanafiyyah 
school, dominated and sectarian against alleviates and other faith groups such 
as yezidis and Assyrians. Overall, it can be said that the pro-Kurdish political 
stream171 in favour of classical laicism, which means separation of the state 
and religious affairs in more strict way, does not trust the Directorate, so it 
promises to leave religious affairs to religious groups, whereas the pro-Islamic 
political stream desires to have the Directorate be more active and influential 
vis-a-vis social order.  
Summary 
In light of the developments within the last three decades, it is undeniable that 
the pro-Kurdish and the pro-Islamic political streams have gone through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 As the last official document of pro-Kurdish political stream, BDP’s declaration of the 12 June 2011 
general election explicitly states that practical and legal banning on headscarf would be ended and 
mistreated ones would be compensated. It is quite indicator of to what degree ideological influence over 
their policies has changes as it is the first time a pro-Kurdish political party articulates a religious freedom 
by giving a specific example in their official declaration.  
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tremendous changes, not dramatically, but gradually, in their ideological 
strictness, with their approach primarily to the Kurdish question and the rest.  
At first glance, from the pre and post-1980 coup d’état, it can be understood, 
by looking at verbal or official written discourses, that ideological references 
prevailed in many places. It might be considered as another striking 
commonality of these political streams, because they both utilized historical 
events (Göcek, 2008) in which they were equally repressed and oppressed, 
even denied, under the dominancy of the Turkish nationalist and secularist 
official state ideology. By articulating and remembering these events, they 
reproduce their concepts and legitimize their current actions, whether they 
were including violence or not, in the minds of their disciples.  
In the 1980s, due to the extreme dominancy of ideological borders of both pro-
Islamic and pro-Kurdish streams, it can be claimed that there was seemingly 
no perception between these two groups, as if they did not think of each other. 
Using a holistic approach, without separating the leftist movement from the 
Kurdish one, and the rightist movement from the political Islamist ones, seems 
to be the cause of that. Indeed, at a practical level, it was quite convenient that 
such a perception of an intra-stream struggle was also going on among leftist 
and rightist groups, unless they did not counter with the opposite. When it 
comes to the 1990s, both political streams experienced a degree of flexibility 
in terms of ideology to integrate them into the state structure, in which official 
state ideology still held its dominancy. In addition, electoral policy in order to 
gain and then increase their legitimacy among their supporters, and eventually 
to obtain political power to make changes they wanted or fought for, forced 
decision-makers of the two political streams to get closer to the people who 
were mostly advocating orthodoxy, not radicalization, in both streams. 172 
Within this period they had a lot of common points and demands to change the 
embedded political structure, as some parts of their ideals were against the 
prevailing official state ideology so they were both repressed. In this sense, it 
is natural to make common statements against, so to speak, their common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Within the scope of moderation theory, it is accepted that the tendency from the radical position to the 
embedded political system due to electoral policy causes moderation of political parties (Tezcür, 2009), 
yet it might cause the opposite result in which democratization might cause radicalization of certain 
groups (Tezcür, 2010). Regarding to the influence of electoral participation on pro-Islamic political 
stream, Ihsan Yilmaz’ (2008) article constitutes a good discussion ground although I do not agree with 
him about the transformation of Islamism into post-Islamism (pp.51-53).  
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enemy. From a specific perspective, these common points were not enough 
unite them in the field of the Kurdish question since their ideological flexibility 
could not reach at the level directing these political streams together.  
Yet, as the first decade of the 21st century showed us, the level of 
democratization, in parallel with the removal of military overseeing of civilian 
politics, forced the parties to go further and loosen their ideological stances. 
The only legitimate way of obtaining power in democracies is with the ballot 
box. Thus they chose to get closer to the centre of their ideological stance 
rather than walking around radical ideas, and preferring to take short cuts 
when heading for utmost targets, for which some people could risk death. 
Because of this, it might be hard to classify the AKP within the pro-Islamic 
political stream as it is not call for sharia, and the BDP within the pro-Kurdish 
political stream as it is now partly approves of good economic and political 
relations with ‘imperialist’ America, from a leftist perspective. These changes 
are of course not immune from other local, regional and international 
developments173 affecting the political, social, cultural, and economic structure 
of Turkey, so there is a vice versa situation in terms of forcing each other to 
change. As a result of such a process, current incumbent political parties of 
both streams are much more eager to work together in solving Turkey’s 
problem, as it can be guessed, primarily, the Kurdish question which occupies 
a highly central point in order for this study to present how these two streams 
perceive each other.  
Since 1994 when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the then Mayor of Istanbul province, 
prepared a report174 on the Kurds and presented it to Mr Necmettin Erbakan, 
he argues that considering the Kurdish question as only a security issue is 
wrong, and social, political, humanitarian, cultural and economic aspects of the 
Kurdish question should immediately be taken into account to solve the 
problem. Since then, his and the AKP’s approach to the Kurdish question is 
‘more democracy and more freedom for people’ (Efegil, 2011, p.31). To 
accomplish such a policy without regarding the PKK as one side of the 
problem, the AKP has fiercely supported the entrance of pro-Kurdish political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 As these changes are massive areas deserving separate, detailed research, I tried not to investigate 
other issues directly or indirectly around those subjects relating to the influence on relationship between 
pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political streams. 
174http://www.dunyabulteni.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=30433  
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parties in the national assembly and forced them to accept the PKK as terrorist 
group anytime that the PKK attacks security forces. Within this process, the 
AKP cannot consider the pro-Kurdish political stream just as a leftist 
movement, but a representative of the Kurdish people, as much as the AKP is, 
because they both received a considerable number of votes from the east and 
southeast of Turkey where the Kurds mostly live.  
As a response to the AKP’s policy, the pro-Kurdish political stream has never 
approved of the PKK as a terrorist organization, because whether they actually 
regard its fight legitimate against the state repression and exploitation, or their 
electoral supports are coming from those who have sympathy towards the 
PKK. In the mean time, the AKP’s initiatives to give certain cultural rights to 
the Kurds under the democratization policy (Efegil, 2011, p.32) have not been 
enough to remove the PKK from the equation, nor to convince the legal 
political stream for not demanding constitutional recognition in the presence 
and cultural rights of Kurds and education in the mother tongue. Eventually, 
the AKP’s negotiation with the PKK began with the Oslo negotiation, and when 
it failed, the current peace process was launched in which the pro-Kurdish 
political stream is not the major actor, but a sort of messenger between 
Abdullah Öcalan and Qandil (headquarters of the PKK, in the border of 
northern Iraq). As a result, right now, even slight ideological differences 
shaping the perception between the pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political 
stream seems to be invisible and would remain like this until the peace 
process ends, whether in a negative or positive way. Regarding electoral 
politics, the eventual targets of democratization in which Kurdish cultural rights 
are crucial, and would determine the highest level of achieving their goals 
which the AKP governments could reach. Because of this, the following 
quotation is quite meaningful to end the chapter with, ‘The AKP will live or die 
by its policies towards the Kurds’ (Abramowitz and Barkey, 2009, p.121).  
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CONCLUSION  
Kurds and Islamists who have been politically active and sought to place 
themselves in the state structure from which they were excluded, have 
constituted a substantial social and political struggle since the commencement 
of the Republic. Within the last century of the Empire the social and political 
structure of the Ottomans had been reshaped by ruling elites in line with the 
western powers’ military, administrative, social, and economic features. This a 
century-long gradual change which resulted in a Turkish nationalist and 
secular state just after the end of the war for independence, led by Atatürk and 
his close associates. The foundation of the new republic continued to 
undertake the transformation of social, political and economic frameworks of 
Turkey again, by modelling itself on western states. This process can be called 
a western style modernization in which an ethnically homogenised nation state 
separates religious and political affairs through taking religious components 
under its control. Within this process, the victories of Atatürk against non-
Muslim invaders (especially Greece, France, and Britain) consolidated their 
positions as being the most eligible ruling elites to run the newly emerged 
country. The people trusted them to elevate the country to the level of civilized 
countries, which meant, becoming a western state. That is why Atatürk himself 
and the Kemalist elites after him had no trouble with implementing their 
revolutionary top-down transformation projects over people left living in the 
style of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in Anatolia.  
Ethnic Kurds, and religious elites, and soldiers, gradually realized the direction 
of the state driven by Atatürk by the mid-1920s, yet their initiatives—whether 
uprising or through legal political procedures—were not adequate to divert the 
state from the envisaged modernization process applied throughout the single 
party era from 1923 to 1946. For instance, Kurdish uprisings such as the Şeyh 
Said, Agri and the Dersim cases, and on the other hand, occasional reactions 
from religious groups against sweeping religious symbols away, occurred 
locally, yet could not challenge the state structure. These backlashes from 
both suppressed groups nevertheless caused more repression for them. Due 
to these occasional reactions, even tiny indications of resentment towards the 
embedded Kemalist state structure was considered to be a serious menace to 
the core of the state, not as a demand stemming from ordinary citizens.  
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Reaction of these repressed groups was mostly because their members were 
deprived of their primary identities, and so they even could not appear to 
express these identities within public spheres. Resentment caused by this 
condition found the opportunity to be voiced when a relatively libertian multi-
party system developed after the Second World War. Within this period, 
historical resemblance of identity deprivation seems to be the most common 
point of both streams. It was unimaginable to have a political figure, for 
instance an MP, overtly employing his Islamic or Kurdish identity within 
political circles. This is not to say that there were no religious and Kurdish 
people involved in politics, but they preferred not to mention, or could not 
mention, their ethnic origin or religiosity in a political atmosphere that was 
totally occupied with the ideas of Turkish nationalism and secularism, 
respectively. Such a political and social condition was inherited by multi-party 
politics.  
Of course resentful people immediately take the opportunity of having their 
voices heard, and thus members of these groups either attended Democrat 
party cadres, or at least voted for the party. Even though there was no 
regression from the embedded official ideology, denying the existence of 
ethnic Kurds, and repressing any religious appearances and applications, 
people pushed the state to change its policies towards these two deprived 
groups. I believe that as long as restrictions stemming from the official state 
ideology of these deprived groups are preserved, evolution and eventually 
massification of these groups will continue in parallel. Within this period, 
developments and the relative involvement of prominent figures from deprived 
groups were unsatisfactory, or they raised their demands of the state 
structure. As a result, together with the benefits of a multi-party political 
system, those who were asking for more freedom in terms of identity within the 
public and official space, mobilized their resources to increase their adherents, 
since the more liberal constitution of 1971 was put into operation, until the 
other conversely more strict constitution of 1982, was approved by 
referendum.  
The experience of these social movements (Islamic and leftist-oriented 
Kurdish) gradually emerged and became influential in social and political 
arenas, leading them comparatively to much more political activity, despite the 
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repressive character of the 1982 constitution which is the most advocatory of 
the official state ideology within the decade immediately after the 1980 coup 
d’état when the PKK as Kurdish nationalist, and the National Outlook (Milli 
Görüş) movement, formed the legal political party, the Refah Party.  
Historical development of these two separate socio-political actors of Turkey 
until 1980s have had tremendous similarities which leads to the question of 
that why they did not even come together to eliminate the official state 
ideology repressing them. Right after such question, perception comes into the 
issue which has been basic source of not having a cooperation for such a 
cause.  
Since the end of the 1980s (the PKK and the Refah party as representative of 
pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic sides), and throughout the 1990s, in which the 
legal pro-Kurdish political stream was formed, have stood out amongst the 
others within the exclusively pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish social streams. That 
is to say, they have become prominent representatives of each distinctive 
movement in the political arena. The core reason why they have succeeded is 
that they have dramatically increased their grassroots support, and seem to be 
the most organized in terms of institutionalization. Thus, their 
institutionalization, and being eager to engage with the political system of 
Turkey as a way of having their ideas and way of life heard, and eventually, to 
obtain power to make the required changes according to their core beliefs, led 
them to think about their rivals. Within this period, it is also significant to say 
that the position of the Milli Görüş movement as a prominent component of the 
pro-Islamic side, and the position of the pro-Kurdish legal political stream, 
ranging from the HEP to the BDP, have become much more crystallized 
among their co-ideologues, and also among contesting ideologies, compared 
to the pre and post-1980 decades. In other words, in the eyes of the Refah 
Party, the pro-Kurdish political stream has been considered a political party 
engaged in ethnic-centred politics with an alleged affiliation with the PKK, a 
separatist terrorist organization, and on the other hand, the pro-Kurdish 
political stream changed its holistic approach to that of an all-Islamic, or 
conservative stream, as a means of separating the Refah Party from other 
‘rightist’ (sagci) political groups.  
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Repression of all leftist oriented groups, together with the denial of Kurdish 
ethnic identity, assisted in raising the profile of the PKK among Kurds, 
whereas a Turkish-Islamic synthesis constituted a massive area of manoeuvre 
from which the pro-Islamic Refah Party benefited 175 . These distinctive 
conditions generated a political struggle among these rival political streams, 
especially those of the relatively deprived suburban migrants of metropolis, 
and also from eastern areas where religion and ethnic identities were given 
priority when it came to electoral politics. A tiny failed interaction between the 
HEP and the Refah Party (based on Ahmet Türk’s visit to headquarter of 
Refah Party in 1991) might be taken as a starting point of such a struggle. It 
was not of course a violent struggle but, as indicated in the thesis, based on 
ideological differences shaping their understanding of others. On the one 
hand, there is a leftist-oriented pro-Kurdish political stream, one of whose aims 
has been to reduce the influence of religion over society, and religion’s control 
over reason, and a religiously driven political party demanding more official 
and public space for the implementation of religion doctrines, on the other.   
Despite the fact that these two rival political streams have a substantial 
amount of common points or critiques in terms of being against capitalism and 
the official state ideology at practical level, what determinates the perception 
between them is not their practices, and critiques, but their core ideology. This 
feature shapes not only the post-1980s but also the pre-1980s terms. This is 
because of the degree of rigidity in ideology. This rigidity leads them to 
consider each other as a part of an established state structure as on the one 
hand, Kurdish ethnicity has not been fully recognized by the pro-Islamic 
political stream. On the other hand, the place of religion in official and public 
spaces is not fully recognized by the pro-Kurdish political stream. Given that 
the PKK has not been involved in the Turkish structure, the ideological rigidity 
preserved itself. That is how the PKK perceived the Refah Party until the pro-
Kurdish legal political stream was established in 1991.  
An inherited and rigid ideologically driven understanding of world has shaped 
the perception between pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish political streams. Even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175  I intentionally used the word ‘benefit’ as Turkish-Islamic synthesis has also been against the 
radicalization of Islamic groups and would rather have more conservative, if say, traditional Islam, Islamic 
understanding and of course apolitical. For instance, as Bill Park states in one of his article, what has 
been targeted with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is that ‘religiosity would offer a more conservative and 
spiritual, and politically less threatening’ (Park, 2007, p.49) among societies in Turkey.  
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when it comes to a critical approach, the implementation of official state 
ideology and a religious-oriented approach to the issues of the pro-Islamic 
political parties sometimes contradicts with the approach of leftist-driven 
(social democrats) ideology of pro-Kurdish political parties, respective of the 
terms in which one of the representatives of these political streams exists. In 
contradiction, in 1997, both Kurdish separatism and reactionary religious 
activities (irticai faaliyetler) were both placed at the top of the list of domestic 
menaces which had to be dealt with. Based on that, throughout the 1990s, 
prevailing official state ideology repressed these two rival political streams in 
the name of protecting the unity and indivisibility of the state and the modern 
secular state character, respectively.  
Nevertheless, Turkey as a part of the global nation-state system could not be 
free from the global developments of liberalization, democratization and 
integration of national economics in the international economy. Specifically 
worth mentioning, the intention of being a member of the European Union 
forced Turkey to be more flexible in recognition of existence of the Kurds, and 
to loose the deployment of radical secularism over religious-related issues. In 
parallel with these developments, two rival political streams gradually obtained 
more space in which they could operate, especially in the political arena. 
Within this process, the perception has never changed or transformed from 
one side as being communist, and the other one, being Islamist. In other 
words, asking for more democracy for their own political stream does not 
include one another, as they were still ideologically driven political parties. This 
embedded and also inherited perception sometimes led them to co-opt with 
official state ideology against each other, if not in public, at least by standing 
silent while the official state ideology focused on one of them, to repress. Last 
but not least, the final decade of the 20th century witnessed the rise of pro-
Kurdish and pro-Islamic streams through increasing their support to the extent 
which the official state ideology had to withdrawn its oppressive policies over 
them. In terms of electoral politics in the Kurdish-populated areas, these 
distinctive and rival political streams had to produce certain politics in the eye 
of their own electorate in order to convince more of the electorate to vote for 
their parties. In light of these developments in Turkey, it can be said that these 
political streams, which came from grassroots political groups, have loosened 
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their rigid ideologically oriented understandings. Of course this effected the 
perception of each other and led them to have more comprehensive ideas of 
other rivals, in contrast to having simple communist versus Islamist holistic 
views of each other, as in the pre-1980s period.  
As a result, new global and national conditions have created more suitable 
grounds upon which pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic political parties were able to 
obtain much more support by loosening their rigid ideological standings and 
ideas—or at least, not emphasizing them. Regarding the pro-Islamic political 
stream, the AKP emphasized the concept of ‘conservative democrats’ which 
meant that they are not radicals anymore, and also respected democracy, 
which once they considered ‘un-Islamic’. On the other hand, the pro-Kurdish 
political stream, the HADEP, began to extend its influence from being totally 
Kurdish-centred, to becoming social democrats, in which they believed that 
Turks and Kurds, and all leftist variations could co-operate. It is hard to 
determine whether the democratization process and global developments 
influenced them to follow such strategy, or the other way around, yet it is an 
undeniable fact that the AKP became a ‘Turkey party’ by taking a substantial 
amount of votes from all over Turkey, and from all kinds of social classes and 
ethnicities. Within the first decade of the 21st century, the entrance of 
independent Kurdish candidates into parliament, and later the formation of a 
group there, was the first time that all fundamental ideologies of Turkey came 
together under the roof of a general assembly. The pro-Islamist AKP, the pro-
Kurdish DTP, the Turkish nationalist MHP, and arguably, the Kemalist CHP 
have been shaping the politics in Turkey ever since.  
The AKP’s all-encompassing struggle with the military overseeing the state 
structure at every level marked the initial years of its powers. Within those 
years it is hard to see any initiatives dealing with the Kurdish issue until 2007, 
with the election of Abdullah Gül as the president of the republic. As soon as 
the AKP felt comparatively free from the threat of coup d’état, possibly coming 
from the military, it delved into the Kurdish question by promoting a solution 
through ‘national unity and brotherhood’ projects, while at the same time 
forcing the pro-Kurdish political stream to put a clear distance between itself 
and the PKK by declaring it a terrorist organization. In this process, the leftist 
feature of the pro-Kurdish political stream has been deemphasized, and 
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rather, its status as being the sole representative of the Kurdish people has 
been promoted. Thanks to this initiative, the once public discussions of the 
Kurd and the Kurdish question have been legitimized. For the sake of solving 
the Kurdish question, further steps have been taken by the AKP governments 
such as negotiating with the life-long imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan, the head of 
the PKK, and allowing members of the BDP (currently representative of pro-
Kurdish political stream) to visit him and carry his message to the Qandil 
mountain where the headquarter of the PKK is located (Ensaroğlu, 2013, 
p.14).  
Such initiatives could not have even been possible while these two rival 
political streams had still considered each other as being ‘communist and 
Islamist’. Taking down their guards towards each rival’s ideologically based 
organizations, have made two contrary political groups working together, at 
least on the Kurdish issue. Of course, the concept of ‘Ummah’ reduces the 
importance of ethnic differences, and gives importance to religiosity, and can 
also be counted as another reason why the pro-Islamist political stream seems 
close to solving such issues of ethnic-denial.  
The ideological orientation of each group has never gone away, but has 
enlarged their commonalities in terms of practices. Based on that, it might be 
possible to argue that most of the ruling elites of the pro-Kurdish and the pro-
Islamist political streams would personally prefer to have a leftist Kurdish 
administration, and a religiously driven social and political structure, 
respectively. Their final target might be to transform the society towards their 
lines of understanding, gradually, but not in revolutionary manner. Thus, leftist 
approaches to Islam which is believed, according to them, one of the crucial 
barriers in order to liberate people from any kinds of irrational dogmas, should 
be changed, while at the same time, the Islamist approach to leftist ideas 
should be changed from perceiving the socialists or communists as ‘Allahsız’ 
(no faith to Allah) to those demanding an increase in the value of labour, and 
equality, as well as exploitation. 
With regard to the most recent developments, the formation of another 
umbrella political party, consisting of social democrats and marginalized 
groups of society, the HDP (Halklarin Demokrasi Partisi-People’s Democracy 
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Party) indicates that immediately after the possible solution of the Kurdish 
question, the leftist ideology of a pro-Kurdish political stream would resurface 
as a dominant feature. Three MPs resigned from the BDP (Sabahat Tuncel, 
elected as the president of newly established party, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, a 
leftist Turk, and Ertuğrul Kürkçü) and joined the HDP. It is because of the 
ethnically Kurdish-centred appearance of the pro-Kurdish political stream, that 
it has always been an obstacle to cooperation with other Turkish and Kurdish 
leftist groups in Turkey. Considering that the PKK declared any political groups 
seeking a solution to the Kurdish question within the Turkish political arena as 
being betrayers, up to the end of the 1980s, the formation of such an umbrella 
political party is meaningful in terms of understanding to what extent the 
Kurdish political stream is free from the military overseeing of the PKK, or to 
what extent the PKK desires to be a legitimate political group within the politics 
of Turkey.  
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